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(1961) 
ARTICLE 
 
RETHINKING THE REGULATION OF SECURITIES  
INTERMEDIARIES 
JILL E. FISCH† 
This Article argues that existing regulation of mutual funds has serious 
shortcomings.  In particular, the Investment Company Act, which is based pri-
marily on principles of corporate governance and fiduciary duties, fails to sup-
port—and in some cases impedes—market forces.  Existing evidence suggests 
that retail investing behavior and the dominance of sales agents with compet-
ing financial incentives further weaken market discipline. 
As a solution, this Article proposes that funds should be treated primarily 
as financial products, rather than corporations; correspondingly, investors 
should be treated primarily as consumers, rather than corporate shareholders.  
To implement this approach, the Article proposes the creation of a new federal 
agency that would develop standardized financial products coupled with cor-
responding disclosure principles.  Sellers of retail financial products would be 
required either to conform their products to these standards or to explain ma-
terial differences.  The goal is to enhance market discipline while making retail 
funds less complicated and more understandable for individual investors. 
 
 
 † Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Prior 
drafts of this Article were presented at the Vanderbilt Law & Business Program Semi-
nar Series, the Illinois Program in Law and Business Policy, and the Eleventh Annual 
Vanderbilt Law & Business Conference.  I am grateful for the helpful comments I re-
ceived at each.  Special thanks to Eric Roiter and Todd Henderson for their thorough 
and thoughtful suggestions.  Vijit Chahar, University of Pennsylvania Law School LLM 
Class of 2010, provided valuable research assistance.    
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INTRODUCTION 
The collapse of the capital markets, following a series of corporate 
governance scandals, has led to a variety of proposals for regulatory 
reform.1  Largely absent from the public debate, however, is a re-
sponse to the changing role and dramatically increased importance of 
intermediaries to the securities markets.2  The ownership of public 
 
1 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM:  A NEW 
FOUNDATION (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/ 
FinalReport_web.pdf (detailing President Obama’s proposal for financial regulatory 
reform); Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Financial Services Committee Ap-
proves Legislation to Regulate Derivatives (Oct. 15, 2009), available at http:// 
www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs_dem/pressder_101509.shtml (describing 
legislation that would establish comprehensive regulation of over-the-counter derivatives).   
2 The Treasury Department released proposed legislation on July 10, 2009, the 
Investor Protection Act of 2009, which addresses, among other things, mutual fund 
sales practices and broker conflicts of interest.  See Investor Protection Act of 2009, 
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/tg205071009.pdf; cf. Investor 
Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing the Treasury De-
partment’s draft legislation in the House of Representatives).  Some of the Treasury 
Department’s proposals are included in the mammoth Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2009 approved by the House of Representatives on December 
11, 2009.  See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009) (containing over 1000 pages of proposed 
reforms to financial regulation).  The extent to which final legislation will address these 
issues remains unclear.   
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equity has shifted substantially from retail to institutional investors 
since Congress enacted the federal securities laws in the 1930s.  As of 
the end of the third quarter of 2009, institutional investors held ap-
proximately fifty percent of total U.S. corporate equities,3 while retail 
investors (“the household sector”) held thirty-eight percent.4  This 
trend is exacerbated for the largest companies; as of the end of 2007, 
institutional investors owned an unprecedented 76.4% of the largest 
1000 corporations.5  Although the market collapse reduced these fig-
ures, as of the end of 2006, institutional investors still controlled assets 
totaling $27.1 trillion, a ten-fold increase from 1980.6 
Many institutional investors are intermediaries in that they invest a 
pool of capital contributed by other investors, most frequently retail 
investors.7  The mutual fund is the dominant form of intermediated 
investment.8  At the end of 2008, even after much of the market col-
lapse,9 equity mutual funds held over $3.7 trillion in assets, ninety-two 
percent of which were contributed by the household sector.10  In addi-
tion to mutual funds, retail money is invested through other interme-
diaries including exchange-traded funds (ETFs), pension funds, and 
 
3 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES:  FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS THIRD QUARTER 2009, at 92 tbl.L.213 
(2009), available at  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1.pdf (after 
June 10, 2010, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20100311).  Institution-
al investors included in the Federal Reserve’s data include banks, savings institutions, 
insurance companies, private pension funds, government retirement funds, mutual 
funds, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, and brokers and dealers.   
4 Id. 
5
 CONFERENCE BD., THE 2008 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT 26 tbl.18 
(2008).  The report defines institutional investors as pension funds, investment com-
panies, insurance companies, banks, and foundations.  Id. at 10 tbl.2.  
6 Id. 
7 See, e.g., Brian Cartwright, Gen. Counsel, SEC, The Future of Securities Regula-
tion, Address Before the University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law & Eco-
nomics (Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/ile/webcasts. 
html#content (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/ 
spch102407bgc.htm) (explaining that retail stock “ownership now is increasingly inter-
mediated by mutual funds and other collective vehicles”). 
8 At the end of 2008, there were almost 9000 mutual funds in the United States.  
INV. CO. INST., 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 15 fig.1.9 (49th ed. 2009), 
available at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2009_factbook.pdf.  “Investment compa-
nies as a whole were the largest group of investors in U.S. companies, holding 27 per-
cent of their outstanding stock at year-end 2008.”  Id. at 11.   
9 The dollar value invested in mutual funds (including equity funds, bond funds, 
hybrids, and money markets) peaked at approximately $12 trillion at the end of 2007.  
Id. at 164 tbl.55.  Equity funds alone accounted for approximately $6.5 trillion of that 
amount.  Id.   
10 Id. 
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money market funds.  Although institutions own most U.S. equity, the 
number of households that are exposed to the capital markets has in-
creased dramatically, fueled in part by growth in various forms of re-
tirement savings, which account for a substantial portion of household 
investment.11  Tax advantages and changes in pension regulation have 
increasingly thrust individual investors into mutual funds and other 
intermediated investments.12 
A growing percentage of ordinary citizens are invested in the capi-
tal markets through intermediaries, and those investments represent 
an increasing percentage of their wealth.  Small investors who partici-
pate in the markets through mutual funds, money market funds, and 
retirement accounts may be financially unsophisticated and of limited 
means.  At the same time, the number and complexity of interme-
diated products continue to increase, creating growing challenges for 
retail investors. 
The financial crisis highlighted these concerns.  Many individual 
investors suffered dramatic losses,13 requiring them to make sacrifices 
such as deferring retirement or taking second jobs.14  Many of those 
who lost money did so because they were invested in unsuitable prod-
ucts, because they did not fully appreciate the risks associated with their 
investments, or because they received inadequate financial advice.  
Going forward, policymakers must target consumer protection with re-
spect to these investments as a distinct regulatory objective.15 
 
11 According to the Investment Company Institute, “Americans held $13.4 trillion 
in retirement assets at the end of the first quarter of 2009, accounting for 33 percent of 
all household financial assets in the United States . . . .”  Press Release, Investment 
Company Institute, Retirement Assets Total $13.4 Trillion in First Quarter (Aug. 10, 
2009), available at http://ici.org/pressroom/news/09_news_q1_ret_assets. 
12 See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1428 (2002) (explaining how the shift from “defined contri-
bution” to “defined benefit” pension plans fueled growth in mutual fund investment). 
13 See, e.g., Sam Mamudi, Wealth Creators vs. Wealth Destroyers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 
2010, at C15 (reporting results of a Morningstar study showing that mutual fund giants 
Janus Capital, Putnum, AllianceBernstein, and Invesco Aim each posted billion-dollar 
negative returns to investors from 2000 to 2009 on an asset-weighted basis). 
14 See, e.g., Adam Shell, Stock Losses Take a Personal Toll, USA TODAY, Mar. 24, 2009, 
at 1B, available at 2009 WLNR 5513140 (recounting stories of “pain and dashed 
dreams” among retail investors).   
15 Intermediation raises a distinct set of concerns with respect to the objectives of 
securities intermediaries as capital market participants.  In particular, intermediaries 
may employ investment and governance strategies that reduce capital market discip-
line.  See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from 
Control, 33 U. SEATTLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 6-8, on file with au-
thor) (describing examples in which intermediary objectives may not be consistent 
with maximization of firm value).     
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Both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Con-
gress have directed reform efforts to retail investment products, but 
these reforms have been slow, piecemeal, and often delayed reactions 
to pervasive problems.16  More problematically, the reforms have not 
altered the fundamental regulatory approach adopted by the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 (ICA),17 which relies on corporate gover-
nance, fiduciary principles, and a disclosure approach modeled upon 
the regulation of investments in operating companies.  This Article 
argues that the ICA approach is conceptually flawed.  Governance 
mechanisms applicable to operating companies do not translate well 
to intermediated financial products.  Empirical research suggests that 
capital market discipline does not adequately constrain the sponsors 
of these products and that the structure of these products and the 
manner in which they are sold precludes the operation of traditional 
market forces.  As Judge Posner, long a champion of market discip-
line, recently observed, “The governance structure that enables mu-
tual fund advisers to charge exorbitant fees is industry-wide . . . .”18  
Fees, moreover, are only part of the story—the evidence suggests that 
many intermediated investments are confusing, misleading, and ex-
cessively risky, and that existing regulation creates incentives for the 
creation of products that are deliberately complex. 
 
16 For example, regulators have long been concerned about sales agent conflicts 
of interest.  In 2004, the SEC proposed rules that would have required brokers to pro-
vide customers with targeted information at the point of sale regarding conflicts of in-
terest.  Confirmation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements for 
Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds and Other Securities, Securities Act Release No. 
8358, Exchange Act Release No. 49,148, Investment Company Act No. 26,341, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 6438 (proposed Feb. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, 274).  
After receiving input from investors and industry groups, the SEC revised its proposals 
and reopened the comment period for the proposal in 2005.  Point of Sale Disclosure 
Requirements and Confirmation Requirements for Transactions in Mutual Funds, Col-
lege Savings Plans, and Certain Other Securities, Securities Act Release No. 8544, Ex-
change Act Release No. 51,274, Investment Company Act No. 26,778, 70 Fed. Reg. 
10,521 (proposed Mar. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, 274). In 
2008, then–SEC Chairman Christopher Cox indicated an intention to revisit point-of-
sale disclosure.  Judith Burns & Kara Scannell, Cox May Revise Rules in His SEC Swan 
Song, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2008, at C2.  To date, the proposal has remained dormant.  
Point-of-sale disclosure is one of the components of the Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2009, but as it is currently proposed, the Act would require the 
SEC to conduct a study of retail investors and products prior to adopting any such 
rules.  H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7104 (2009).   
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006). 
18 Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc), denying reh’g to 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated 
No. 08-586 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-
586.pdf. 
FISCH FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/24/2010  12:01 PM 
1966 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 1961 
This Article offers a bold alternative:  rejecting the ICA frame-
work—including its corporate governance requirements and reliance 
on fiduciary principles—in favor of an integrated product-based ap-
proach:  “conform or explain.” 19  Conform or explain would require a 
new regulatory agency, the Consumer Investment Regulatory Authori-
ty (CIRA), to promulgate specifications for standardized or plain-
vanilla versions of the most common intermediated investment prod-
ucts.  CIRA’s standards would include benchmarks, as well as informa-
tion about risk, asset allocation, product characteristics, investor suit-
ability, and cost. 
Unsophisticated investors or those who want to minimize their re-
search costs could purchase compliant products with the knowledge 
that these products conform to industry norms.  In other words, inves-
tors would know that the product had the specified characteristics and 
that its fees, risk, etc., were within a standard range.  Firms would be 
free to market other products, but would be required to disclose the 
manner in which their products differ from the standard, including 
differences in investment strategies, fees, and fee structures.  CIRA 
would also oversee the sales practices used to market nonconforming 
products and would be free to impose additional regulation on selling 
agencies, such as disclosure of conflicts of interest.  By retaining the 
freedom for firms to develop new financial products while better tai-
loring disclosure, this model would increase consumer protection 
without sacrificing innovation.  More importantly, by providing mean-
ingful transparency to often opaque and complex products, conform 
or explain would enhance market discipline while retaining the range 
of investment choices available for sophisticated investors. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides an overview of the 
existing regulatory structure applicable to mutual funds and related 
intermediated investments—money market funds, ETFs, and 401(k) 
plans.  Part II considers the effectiveness of market discipline and of-
 
19 Although the terminology “conform or explain” superficially resembles the 
“comply or explain” approach introduced by the Cadbury Commission and subse-
quently incorporated into U.K. corporate law, the U.K. approach is based on the pre-
mise that the objective is full compliance with the designated standards.  See, e.g., THE 
COMM. ON THE FIN. ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 54 (1992), available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf (“The boards of all listed com-
panies registered in the UK should comply with the Code of Best Practice . . . .  As 
many other companies as possible should aim at meeting its requirements.”).  In con-
trast, this Article envisions a scenario in which the regulatory standard is a benchmark, 
rather than a norm.   
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fers some reasons why market forces may not effectively constrain 
fund companies.  Part III identifies critical weaknesses in existing in-
vestment company regulation, focusing on the regulation of corporate 
governance and disclosure.  In Part IV, the Article introduces its pro-
posal—product regulation under a conform-or-explain model admi-
nistered by CIRA—and demonstrates why this approach is superior to 
the alternatives. 
I.  REGULATION OF RETAIL INVESTOR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES 
A.  Mutual Funds 
A mutual fund is a pooled investment vehicle,20 regulated by the 
SEC pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA).21  Mutual 
funds are typically organized as corporations or business trusts under 
state law.22  The ICA requires a mutual fund, whether or not it is orga-
nized as a corporation, to have a board of directors or trustees elected 
by the shareholders and consisting of at least forty percent independent 
directors.23  Certain SEC exemptive rules extend the ICA’s indepen-
dence requirement; to qualify for these exemptions, fund boards must 
have a majority of independent directors.24  The board is responsible 
 
20 The SEC explains that “[a] mutual fund is a company that pools money from 
many investors and invests the money in stocks, bonds, short-term money-market in-
struments, or other securities.”  SEC, Mutual Funds, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ 
mutfund.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
21 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64.  In addition to mutual funds, the ICA regulates other 
types of pooled investment vehicles.  The term “investment company” includes closed-
end funds and unit-investment trusts.  See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (defining “investment com-
pany”).  The details of mutual fund regulation under the ICA are extensive.  Additional 
components not detailed in this Article include regulation of mutual fund investments, 
conflicts of interest, pricing requirements, and standardized terms for redeemability, as 
well as relatively new requirements that mutual funds disclose their voting in portfolio 
companies.  For a more comprehensive discussion of mutual fund regulation, see TAMAR 
FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION (3d ed. 2005).     
22 The ICA permits a mutual fund to be organized as “a corporation, a partnership, 
an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, a fund, or any organized group of persons 
whether incorporated or not . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(8).  As Philip Newman explains, 
prior to 1988, some mutual funds were organized as limited partnerships, but changes to 
tax law eliminated the practicality of that business structure.  Philip H. Newman, Legal 
Considerations in Forming a Mutual Fund, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, July 16-18, 2008, at 7, 
9, available at WL SP019 ALI-ABA 7.  Today most mutual funds are organized as Massa-
chusetts business trusts, Delaware statutory trusts, or Maryland corporations.  Id.   
23 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a). 
24 See Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 7932, Exchange Act Release No. 43,786, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734, 3736 ( Jan. 16, 2001) (codified as amended at scattered 
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for approving the fund’s contract with its investment advisor,25 pricing 
the fund’s assets,26 and overseeing compliance with the fund’s invest-
ment policies.27  The ICA also vests shareholders with the right to vote 
on alterations to the advisory contract (such as fee increases)28 and cer-
tain changes to the fund’s investment objectives or policies.29 
The mutual fund is a distinct legal entity that holds title to the 
fund’s assets, but the fund itself is simply a pool of liquid assets with 
no independent operations or employees.  Mutual funds are typically 
managed externally.  An investment advisor makes the fund’s invest-
ment and trading decisions pursuant to an advisory contract.  The 
mutual fund procures other services, such as custodian services and 
recordkeeping, through third party contracts. 
The SEC has sought to protect the relatively unsophisticated in-
vestors who purchase mutual funds through variations on its tradi-
tional disclosure-based approach.  Mutual funds are required to regis-
ter with the SEC30 and provide disclosure to investors akin to that 
provided by public companies, both at the time of an initial sale and 
on a periodic basis.31 
Although these rules have undergone frequent modifications, the 
basic structure requires that investors receive disclosure at the time of 
purchase through a statutory prospectus.  Under rules adopted in 
2009, the information that the SEC views as most important must be 
included in a “summary prospectus,” which appears at the front of the 
mutual fund prospectus.32  This information, which must be disclosed 
 
parts of 17 C.F.R.) (requiring, among other things, that fund boards have a majority of 
independent directors for the funds to qualify for certain exemptive rules).  In 2004, 
the SEC amended its rules to require funds relying on these exemptions to have 
boards with at least seventy-five percent independent directors.  Investment Company 
Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 
46,381, 46,389 (Sept. 7, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).  The Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit invalidated this rule in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 
412 F.3d 133, 144-45 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
25 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c).   
26 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2009).  
27 See Inv. Co. Inst., Overview of Mutual Fund Governance, http://www.ici.org/ 
idc/policy/overview_fund_gov_idc (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (“In fulfilling their over-
sight responsibilities, directors seek to ensure that the adviser is managing the fund in 
a manner consistent with the fund’s stated investment objectives.”). 
28 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a). 
29 Id. § 80a-13(a).   
30 Id. § 80a-7(a), a-8. 
31 Id. § 80a-29(a)–(b) (requiring periodic disclosure).   
32 See Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered 
Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8998, In-
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in a standardized order and form, includes “(1) [i]nvestment objec-
tives; (2) costs; (3) principal investment strategies, risks, and perfor-
mance; (4) investment advisers and portfolio managers; (5) brief pur-
chase and sale and tax information; and (6) financial intermediary 
compensation.”33  The rules permit a mutual fund to satisfy the pros-
pectus-delivery requirement with a summary prospectus as long as it 
posts the full statutory prospectus on its website.34  The SEC appears to 
believe that the summary prospectus, which it expects to consist of 
three to four pages, will provide investors with sufficient information 
to make an informed investment decision.35 
The full statutory prospectus contains more detailed disclosure 
about the items in the summary prospectus, financial highlights, and 
additional information about the portfolio manager.36  The prospectus 
is supplemented by a third document, the Statement of Additional In-
formation (SAI), which contains, according to the SEC, information 
that “is not necessarily needed by investors to make an informed in-
vestment decision, but that some investors find useful.”37  Among the 
categories of information contained in the SAI, but not the prospectus, 
are information about the compensation of the portfolio manager, in-
formation about service providers, certain fund investment policies 
(such as a fund’s derivative policy), and the brokerage commissions 
 
vestment Company Act Release No. 28,584, 74 Fed. Reg. 4546, 4549 ( Jan. 26, 2009) (to 
be codified at scattered parts of 17 C.F.R) [hereinafter Summary Prospectus Rule] 
(stating that the summary prospectus contains “key information that is important to an 
informed investment decision”).  The SEC adopted the current rule in response to 
complaints that mutual fund prospectuses were too long and difficult for investors to 
use.  See id. at 4547.  Discussing the revised disclosure requirements, the director of the 
SEC’s Division of Investment Management stated that “[m]any investors often find 
current fund prospectuses to be lengthy, legalistic and confusing.  This mutual fund 
disclosure framework will provide information that is easier to use and more readily 
accessible, while retaining the comprehensive quality of the mutual fund information 
available today.”  Press Release, SEC, SEC Improves Disclosure for Mutual Fund Inves-
tors (Nov. 19, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-275.htm. 
33 Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 32, at 4552.   
34 Id. at 4559-60.    
35 Id. at 4549. 
36 See id. at 4552-58 (describing additional prospectus requirements). 
37 SEC, Information Available to Investment Company Shareholders, http:// 
www.sec.gov/answers/mfinfo.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (“The SAI generally in-
cludes the fund’s financial statements and information (or additional information) 
about:  the history of the fund; some fund policies (such as on borrowing and concen-
tration policies); officers, directors and persons who control the fund; investment advi-
sory and other services; brokerage commissions; tax matters; and performance meas-
ures, such as, average annual total return.”). 
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paid by the fund.38  Funds are not required to deliver the statutory 
prospectus or SAI to investors, but these documents must be available 
upon request and without charge.  New rules require that funds post 
these documents on the Internet and use available technology to make 
the documents user-friendly.39 
Like public operating companies, mutual funds are also subject to 
periodic disclosure requirements.  Mutual funds must file a form N-Q 
with the SEC on a quarterly basis40 and must provide annual and se-
miannual reports to shareholders.41  Shareholder reports must include 
significant portfolio holdings, fund financial statements with an ex-
planation of relevant accounting treatments, and detailed perfor-
mance information.42  Funds are also required to include a manage-
ment discussion of fund performance (MDFP), which is analogous to 
the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) required in the an-
nual report of a public operating company.43  As the SEC explains, the 
MDFP requires the fund “to provide substantive discussion of the fac-
tors that affected the fund’s performance during the reporting pe-
riod.”44  Finally, funds must disclose the manner in which they have 
voted their portfolio securities on Form N-PX, which they file annually 
with the SEC.45 
The ICA also imposes substantive regulation on mutual funds.  
Funds are restricted in their use of leverage.46  This limitation extends 
 
38 Id. 
39 See Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 32, at 4566-69 (describing technology 
requirements, including that fund filings contain hyperlinks to enable investors to 
move easily between documents). 
40 See Form N-Q, 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.332, 274.130 (2009) (providing the form invest-
ment companies use to file schedules of portfolio holdings for first and third quarters). 
41 See Form N-CSR, 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.331, 274.128 (providing the form investment 
companies use to file certified semiannual shareholder reports). 
42 See, e.g., Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered 
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8393, Exchange Act 
Release No. 49,333, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,372, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,244, 
11,248 (Mar. 9, 2004) (codified as amended in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.) (adopting 
a requirement that funds disclose a summary portfolio schedule to shareholders and 
provide a complete portfolio schedule, free of charge, upon request).   
43 Id. at 11,254.  The fund’s principal executive and financial officers must certify 
the MDFP, pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Rule 30a-2.  Id.  
44 Id. 
45 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-4 (“Every registered management investment compa-
ny . . . shall file an annual report . . . containing the registrant’s proxy voting record for 
the most recent twelve-month period . . . .”); see also Form N-PX, 17 C.F.R. § 274.129 
(providing the form for funds to disclose their proxy voting record). 
46 See Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC, Investment Company Act 
of 1940:  Regulatory Gap Between Paradigm and Reality?, Address at the American Bar 
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to short selling, which the SEC views as borrowing.47  Funds are limited 
to holding a maximum of fifteen percent of their portfolios in illiquid 
assets48 and are also regulated in their use of options and other deriva-
tive products.49  Funds must disclose their use of these investment 
techniques—both in their names and in the descriptions of their in-
vestment policies—and must “cover [their] position[s] with segre-
gated assets or an offsetting hedge.”50 
Investment companies typically compensate their advisors with a 
percentage of assets under management.  An asset-based fee structure 
may include breakpoints, in which the percentage paid decreases at 
specified fund asset levels.51  Although funds may compensate their 
advisors based on performance, the ICA prohibits the general use of 
incentive fee structures.52  Rather, the only type of performance fee 
 
Association Spring Meeting (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/2009/spch041709ajd.htm (describing the ICA requirement that mutual funds 
maintain an asset coverage ratio of 300%).  The ICA explicitly limits the ability of a mu-
tual fund to issue senior securities.  15 U.S.C. 80a-18(f)(1) (2006).  The SEC has consis-
tently interpreted borrowing as analogous to issuing senior securities, in violation of Sec-
tion 18.  See, e.g., Securities Trading Practices of Registered Investment Companies, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 10,666, 44 Fed. Reg. 25,128, 25,129 (Apr. 27, 1979) 
(“Section 18(f)(1) . . . by implication . . . treats all borrowings as senior securities.”). 
47 See, e.g., Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC, Remarks Before the 
4th Annual Hedge Funds and Alternative Investments Conference (May 23, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch052307ajd.htm (explaining that mu-
tual fund regulatory limits allow “funds to leverage up to one-third the value of their as-
sets and to engage in short sales as high as 50% of assets”).  These limitations led to the 
creation of so-called 130/30 funds, which use a long/short trading strategy while con-
forming to the limitation on leverage by selling short $30 worth of assets for every $130 
invested long.  See, e.g., David Blitz, 130/30 Investing:  Just Another Hype or Here to Stay? 
2 (May 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1132940 (explaining the development and use of 130/30 funds).   
48 Revisions of Guidelines to Form N-1A, Securities Act Release No. 6927, Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 18,612, 57 Fed. Reg. 9828, 9828 (Mar. 20, 1992). 
49 See Donohue, supra note 46 (identifying provisions regulating the use of derivatives). 
50 Id. 
51 Breakpoint fees are designed to enable the mutual fund to capture some of the 
economies of scale associated with providing advisory services to a larger fund.  On a per-
centage basis, a large fund should be cheaper to operate than a small fund, and a break-
point fee requires the advisor to share some of these savings with the fund.  See SEC, 
Breakpoints, http://www.sec.gov/answers/breakpt.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (ex-
plaining breakpoint fees). 
52 The prohibition is contained in section 205 of the Investment Advisors Act, 
which regulates the compensation of an advisor to an investment company.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (2006) (prohibiting the use of “compensation to the investment 
adviser on the basis of a share of capital gains upon or capital appreciation of the 
funds”); see generally Factors to be Considered in Connection with Investment Company 
Advisory Contracts Containing Incentive Arrangements, Investment Company Act Re-
lease No. 7113, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 315, 37 Fed. Reg. 7690 (Apr. 6, 
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permitted is a “fulcrum” fee.53  A fulcrum fee is based on the fund’s 
performance relative to a designated index and is adjusted depending 
upon whether the fund outperforms or underperforms the index.54  
Critically, the fulcrum fee must be symmetrical—the downward ad-
justment for underperformance must be the same as the upward ad-
justment for outperformance.55 
Policymakers have long expressed concern about the potential for 
excessive mutual fund fees and the inability of market forces to con-
strain those fees adequately.  In 1966, the SEC submitted a report to 
Congress identifying excessive costs to mutual fund investors as a criti-
cal issue requiring Congress’s attention.56  In particular, the SEC 
noted that “neither competition nor the ‘few elementary safeguards’ 
against conflict of interest deemed sufficient in 1940 and contained in 
the Investment Company Act, presently provide” adequate protection 
against “excessive costs in the acquisition and management of [mutual 
fund] investments.”57  The SEC noted a particular problem with re-
spect to small investments by “family men of moderate income,” who 
were charged front-end loads of as much as fifty percent of their first 
year’s investment.58 
Congress responded to these concerns with the Investment Com-
pany Amendments Act of 1970, amending the ICA to strengthen fee-
related disclosure and oversight of fees by the board of directors.59  
Congress required that forty percent of directors be independent60 
and that those directors act independently to evaluate and approve 
the fund’s contract with its investment advisor.61  Congress also im-
 
1972) (describing the regulation and the assessment of an appropriate fulcrum fee).  
An exemption is available to mutual funds that limit their investors to “qualified 
clients.”  17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(a) (2009).  Qualified clients include natural persons 
with a net worth of more than $1.5 million.  17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d)(1)(ii)(A) (2009). 
53 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2) (permitting a contract that “provides for compensa-
tion based on the asset value of the company or fund under management averaged 
over a specified period and increasing and decreasing proportionately with the in-
vestment performance of the company or fund over a specified period in relation to 
the investment record of an appropriate index of securities prices”). 
54 Id.  
55 Id. 
56 SEC Submits Report to Congress on Investment Companies, Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 4766 (Dec. 2, 1966), available at 1966 SEC LEXIS 377.   
57 Id. at *4. 
58 Id. at *5-6. 
59 Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.).  
60 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2006). 
61 Id. § 80a–15(c). 
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posed, in section 36(b) of the ICA, a fiduciary duty upon investment 
advisors in connection with their compensation.62 
The SEC, in turn, has engaged in a variety of rulemaking and ad-
ministrative decisions addressing fee disclosure and regulation of fee 
types, including loads and 12b-1 fees, as well as regulation of fund ad-
vertising.63 The SEC describes its goal as “eliminating impediments to 
vigorous price competition, increasing investor understanding of total 
investment costs, promoting cost comparability among funds, and eas-
ing restrictions so that funds may experiment with distribution ar-
rangements that make costs more explicit.”64  Today, mutual funds must 
disclose all fees borne by investors in a standardized tabular format.65 
Despite these actions, critics continue to attack mutual fund fees 
as excessive.  Advisory fees—the fees funds pay to their investment ad-
visors—have received particular criticism.  The SEC observed that be-
tween 1959 and 1966, fund shareholders brought over fifty lawsuits 
against their mutual fund advisors challenging the size of the advisory 
fees paid.66  Fee litigation has continued to the present day. 
On March 30, 2010, the Supreme Court announced the appropri-
ate test for evaluating investor claims of excessive advisory fees under 
section 36(b) of the ICA.67  Most lower courts interpreting section 
36(b) had applied the test, articulated in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch As-
 
62  Section 36(b) provides, in pertinent part, the following: 
For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a registered in-
vestment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the 
receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid 
by such registered investment company or by the security holders thereof, to 
such investment adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser. 
Id. § 80a-35(b). 
63 See DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, PROTECTING INVESTORS:  A HALF CENTURY OF IN-
VESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 293-98 (1992) (describing various SEC initiatives to 
regulate mutual fund fees).  
64 Id. at 297.  Fee disclosure remains imperfect, however.  See infra Section III.B. 
(discussing the limited transparency associated with fee disclosure).   
65 See, e.g., SEC Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Regis-
tered Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8393, Exchange 
Act Release No. 49,333, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,372, 69 Fed. Reg. 
11,244, 11,246-48 (Mar. 9, 2004) (codified as amended at scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.) 
(updating and standardizing fee disclosure requirements); SEC, Invest Wisely:  Mutual 
Funds, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (de-
scribing shareholder fees and SEC disclosure rules). 
66 SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. 
Rep. No. 89-2337, at 83 (1966), as reprinted in FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 21, at 213. 
67 Jones v. Harris Assocs., No. 08-586 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010), http:// 
www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-586.pdf.  
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set Management, Inc., that for an advisory fee to violate the statute, “the 
adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large 
that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and 
could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”68  Gar-
tenberg was premised on the concern that competition among fund ad-
visors may be “virtually non-existent.”69 
The Seventh Circuit rejected this analysis in favor of a market-
oriented view.70  The court reasoned that because advisory fees are a 
substantial component of a mutual fund’s overall expenses, and be-
cause expenses, in turn, substantially affect mutual fund returns, com-
petition over mutual fund purchases should constrain advisory fees, so 
long as the mutual fund industry is competitive—despite the “inces-
tuous[]” relationship between a fund and its advisor.71 
Dissenting from the Seventh Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc, 
Judge Posner questioned the extent to which market forces in the mu-
tual fund industry can be trusted to produce reasonable fees.72  Citing 
recent criticisms of the market for executive compensation, Judge 
Posner observed that market competition may not solve the problem 
of excessive fees if all mutual funds operate subject to the same system 
of incentives.73  In essence, absent adequate competition, high fees will 
not “drive investors away.”74 
The Supreme Court did not fully resolve this disagreement, premis-
ing its adoption of the Gartenberg  test on the text of the ICA and its view 
that Gartenberg “has provided a workable standard for nearly three dec-
ades.”75  The Court explicitly noted that the debate in the Seventh Cir-
cuit over the adequacy of the mutual fund market in constraining advi-
 
68 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Jones slip op. at 7 (describing the Gar-
tenberg standard as reflecting “something of a consensus”). 
69 Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929. 
70 See Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that Garten-
berg “relies too little on markets”), reh’g denied, 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008), and va-
cated, No. 08-586 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010). 
71 See Jones, 527 F.3d at 631, 634-35 (“[I]nvestors can and do protect their interests 
by shopping, and . . . regulating advisory fees through litigation is unlikely to do more 
good than harm.”). 
72 See Jones, 537 F.3d at 730-32 (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing). 
73 Id. at 730-31 (noting that “fund directors and advisory firms that manage the 
funds hire each other preferentially based on past interactions,” exacerbating agency 
problems (quoting Camela M. Kuhnen, Social Networks, Corporate Governance and Con-
tracting in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2185, 2185 (2009))). 
74 Id. at 731. 
75 Jones, No. 08-586, slip op. at 17. 
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sory fees was “a matter for Congress and not the courts.”76  Part II below 
considers the questions Jones left unresolved about the operation of the 
mutual fund market and the effect of that market on advisory fees. 
B.  Money Market Funds 
Technically, money market funds are a subset of mutual funds.  
Unlike most mutual funds, however, money market funds are ma-
naged in an effort to maintain a stable one-dollar share price.  In es-
sence, they seek to provide (but not guarantee) that investors will not 
lose money on their investment.  Money market funds are specially 
regulated by the SEC.  SEC Rule 2a-7 specifically allows money market 
funds to use the amortized cost method of valuation, which enables 
them to sell and redeem shares at one dollar rather than, like other 
mutual funds, at net asset value (NAV).77  Rule 2a-7 attempts to ad-
dress the safety of money market fund investments by requiring that 
money market funds invest in safe, diversified, and liquid securities, 
such as high-quality commercial paper, repurchase agreements, and 
certain short-term bonds.78 
Investors commonly use money market funds as an alternative to 
bank accounts; they provide near-immediate liquidity, as well as ser-
vices like check-writing and ATM access.  As such, money market 
funds are extremely popular.  According to the SEC, as of June 2009, 
750 money market funds, holding $3.8 trillion in assets collectively, 
were registered with the SEC, and money market funds “account for 
approximately 39 percent of all investment company assets.”79 
Money market funds have traditionally competed with each oth-
er—and with traditional bank accounts—on the basis of yield.  As with 
most investments, higher yield is typically associated with greater risk.  
Investors may or may not recognize that a money market fund is 
 
76 Id. 
77 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2009). 
78 Id.; see also Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?:  Two Thumbs 
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 698-700 (1999) (describing 
the SEC’s adoption of 1991 amendments to Rule 2a-7 in response to commercial paper 
defaults). 
79 Money Market Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,807, 74 
Fed. Reg. 32,688, 32,689 (proposed July 8, 2009) [hereinafter Proposed Money Market 
Fund Reform].  As of February 2010, these numbers had decreased.  See Money Market 
Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,132, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060, 
10,060 (Mar. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Final Money Market Fund Reform] (“Money mar-
ket funds have over $3.3 trillion dollars in assets under management, and comprise 
over 30 percent of the assets of registered investment companies.”).   
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riskier than a traditional bank account because the one-dollar-per-
share net asset value is not assured and the account is not backed by 
federal deposit insurance.  It is difficult for investors to evaluate the risk 
associated with a particular money market fund even if they are aware 
of it.  A fund’s risk is based on the quality of its fixed income holdings, 
and that quality is not particularly transparent to fund investors.  In ad-
dition, because of the short-term nature of a money market fund’s hold-
ings, a fund’s risk profile can change rapidly.  Under the SEC’s re-
quired quarterly disclosure of mutual fund portfolio holdings,80 
disclosure to the public of such a change could be substantially delayed. 
The risk associated with money market funds gained visibility in 
September 2008 when the $66 billion Reserve Primary Fund an-
nounced that it was “breaking the buck” and reducing its share price 
to ninety-seven cents.81  Commentators subsequently observed that the 
Reserve Primary Fund’s situation was predictable:  the Fund had in-
vested in a host of risky assets that offered higher yields and, as a re-
sult, paid as much as 4.04%, compared to the average 2.75% money 
market yield as reported by Morningstar.82  Specifically, the Reserve 
Primary Fund was forced to write off $785 million of Lehman Brothers 
debt when Lehman declared bankruptcy.83 
The Reserve Primary Fund was only the second fund to break the 
buck in history.84  Nonetheless, its announcement, coupled with the 
stock market decline and other components of the financial crisis, 
generated a widespread fear of investor panic.85  To allay this fear, the 
federal government announced a temporary guarantee of money 
 
80 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.   
81 See Final Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 79, at 10,061 (describing the 
announcement made by the Reserve Primary Fund).  
82 Matthew Schifrin & Joshua Lipton, Hell Bent Innovator, FORBES.COM, Sept. 22, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/22/reserve-primary-bent-pf-ii-in_ms_0922money_inl. 
html. 
83 Christopher Condon, Reserve Primary Money Fund Falls Below $1 a Share (Update4), 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601087&sid=a5O2y1go1GRU. 
84 See id. (“The only other money-market fund to break the buck was the $82.2 mil-
lion Community Bankers Mutual Fund in Denver, which liquidated in 1994 because of 
investments in interest-rate derivatives.”). 
85 See Final Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 79, at 10,061 (“During the 
week of September 15, 2008, investors withdrew approximately $300 billion from taxa-
ble prime money market funds, or 14 percent of the assets held in those funds.”); Kara 
Scannell & Eleanor Laise, SEC Commissioners Talk Money Funds, WALL ST. J., June 25, 
2009, at C9 (“[I]nvestors suddenly started pulling cash out of the $3.7 trillion money-
market fund industry, causing damaging knock-on effects in a range of other financial 
markets.”).   
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market fund assets.86  The government guarantee averted a run on 
money market funds. 
In February 2010, the SEC adopted rules to increase the safety and 
liquidity of money market funds.87  The rules tightened the risk-limiting 
conditions of Rule 2a-7.88  The changes included an increase in the re-
quired quality of the securities in which money market funds may in-
vest, a reduction in the maximum weighted-average maturity of those 
securities from ninety to sixty days, and a variety of liquidity require-
ments aimed at ensuring that funds have sufficient liquidity to handle 
heavy redemption demands.89  The rules enhanced investors’ ability to 
monitor fund risk by increasing the frequency with which funds report 
their portfolio holdings from quarterly to monthly.90  The SEC also 
floated a proposal that money market funds trade at floating net asset 
values rather than the stable one dollar per share;91 this proposal did 
not receive widespread support and has not been adopted to date.92 
 
86 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Guaranty 
Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.treas.gov/press/ 
releases/ hp1147.htm (“For the next year, the U.S. Treasury will insure the holdings of 
any publicly offered eligible money market mutual fund . . . that pays a fee to partici-
pate in the program.”). 
87 See Final Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 79, at 10,062 (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274) (explaining that the adopted rules limit risks by requiring main-
tenance of liquidity buffers and provide the SEC with stronger oversight power). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 10,062-80.   
90 See id. at 10,081 (explaining a new requirement that funds disclose portfolio 
holdings on their websites on a monthly basis); id. at 10,082 (requiring that funds 
make more detailed disclosures, on a monthly basis, to the SEC).   
91 See Proposed Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 79, at 32,716 -18 (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274) (requesting comment on amending money market 
fund regulation to require a floating net asset value). 
92 See Final Money Market Reform, supra note 79, at 10,062 (describing the proposal 
and indicating that SEC staff continues to explore this and other regulatory changes); see 
also Memorandum from Jennifer B. McHugh, Senior Advisor to the Chairman, SEC, to 
File No. S7-11-09 (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-
09/s71109-163.pdf (describing the meeting between SEC officials and representatives of 
the Investment Company Institute and indicating the ICI’s “lack of support for [the] idea 
of floating net asset values for money market funds”).  The SEC adopted a rule requiring 
funds to report market-based value to the SEC and to the fund’s board, but in response 
to concerns raised by commentators, provided that public availability of this “shadow 
NAV” would be delayed for sixty days after the end of the reporting period.  Final Money 
Market Reform, supra note 79, at 10,083; see also id. at 10,061 (“One of the most impor-
tant [procedural requirements] is the requirement that the fund periodically ‘shadow 
price’ the amortized cost net asset value of the fund’s portfolio against the mark-to-
market net asset value of the portfolio.”). 
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Fund expenses strongly affect money market fund yields and the 
expense ratios for money market funds are relatively high.93  These 
costs may be a function of transaction-related expenses, such as check-
writing and ATM access.  In addition, money market funds may face 
high costs because of the limited supply of securities in which they 
may invest, a supply that will become more limited as a result of the 
amendments to rule 2a-7. 
These high expenses are, at the moment, coupled with a limited 
ability to generate returns due to low interest rates.  Many money 
market funds responded to the financial crisis by temporarily waiving 
some or all of their fees in an attempt to maintain attractive returns.94  
More recently, however, most money market funds have paid little or 
no return to investors.95  It is not clear, under current interest rates, 
whether the business model of the money market fund is sustainable, 
in part because their expenses are high relative to current interest 
rates and in part because the flight to safety has restricted the range of 
instruments in which they can invest.96  With the huge importance of 
money market funds as an investment vehicle, maintaining such funds 
is critically important.  Regulatory interventions designed to reduce 
fund risk may interfere with their economic viability. 
C.  Exchange-Traded Funds 
Exchange-traded funds, or ETFs, are closely related to mutual 
funds.  ETFs have been generally marketed since the mid-1990s.97  Orig-
inally, ETFs were limited to tracking a specific index, much like an in-
 
93 See, e.g., Leslie Scism, How Well Do You Know . . . Money-Market Funds?, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 3, 2008, at R3 (reporting that in 2008, “the average of all money-market funds 
[was] 0.58% of assets, [although] the average for the 25 largest [funds was] 0.24%”).  
94 See Joan Goldwasser, Money-Market Funds Waive Fees to Boost Yields, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 22, 2009, at F3 (“Some 60 percent of money-market funds already waive a portion 
of their fees; others may follow.”); Chuck Jaffe, Money Fund Yields So Low That Banks Are 
Better Idea, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 10, 2010, at 23 (reporting that Charles Schwab “is los-
ing over $100 million per quarter in revenues because it is waiving fees so that its mon-
ey funds stay positive”); Laura Bruce, Look Beyond Yield when Buying Money Market Funds, 
BANKRATE.COM, June 3, 2003, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/money_market/ 
20030603a1.asp (observing that many money market funds have high expense ratios 
and funds are subsidizing some expenses to maintain positive yields). 
95 See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 94 (reporting that Vanguard was paying .01 percent on 
one of its money market funds). 
96 See id. (predicting that fund companies would exit the market if yields did not in-
crease). 
97 See Exchange-Traded Funds, Securities Act Release No. 8902, Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 28193, 73 Fed. Reg. 14,618, 14,619 (proposed Mar. 18, 2008).  
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dexed mutual fund,98 but they have subsequently expanded to include a 
variety of short, leveraged, and actively managed investment options.99 
An ETF is typically organized as an open-end fund or unit invest-
ment trust.100  Like mutual funds, ETFs hold a pool of securities that 
conforms to the terms of the ETF’s prospectus.  The pool is assem-
bled by the ETF sponsor from creation units—packets of stock that 
can range from 10,000 to 600,000 shares (although, according to the 
SEC, most creation units consist of 50,000 or more shares).101  The 
ETF shares are then sold and subsequently traded on the secondary 
market.  ETFs offer stock-like trading rather than mutual fund–type 
redemptions; investors are able to trade and price their investment on 
an intra-day basis and can use limit orders and options. 
Unit investment trusts and open-end funds are both regulated as 
investment companies, but ETFs differ from traditional mutual funds 
in several ways.102  The most important difference is that ETF shares 
are not redeemable at NAV except in creation units through in-kind 
exchanges.103  Ordinary ETF shares trade at negotiated prices in the 
secondary market.  These features, among others, require new ETFs 
to obtain exemptive orders from the SEC in order to operate.104  Exist-
ing exemptive orders have been based on a variety of conditions, in-
cluding disclosure by the ETF of its holdings on a daily basis (either 
on its website or through the publicly available website of an index 
 
98 See Actively Managed Exchange-Traded Funds, Investment Company Act Re-
lease No. 25,258, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,614, 57,615 (proposed Nov. 15, 2001) (“A fundamen-
tal characteristic of all existing ETFs traded in the United States is that they are based 
on specific domestic and foreign market indices.”). 
99 See id. (requesting public comment on the authorization of actively traded ETFs). 
100 Id. at 57,614. But see Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. at 14,623 (explain-
ing that the SEC has not received an exemptive application for an ETF organized as a 
unit investment trust since 2002). 
101 Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. at 14,649 n.316. 
102 See, e.g., In re iShares Trust, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,111, 75 
SEC Docket 1464 (Aug. 15, 2001) (granting exemptions from various provisions of the 
ICA to authorize an ETF sponsor, among other things, “to issue shares of limited re-
deemability [and] permit secondary market transactions in the shares of the portfolios 
at negotiated prices on the national securities exchange”). 
103 See Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. at 14,624 (“The principal distinguish-
ing feature of open-end funds is that they offer for sale redeemable securities.”). 
104 See id. at 14,624-27 (describing SEC conditions).  The SEC’s practice, since 
2000, has been to authorize sponsors to create new ETFs without further exemptive 
relief, so long as the ETFs meet the terms and conditions of the original exemptions.  
See, e.g., In re Barclays Global Fund Advisors, Investment Company Act Release No. 
24,451, 72 SEC Docket 1082 (May 12, 2000) (describing conditions and permitting 
creation of additional compliant ETFs). 
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provider), listing the ETF on a national securities exchange, and regu-
lar dissemination, by those exchanges, of the ETF’s intra-day value.105  
The SEC has also exempted broker-dealers from the prospectus deli-
very requirement for most secondary market transactions in ETFs.106  
In 2008, the SEC proposed ICA Rule 6c-11, which would codify the 
exemption for ETFs that meet the foregoing conditions, eliminating 
the need for sponsors to obtain individual exemptions.107  To date, the 
SEC has not adopted that rule. 
The inability of investors to redeem ETF shares at NAV means that, 
in theory, ETF shares can trade at a premium or discount to NAV, like 
closed-end mutual funds.108  The potential for such a gap is reduced by 
the fact that financial institutions can purchase and sell creation units at 
each day’s NAV.  The transparency of the ETF’s portfolio facilitates 
these transactions by enabling investors to identify any difference be-
tween market price and NAV.  The resulting arbitrage opportunity 
causes the ETF’s market price to remain at or close to NAV.109 
Traditional indexed ETFs have competed successfully with indexed 
mutual funds.  Like mutual funds, ETFs offer investors easy diversifica-
tion and transparency.  In many cases, ETFs offer lower expenses, 
greater trading convenience, and tax advantages.110  The ETF structure 
proved particularly advantageous during the market volatility of the 
last several years because the absence of redemption rights means that 
ETF returns are not reduced by net outflows during a market down-
 
105 See Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. at 14,624-27 (identifying these condi-
tions as requirements of prior exemptive orders). 
106 Id. at 14,630.  In the 2009 amendments to the ICA, the SEC adopted specific dis-
closure requirements for an ETF prospectus, including an explanation that investors may 
pay brokerage commissions that are not reflected in the ETF’s reported expenses, as well 
as information regarding the creation units.  Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 32, at 
4558.  
107 Id. at 14,621 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 270, 274). 
108 The SEC recently adopted a requirement that an ETF prospectus disclose the 
number of trading days during the most recent year and quarters when the ETF’s trading 
price was greater or less than the ETF’s NAV.  See Summary Prospectus Release, supra 
note 32, at 4559. 
109 Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. at 14,620.  But see Sam Mamudi, Bond 
ETF Buyers Must Stay on Guard for Hidden Risks, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2010, at C7 (report-
ing that prices in non–Treasury bond ETFs are deviating significantly from NAV). 
110 Significantly, however, ETFs raise similar issues to mutual funds in that their 
fees vary to a degree that produces material differences in performance, even between 
comparable passively managed products.  See, e.g., John Jannarone, Getting a Fair Share 
from ETFs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2010, at C10 (identifying differences in ETF fees as well 
as the allocation of stock-lending fees). 
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turn—outflows that may require mutual fund managers to sell low 
(and correspondingly, during market increases, buy high).111 
These advantages and the growing popularity of ETFs led fund 
sponsors to introduce actively managed ETFs.112  The SEC approved 
exemptive orders permitting the sale of the first actively managed 
ETFs in 2008.113  Actively managed ETFs offer additional regulatory 
challenges.  First, because an actively managed ETF does not track an 
index, it is more difficult to maintain transparency of the ETF’s port-
folio.  Reduced transparency makes it harder for financial institutions 
to arbitrage actively managed ETFs.  As a result, the price of ETF 
shares may diverge substantially from NAV.  Alternatively, mandating 
comparable transparency to that required of index ETFs may allow 
other market participants to identify and copy an ETF’s investment 
strategy.  Although the SEC’s most recent release contemplates apply-
ing its general exemptive rules to actively managed ETFs, the rules 
would apply only to those ETFs that are fully transparent.114 
Beyond the introduction of actively managed ETFs, the variety of 
investment strategies employed by ETFs has proliferated.  A substan-
tial number of ETFs currently use sampling and derivatives transac-
tions to duplicate the returns associated with a particular index, rather 
 
111 See REFLOW, HOW SHAREHOLDER FLOW DAMAGES FUND PERFORMANCE (2009), 
available at http://www.reflow.com/flowdamages.htm (describing how shareholder 
inflows and outflows can damage mutual fund performance). 
112 See Scott Burns, Actively Managed ETFs Are (Finally) Here, MORNINGSTAR, Jan. 15, 
2009, http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=271218 (describing the 
introduction of actively managed ETFs as a response to “investor demands for transpa-
rency, liquidity, and tax efficiency”).   
113 See In re Barclays Global Fund Advisors iShares Trust, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 28,173 (Feb. 27, 2008) (granting an actively managed ETF’s requested 
exemption); Barclays Global Fund Advisors, et al.; Notice of Application, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 28,146, 73 Fed. Reg. 7771 (Feb. 11, 2008) (providing notice 
of the requested exemptions); SEC Approves Actively Managed Exchange Traded Funds, 
STAY CURRENT (Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP, Los Angeles, CA), Feb. 2008, at 
1, available at www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/855.pdf?wt.mc_ID=855.pdf 
(reporting the SEC’s issuance of public notices indicating its imminent decision to 
grant applications from several actively managed ETFs).  The SEC had long been con-
sidering allowing actively managed ETFs but had noted several distinctive concerns.  
See Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. at 14,621-23 (describing the SEC’s promul-
gation of its 2001 Concept Release, Actively Managed Exchange-Traded Funds, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 25,258, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,614 (proposed Nov. 15, 
2001), and comments submitted in response to that release). 
114 See Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. at 14,620 (noting the benefits of ETF 
transparency in facilitating arbitrage). 
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than actually purchasing the securities that constitute the index.115  
ETFs use borrowing and derivatives to offer leveraged and inverse 
products—using debt to multiply market-based returns and using de-
rivatives to create synthetic short positions.116  Unlike traditional ETFs, 
nontraditional ETFs typically reset daily.117  Because of their extensive 
use of derivatives, ETFs’ returns over time may differ from the per-
formance of the underlying securities or index in ways that are diffi-
cult for investors to evaluate.118  As a result, the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) recently warned brokers that “inverse 
and leveraged ETFs typically are not suitable for retail investors who 
plan to hold them for longer than one trading session, particularly in 
volatile markets.”119 
Finally, since 2003, investors have been able to purchase commodi-
ty ETFs as well as equity and bond ETFs.120  ETFs that invest in com-
modities or currency are not regulated as investment companies.  
Commodity ETFs allow investors to invest in foreign currencies, com-
modity indexes and specific sectors.  These ETFs greatly expand the 
investment and diversification options available to retail investors.  
Many commodity ETFs, however, are artificially constructed through 
derivative products, which can cause their returns to vary substantially 
from the price of the underlying commodities.121 
 
115 See, e.g., Guillermo Cano et. al, ETFs, Swaps, and Futures:  Trade at Index Close 
(TIC) and the Coevolution of Financial Markets, 2009 INST. INV. J. (EIGHTH ANN. GUIDE TO 
EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS & INDEXING INNOVATIONS), Fall 2009, at 50, 50-51 (describ-
ing the use of swaps and futures by ETFs and explaining how the use of swaps can 
create tracking error and lead to counterparty risk). 
116 See, e.g., Jonathan Spicer, Short ETFs Under Microscope as SEC Pounces, REUTERS, 
Apr. 14, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE53D7GU20090414 (“Leveraged 
inverse ETFs are considered ‘synthetic’ because they use a formula of options and other 
derivatives to yield two or even three times the profit when the underlying assets fall.”). 
117 See FINRA Reminds Firms of Sales Practice Obligations Relating to Leveraged and Inverse 
Exchange-Traded Funds, Reg. Notice 09-31 (FINRA, Washington, D.C.), June 2009, at 2, 
available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/ 
notices/p118952.pdf (describing daily reset and accompanying compounding). 
118 See id. (providing examples).   
119 Id. at 3.  
120 Commodity ETFs are regulated by the Commodity Futures and Trading Com-
mission (CFTC), not the SEC, and have recently been the focus of increased regulatory 
attention.  See, e.g., Brian Baskin, Small Investors Face Big Hit in ETF Push, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 22, 2009, at B1 (describing the growth and regulation of commodity ETFs). 
121 See, e.g., John Jannarone, Exchange-Traded Funds Miss Oil Gusher, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 16, 2009, at C16 (explaining that, because they purchase derivatives, oil ETFs 
have underperformed the market even though spot oil prices rose by 54%). 
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D.  401(k) Plans 
Retirement accounts reflect an ever-increasing percentage of in-
vestment funds, particularly investments by retail investors.  Several 
factors account for this growth, including the tax advantages of cer-
tain types of retirement accounts, the move from defined benefit 
pension plans to defined contribution plans,122 increases in life expec-
tancy and improvements in the health of retirees that make retire-
ment savings more important, and the decreasing ability of govern-
ment and employer-provided retirement payments—including social 
security—to meet the needs of retirees.  Although retirement ac-
counts may be invested directly or through one or more of the inter-
mediaries described above, the retirement account creates an addi-
tional layer of intermediation and agency costs.  The remainder of this 
Section highlights the particular issues raised by 401(k) plans. 
Employer-sponsored 401(k) plans are employee-directed defined 
contribution retirement plans.  Pursuant to section 401(k) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code (for which they are named),123 401(k) plans’ tax 
treatment enables employees to defer recognition, and consequently 
taxation, of a portion of their income until retirement.  Employers al-
so receive favorable tax treatment for their matching contributions.  
The amount of assets invested in 401(k) accounts grew from $385 bil-
lion in 1990 to approximately $2.4 trillion at the end of 2008.124  These 
plans account for approximately seventeen percent of the U.S. re-
tirement plan market.125 
The applicable tax laws establish the rules governing 401(k) plans 
in the first instance.  The Internal Revenue Code limits the total dol-
lar amount of contributions that is exempt from current taxation,126 
precludes plans from discriminating in favor of highly compensated 
employees,127 and specifies the terms and conditions upon which 
funds may be withdrawn from a plan.128 
 
122 See, e.g., Paul J. Donahue, Plan Sponsor Fiduciary Duty for the Selection of Options in 
Participant-Directed Defined Contribution Plans and the Choice Between Stable Value and Money 
Market, 39 AKRON L. REV. 9, 11 (2006) (describing the shift in popularity from defined 
benefit plans to defined contribution plans). 
123 I.R.C. § 401(k)(2006). 
124 Inv. Co. Inst., Frequently Asked Questions About 401(k) Plans, http:// 
www.ici.org/faqs/faqs_401k (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).  The total value of assets invested 
in 401(k) plans exceeded $3 trillion before the financial crisis of 2008.  Id. 
125 Id. 
126 I.R.C. § 402(g)(1). 
127 Id. § 401(k)(3), (12). 
128 Id. § 401(k)(13)(D)(iii). 
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Because 401(k) plans are an employee benefit, the Benefits Secu-
rity Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor regulates their 
operation, pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1976 (ERISA).129  Under ERISA, an employer offering a 401(k) plan 
owes fiduciary duties to plan participants.130  These fiduciary duties re-
quire that the employer use plan assets for the exclusive purpose of 
providing benefits to plan participants and paying the associated costs 
of the plan.  As with mutual funds, the largest component of plan fees 
is the cost of investment management services.  The Department of 
Labor has explained that plan “fiduciaries have a responsibility to en-
sure that the services provided to their plan are necessary and that the 
cost of those services is reasonable.”131  ERISA also requires that plan 
assets be segregated and held in trust.132 
Importantly, however, an employer’s fiduciary duties under ERISA 
are limited.  Section 404(c) of ERISA exempts employers from liability 
for investment losses when plan participants control the investment of 
their contributions.133  To qualify for the 404(c) exemption, employers 
must offer their employees a range of diversified investment options 
and must make certain required disclosures.134  To the extent that the 
investment options include mutual funds, the requirements incorpo-
rate the disclosure mandated by the SEC under the ICA.  For example, 
when the SEC adopted the summary prospectus option, the Depart-
ment of Labor issued a bulletin indicating that a summary prospectus 
would satisfy the disclosure requirements of section 404(c).135 
Employers typically outsource the operation of their 401(k) plans 
to a plan provider or trustee that selects, in the first instance, the in-
vestment alternatives available to employees and oversees the adminis-
tration of the plan, including record keeping, deposits, investor rela-
tions, and so forth.136  The provider’s selection of investment options is 
 
129 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006). 
130 See Donahue, supra note 122, at 12-19 (explaining that a sponsor’s fiduciary du-
ty under ERISA extends “to the selection of investment options for Participant-directed 
DC Plans”).  
131 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, UNDERSTANDING RETIREMENT PLAN FEES AND EXPENSES 1 
(May 2004), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/undrstndgrtrmnt.pdf. 
132 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)–(b). 
133 Id. § 1104(c). 
134 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2009). 
135 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN 2009-03, DELIVERY OF A 
SUMMARY PROSPECTUS IN AN ERISA §404(C) PLAN (2009), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/fab2009-3.html. 
136 See, e.g., Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing 
Fidelity Trust’s responsibilities as Trustee for 401(k) plans offered by Deere & Company). 
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subject to the employer’s approval.  Depending on the size of the em-
ployer, the employer’s fiduciary obligations may be vested in a retire-
ment plan committee or board.137 
Existing law imposes relatively limited obligations on the employer 
and the plan provider.  Neither is required to offer a specific menu or 
number of investment options beyond the minimal requirement in 
section 404(c) of ERISA that plans offer at least three diversified in-
vestment options with “materially different risk and return characteris-
tics.”138  In fact, 401(k) plans typically offer an average of seventeen in-
vestment choices.139  This average has increased over the past several 
years,140 but the number can vary tremendously.141  At the end of 2008, 
nearly half of 401(k) assets were invested in mutual funds, primarily 
stock mutual funds.142  Many 401(k) plans also offer guaranteed in-
vestment contracts, company stock, or direct brokerage accounts as 
investment options.143 
Existing law does not require an employer or plan provider to 
maximize return or minimize fees in selecting investment options.  
Legislation pending in Congress would impose more extensive obliga-
tions by requiring plan providers to disclose to employers both the to-
tal amount of plan fees and the breakdown of those fees by category.144  
The proposal would also require disclosure of fee information to plan 
participants.145  The Department of Labor has issued proposed regula-
 
137 See, e.g., Complaint at 18-19, Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-3109 (W.D. 
Mo.) (Mar. 27, 2008) (describing the Wal-Mart Retirement Plans Committee as the 
named fiduciary for the 401(k) plan).  
138 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B). 
139 See The Economics of Providing 401(k) Plans:  Services, Fees, and Expenses, 2008, RES. 
FUNDAMENTALS (Inv. Co. Inst., Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2009, at 17 n.10 [hereinafter 
Economics of 401(k)], available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/fm-v18n6.pdf (citing survey 
results reporting averages ranging from twelve to eighteen investment options).   
140 See 401(k) Plans:  A 25-Year Retrospective, RES. PERSP. (Inv. Co. Inst., Washington, 
D.C.), Nov. 2006, at 17, available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/per12-02.pdf (reporting 
that in 1995, 401(k) plans offered an average of six funds, and that by 2005, the aver-
age had increased to fourteen).   
141 See, e.g., Emily Brandon, How Many 401(k) Investment Options Do You Want?, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/money/blogs/planning-
to-retire/2009/10/2/how-many-investment-options-do-you-want-in-a-401k.html (stating that 
most plans have between ten and nineteen options, but some have more than twenty-five). 
142 Economics of 401(k), supra note 139, at 1. 
143 Id. at 9. 
144 See Kelly K. Spors, Small 401(k) Plans Often Pay Big Fees, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2009, at 
R3 (describing the proposed disclosures).  The legislation would also require providers to 
disclose conflicts of interest such as any relationships they have with financial advisors.  Id.   
145 See id. (explaining that “employees in 401(k) plans would get a more specific 
breakdown” of the fees they pay). 
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tions that would require comparable disclosure to employers under 
ERISA section 408(b)(2) and to plan participants under sections 
404(a) and (c).146  To date, these regulations have not been adopted.147 
ERISA also imposes disclosure obligations upon employers.148  The 
plan administrator must provide a summary plan description to plan 
participants.149  In addition, the plan must file an annual report de-
scribing its financial condition and operations.150  The IRS, the 
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), and the Department 
of Labor have jointly determined the required disclosures that must 
be made in the annual report, Form 5500.151  These disclosures de-
scribe various plan features and are accompanied by schedules that 
include financial statements and information on service providers.152  
In 2007, in response to ongoing concerns about conflicts of interest, the 
Department of Labor increased the Form 5500 disclosure requirements 
concerning compensation provided by the plan to service providers.153 
II.  THE MARKET FOR MUTUAL FUNDS AND RELATED PRODUCTS 
A.  Evidence on the Effectiveness of Market Discipline 
At the core of Jones v. Harris Associates are the operation of the mu-
tual fund market and the question of whether competitive forces are 
sufficient to discipline fund fees.154  Commentators have debated this 
 
146 See Reasonable Contract or Arrangement Under Section 408(b)(2), 72 Fed. 
Reg. 70,988 (proposed Dec. 13, 2007) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550) (proposing 
disclosure for 408(b)(2) plans); Fee and Expense Disclosures to Participants in Indi-
vidual Account Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 20,457 (proposed Apr. 25, 2007) (to be codified at 
29 C.F.R. pt. 2550) (proposing disclosure for 404(a) plans).  
147 See EBSA Unified Agenda Fact Sheet, Service Provider Disclosure to Plan Fidu-
ciaries, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/unifiedagenda/ebsafall2009/1210-AB08fs.html 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (stating intention to publish a final regulation in May 2010). 
148 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021–1024 (2006). 
149 Id. §§ 1021(a), 1024(b). 
150 Id. §§ 1021(b)(1), 1023.  Plans are also required to file supplemental and ter-
minating reports.  Id. §§ 1023(b)(2)–(c). 
151  See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-10(d) (2009) (providing the form for annual reports). 
152 See, e.g., IRS, 2009 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 5500 7-12 (2009), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i5500.pdf (setting out disclosure requirements). 
153 Annual Reporting and Disclosures, 72 Fed. Reg. 64,710 (Nov. 16, 2007) (codi-
fied at 29 C.F.R. § 2520). 
154 No. 08-586 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/ 
09pdf/08-586.pdf. 
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point extensively.155  At a minimum, the mutual fund market presents 
some anomalies to those who would characterize it as competitive.  
The analysis in this Article focuses on the retail market for mutual 
funds.  As commentators have explained, the mutual fund market is 
segmented—institutional investors can purchase different funds, gen-
erally with lower expenses, than can retail investors.156 
As of the end of 2008, the average annualized cost to a retail inves-
tor of an equity mutual fund was approximately 0.99 percent.157  Ac-
cording to the Investment Company Institute,158 this cost reflects a 
substantial and persistent downward trend in fee levels—in 1980, the 
average stock fund cost an investor 2.32 percent per year.159  Fees vary 
considerably depending on fund type.160  Actively managed funds 
charge higher fees than indexed funds.161  Equity funds typically cost 
more than bond funds.162  Funds involving non-U.S. securities163 or 
small-capitalization companies cost more than funds investing in 
large-capitalization domestic issuers.164 
 
155 Compare Brief of Robert Litan et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, 
Jones v. Harris Assocs., No. 08-586 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010) (“[M]arket forces cannot be 
relied upon to constrain the fees charged by mutual funds to competitive levels.”), with 
John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry:  Evi-
dence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 163 (2007) (“[T]he mutual fund in-
dustry’s market structure is consistent with competition providing strong constraints 
on advisory fees.”). 
156 See Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual 
Funds:  Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1032-33 (2005) (examining evidence suggesting market segmen-
tation and noting that the presence of sophisticated investors does not protect the less 
sophisticated if the market is segmented); cf. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 634 
(7th Cir. 2008) (“The sophisticated investors who do shop create a competitive pres-
sure that protects the rest.”), vacated, No. 08-586 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010). 
157 INV. CO. INST., supra note 8, at 60-61. 
158 The Investment Company Institute is a private membership organization of 
U.S. investment companies.  Its membership includes “SEC-Registered funds, their in-
vestment advisers, underwriters and fund directors.”  Inv. Co. Inst., About ICI:  Mem-
bership, http://www.ici.org/about_ici/membership (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).  
159 INV. CO. INST., supra note 8, at 60-61. 
160 See id. at 64-67 (summarizing expense ratios by fund type). 
161 See id. at 64, 67. 
162 Id. at 64. 
163 Id. at 64, fig.5.4. 
164 See id. at 64 (“[S]mall- and mid-cap stocks tend to be more costly to manage.”); 
see also DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, REPORT ON MUTUAL FUND FEES AND EXPENSES tbl.9 
(2000) (comparing relative fees across fund categories).  
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The most substantial component of most mutual fund fees, and 
the component most commonly criticized as excessive,165 is the man-
agement fee—the fee paid to the fund’s investment advisor.  As indi-
cated above, concerns about excessive management fees led Congress 
to adopt statutory changes mandating independent director oversight 
and imposing a fiduciary duty on investment advisors in connection 
with their compensation.166  Jones concerns the manner in which 
courts should evaluate whether the applicable fees meet the fiduciary 
duty test of ICA section 36(b).  Although the Supreme Court adopted 
the Gartenberg multifactor test,167 it is unclear how an advisor’s fee can 
be excessive if it is set by competitive market forces. 
In a highly influential article, John Coates and R. Glenn Hubbard 
argue that the mutual fund market is, in fact, highly competitive.168  
To support their claim, they cite the substantial number of mutual 
funds; the lack of industry concentration; the ability of new funds and 
fund families to enter the market; the extensive distribution channels 
through which funds are sold; the decline, over time, in average fees; 
and, perhaps most important, investor responsiveness to fees through 
investment decisions.169  Specifically, Coates and Hubbard find that 
“holding other factors constant, investors shift substantial amounts of 
assets out of high-fee funds and into low-fee funds.”170  This respon-
siveness suggests effective market discipline over fees.171 
Indeed, by most standard measures, the mutual fund market ap-
pears highly competitive.  The industry currently boasts approximately 
9000 mutual funds offered by approximately 700 different sponsors.172  
Entry into the market is easy, as evidenced by the fact that new en-
 
165 Notably, however, a fund’s management fee is often proportionate to the other 
fees, which are typically subjected to far less scrutiny.  See, e.g., PETER J. WALLISON & 
ROBERT E. LITAN, COMPETITIVE EQUITY 79-80 (2007) (suggesting that fund advisors 
have little incentive to minimize other fund expenses because directors typically ana-
lyze management fees on a “cost-plus” basis). 
166 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.   
167 Jones v. Harris Assocs., No. 08-586, slip op. at 17 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-586.pdf. 
168 See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 155, at 153 (“[P]rice competition is in fact a 
strong force constraining fund advisors . . . .”). 
169 Id. at 163.  
170 Id. at 180. 
171 The growth of the Vanguard Group, known for its low fees, into one of the 
largest fund families also suggests effective market discipline.  Significantly, a recent 
Morningstar study found that the Vanguard Group created $189 billion of wealth for 
its shareholders over the 2000–2009 time period.  Mamudi, supra note 13. 
172 INV. CO. INST., supra note 8, at 13 fig.1.6, 15 fig.1.9. 
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trants have successfully attracted billions of dollars in assets.173  Mutual 
funds are marketed through a variety of channels, including brokers, 
fund supermarkets, direct advertisements, and sales to investors.174  
The market share of fund complexes has changed substantially and 
continually over time.  As the Investment Company Institute observes, 
“of the largest 25 fund complexes in 1985, only 10 remained in this 
top group in 2008.”175  Finally, although large fund complexes increa-
singly dominate,176 the overall level of industry concentration is consis-
tent with a competitive industry.177 
Competition also appears to have reduced fund fees.  Data col-
lected by the Investment Company Institute shows the average ex-
pense ratio for an equity mutual fund declined from 2.32% in 1980 to 
0.99% in 2008.178  Products that are widely offered face stiff price 
competition.  Over the past several years, two major mutual fund 
companies—Fidelity and Charles Schwab—both reduced fees on their 
popular equity index funds, seemingly in an effort to compete with 
Vanguard, which has historically been known for its low expense ra-
tios.179  Mutual funds also face increasing competition from ETFs. 
Yet the story is incomplete.  First, the evidence that fees are decreas-
ing is not clear-cut.  The SEC found that average expense ratios rose 
during most of the period from 1979 to 1999, although it noted that 
growth in fund size, an increase in the number of specialized funds, 
and changes in distribution and sales fees created methodological is-
sues that impeded direct comparisons.180  Alan Palmiter reports that 
“[w]eighted average expense ratios for equity funds grew from 0.64% in 
 
173 See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 155, at 168 tbl.4 (listing the twenty largest 
equity funds in 2004 that did not exist in 1994). 
174 See id. at 170-71 (examining distribution channels). 
175 INV. CO. INST., supra note 8, at 21. 
176 See id. (“The share of assets managed by the largest 25 firms increased to 75 
percent in 2008 from 68 percent in 2000.  In addition, the share of assets managed by 
the largest 10 firms in 2008 was 53 percent, up from the 44 percent share managed by 
the largest 10 firms in 2000.”). 
177 “The mutual fund industry ha[d] a Herfindahl-Hirschman index number of 433 
as of December 2008.”  Id.  Numbers of less than 1000 indicate an unconcentrated indus-
try.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDE-
LINES 15 (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf. 
178 INV. CO. INST., supra note 8, at 60-61. 
179 See, e.g., David Bogoslaw, Behind Schwab’s Fee-Cutting Frenzy, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, 
May 6, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/may2009/pi2009056_ 
885433.htm (reporting on Fidelity’s decision to cut fees in March 2005 and Charles 
Schwab’s reduction of fees in May 2009).   
180 DIV. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 164 (noting comparisons over time). 
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1980 to 0.92% in 2004.”181  Most recently, fund fee rates have increased 
an average of five percent in the wake of the stock market decline.182 
Second, in a competitive market, prices of similar products tend to 
converge.  Yet, as Peter Wallison and Robert Litan reveal, fee differen-
tials within the mutual fund industry persist, and the level of dispersion 
is surprisingly high.183  Even among funds that seem to offer similar 
products, the range of fees is substantial, with some funds charging 
fees that are almost three times those of their competitors.184  Perhaps 
more surprising, the dispersion of expense ratios in the U.K. mutual 
fund market is far smaller, although its market contains fewer funds.185 
Third, it is unclear what justifies the existing fee differentials.  
Coates and Hubbard argue that price dispersion in the mutual fund 
industry can be explained by product differentiation and search costs.  
But are the mutual funds that charge different fees really different?  
Although the large number and wide variety of mutual funds may 
make price comparisons difficult, price variation appears among 
products that are readily identified as substantially similar.  Van-
guard’s Equity Index 500 fund, for example, has an expense ratio of 
0.18%,186 while UBS’s S&P 500 Index fund, class C, has an expense ra-
tio of 1.45%.187  Wallison and Litan detail the variation in fees for in-
dexed mutual funds, which do not require professional stock-picking 
 
181 Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual Fund Board:  A Failed Experiment in Regulatory Out-
sourcing, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 165, 190 (2006). 
182 Allan Roth, Mutual Fund Fees Jump 5 Percent, CBS MONEYWATCH.COM, Aug. 17, 
2009, http://moneywatch.bnet.com/investing/article/mutual-fund-fees-jump-5-percent/ 
331641.  Concededly, these rates were applied to a smaller asset base as a result of the 
stock market decline. 
183 See WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 165, at 8-9 (explaining that the mutual fund 
industry “does not appear to conform to the ‘law of one price’”). 
184 Id. at 9 (reporting a difference in cost of almost 300 percent within a sample of 
811 actively managed equity funds). 
185 Id. at 10.  Wallison and Litan attribute this phenomenon to differences in the 
regulatory structure.  See id. (“In the United Kingdom, mutual funds are generally con-
tractual arrangements between advisers and investors; intervening corporate struc-
tures . . . have no voice in the setting of fees and expenses of advisers . . . .”).  Interes-
tingly, the size of mutual fund fees varies significantly by country.  See Ajay Khorana, 
Henri Servaes & Peter Tufano, Mutual Fund Fees Around the World, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 
1279, 1280 (2008) (explaining that the average expense ratio of equity funds by coun-
try varies from 1.05% to 2.56%).  Canadian investors pay some of the highest fees—an 
average of 2.56% at the time of the Khorana et al. study.  Id.  
186 THE VANGUARD GROUP, VANGUARD 500 INDEX FUND PROSPECTUS:  INVESTOR 
SHARES & ADMIRAL SHARES 3 (Apr. 29, 2009).   
187 UBS GLOBAL ASSET MGMT., UBS S&P 500 INDEX FUND PROSPECTUS 6 (Sept. 28, 
2009), available at www.ubs.com/2/e/us_library/mutual/sp500_prospectus.pdf.  The 
UBS S&P 500 Index Fund is currently being liquidated.  Id. at 10. 
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talent and which should exhibit identical performance.188  Similarly, 
Edwin Elton et al. find that costs for S&P 500 index funds can vary by 
more than two percent per year.189 
Are investors paying for differentiated advisory services?  Classic 
efficient market theory suggests that, in the long term, mutual fund 
managers should not systematically beat the market.190  Indeed, empir-
ical evidence suggests that mutual fund returns tend to converge to 
the mean.191  This does not mean, however, that all managers are 
equally talented.  The empirical literature is in disagreement on the 
extent to which mutual fund managers exhibit stock-picking ability or 
market timing, but recent studies identify a subset of managers who 
are able to outperform the market.192  In most cases, however, even 
 
188 See WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 165, at 121 n.8 (asserting that fee differen-
tials exist among essentially identical funds). 
189 See Edwin J. Elton et al., Are Investors Rational?  Choices Among Index Funds 1 
(N.Y.U., Working Paper No. SC-AM-02-08, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/         
abstract=1300816 (finding  differences in costs and returns despite the fact that the 
funds hold the same portfolios). 
190 See, e.g., Christine Benz, What the Data Say on Active vs. Passive Funds, MOR-
NINGSTAR.COM, Mar. 5, 2010, http://www.morningstar.com/cover/videocenter.aspx? 
id=328998  (interviewing Morningstar’s John Rekenthaler, who states that “two-thirds 
of fund managers will underperform over a long period of time”); see also, D. Bruce 
Johnsen, Myths About Mutual Fund Fees:  Economic Insights on Jones v. Harris 7 (George 
Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09 -49, 2009) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1483862 (“Regardless of the level of the advisory fee . . . any 
expected abnormal return to a manager’s superior stock-picking skill will be competed 
away by investors chasing the prospect of capturing the associated rents.”). 
191 Although a variety of scholars have studied persistence in mutual fund returns, 
the general consensus, consistent with the findings in Mark Carhart’s influential article, 
is that superior returns do not persist in the long term.  See Mark M. Carhart, On Persis-
tence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 79-81 (1997) (finding that expenses and 
transaction costs explain some degree of persistence, but that the evidence does not 
support the existence of skilled portfolio managers who can consistently beat the mar-
ket).  Carhart does find consistent underperformance by the worst performing mutual 
funds.  Id. at 80; see also HOSSEIN KAZEMI ET AL., CTR. FOR INT’L SEC. & DERIVATIVES 
MKTS., PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE FOR MUTUAL FUNDS:  ACADEMIC EVIDENCE 13 (2003), 
available at http://cisdm.som.umass.edu/research/pdffiles/performancepersistence.pdf 
(finding little support for performance persistence or stock-picking ability from 1997 to 
2002); Nicolas P. B. Bollen & Jeffrey A. Busse, Short-Term Persistence in Mutual Fund Per-
formance, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 569, 594-95 (2004) (finding that persistence in mutual fund 
returns is a short-term phenomenon); Ronald N. Kahn & Andrew Rudd, Does Historical 
Performance Predict Future Performance?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 1995, at 43, 49-50 
(finding “no evidence of persistence for performance among equity mutual funds”). 
192 See, e.g., Robert Kosowski et al., Can Mutual Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks?  New 
Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis, 61 J. FIN. 2551, 2553 (2006) (finding that a sizeable 
minority of mutual fund managers pick stocks well enough to cover their costs); Mal-
colm Baker et al., Can Mutual Fund Managers Pick Stocks?  Evidence from Their 
Trades Prior to Earnings Announcements 3 (Nov. 13, 2007) (unpublished manu-
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superior performance on a precost basis does not lead to superior in-
vestor returns once costs are taken into account.193 
Moreover, even if managers have different abilities to generate re-
turns, so long as there are decreasing returns to scale,194 inflows to tal-
ented managers should eventually reduce returns to competitive le-
vels.195  This reduction means that, although skilled managers may earn 
economic rents from their ability, investors do not earn superior returns. 
Because mutual fund advisors are typically compensated as a per-
centage of assets under management, skilled managers achieve these 
rents by attracting investment into their funds.  Studies convincingly 
demonstrate that the largest factor influencing fund inflows is the 
fund’s past performance.196  Although fund inflows will reward the 
manager for superior past performance by increasing assets under man-
agement, if that performance does not persist, entering investors will not 
beat the market.  As a result, investors should not be willing to pay high-
er fees, on a percentage basis, based on the fund’s past performance. 
More importantly, whether or not a subset of fund managers can 
consistently outperform the market, most do not.  Therefore, most in-
vestors will not be able to select a mutual fund that provides superior 
 
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=570381 (finding evidence that fund man-
agers do have some degree of stock-picking skill); Yong Chen et al., Measuring the Tim-
ing Ability and Performance of Bond Mutual Funds 30, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 15318, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15318 
(finding that a number of bond fund managers demonstrate investment ability, but 
that “investment fees and trading costs absorb the superior returns (and then some)”). 
193 See Chen et al., supra note 192, at 31 (finding no significant positive perfor-
mance by bond mutual funds after controlling for costs). 
194 See, e.g., Joshua M. Pollet & Mungo Wilson, How Does Size Affect Mutual Fund Be-
havior? 30 (H.K. Univ. of Sci. & Tech. Bus. Sch., Research Paper No. 07-06, 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=918250  (providing “evidence that the proximate 
cause of diminishing returns to scale for mutual funds is the inability to scale an in-
vestment strategy as the fund becomes large”). 
195 See Jonathan B. Berk & Richard C. Green, Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in 
Rational Markets, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1269, 1271 (2004) (“New money flows to the fund 
[with superior managers] to the point at which expected excess returns going forward 
are competitive.”). 
196 See, e.g., Richard A. Ippolito, Consumer Reaction to Measures of Poor Quality:  Evidence 
from the Mutual Fund Industry, 35 J.L. & ECON. 45, 56 (1992) (finding a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between fund growth and past performance); Prem C. Jain & Joanna 
Shuang Wu, Truth in Mutual Fund Advertising:  Evidence on Future Performance and Fund 
Flows, 55 J. FIN. 937, 939 (2000) (finding that funds advertising higher returns subse-
quently attracted significantly more inflows than the control groups); Erik R. Sirri & Pe-
ter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 1589, 1619 (1998) (finding that 
consumers base their decisions on past fund performance, but do so asymmetrically). 
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returns and will be unlikely to benefit from investing on the basis of a 
fund’s historical performance. 
Instead, as empirical studies have repeatedly shown, the most con-
sistent predictor of a fund’s return to investors is the fund’s expense 
ratio.197  Funds with high expense ratios underperform their peers on 
an after-cost basis.198  Vanguard founder, John Bogle, observed that 
“industry experts and academics have been saying for decades . . . ‘that 
expenses are the most powerful indicator of a fund’s performance.’”199  
This correlation is due in part to the simple fact that fees reduce the 
investors’ net returns and in part to the effect of compounding on 
long-term investor returns.200  Even before costs are reflected in re-
turns, however, there is little evidence that higher fees are correlated 
with increased performance.201  Despite these studies, which have been 
widely reported in the news media, investors apparently persist in be-
lieving the opposite:  that higher fees result in higher performance.202 
In sum, the empirical data are mixed.  Although Coates and Hub-
bard cite the inflow of money into funds with lower costs or better 
performance,203 money continues to flow into funds with higher costs 
 
197 See, e.g., Roth, supra note 182 (“[T]he only factor that is predictive of a fund’s 
relative performance against similar funds is fees.”).  Significantly, however, these em-
pirical studies often focus on expense ratios rather than management fees.  One recent 
study finds some evidence that funds with the highest management fees outperform 
their peers.  See John A. Haslem et al., Identification and Performance of Equity Mutual 
Funds with High Management Fees and Expense Ratios, J. INVESTING, Summer 2007, at 32, 
50 (suggesting that “higher management fees may add value to active portfolio man-
agement and contribute to improved performance measures”). 
198 See, e.g., Haslem et al., supra note 197, at 50 (finding that higher expense ratios 
correlate negatively with performance).     
199 John C. Bogle, A New Order of Things—Bringing Mutuality to the “Mutual 
Fund,” Manuel F. Cohen Memorial Lecture at the Georgetown University Law Center 
(Feb. 19, 2008) (quoting Morningstar), in 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 471, 492 (2008). 
200 See, e.g., Roth, supra note 182 (explaining the effect that compounding can 
have on returns). 
201 See Javier Gil-Bazo & Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, The Relation Between Price and Performance in 
the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2153, 2154 (2009) (“[F]unds with worse before-fee 
risk-adjusted performance charge higher fees.”); see also Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, 
Funds with Low Expense Ratios Outperforming Their More Expensive Peers over Long 
Term, Says S&P (June 11, 2003), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/ 
spf/pdf/media/expenseratios.pdf (finding that funds with below-average expense ra-
tios outperformed funds with above-average expenses “over a one, three, five, and ten-
year annualized basis”). 
202 See, e.g., Neil Weinberg, Fund Managers Know Best, FORBES, Oct. 14, 2002, at 220 
(reporting that eighty-four percent of respondents surveyed believe higher fees result 
in higher performance). 
203 See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 155, at 183-85 (finding total assets “very res-
ponsive to fees”). 
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and poor performance as well.  Investors fail to respond to chronic 
poor performance by withdrawing their funds, allowing some of the 
worst performing mutual funds to survive.204  The mutual fund market 
offers extensive evidence of the long-term survival of funds that con-
sistently underperform the market and simultaneously charge higher 
relative fees.  Indeed, the very factors that Coates and Hubbard cite as 
evidence of market competition—easy access to fund performance 
and expense information, multiple distribution channels, and so 
forth—pose a puzzle as to why such funds persist.205 
The data do not conclusively establish either a competitive market 
or its absence, but they present anomalies that appear inconsistent 
with a standard market explanation.  Problematically, while the empir-
ical evidence suggests that investors cannot outperform the market 
through their choice of funds, the existing market structure, which 
includes a choice of almost 10,000 intermediated retail products with 
a wide range of fees, offers evidence that investors continue to seek 
outperformance.206  In addition, as detailed further below, regulatory 
constraints, methodological challenges, and a lack of transparency 
frustrate efforts to assess the degree to which management adds suffi-
cient value to justify the cost associated with actively managed products. 
B.  Methodological Challenges to Studying the Mutual Fund Market 
Methodological challenges limit the ability of investors and re-
searchers to evaluate fund performance and to identify relationships 
 
204 See Jonathan B. Berk & Jing Xu, Persistence and Fund Flows of the Worst Per-
forming Mutual Funds 16 (Oct. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/department/Seminar/2004Fall/MicroFall2004/ 
micro-berk-paper2-persist-120204.pdf (finding that investors in the worst performing 
funds are unwilling to withdraw their money). 
205 Coates and Hubbard point to the existence of persistent prices differences in 
other product markets and attribute that persistence to differences in buyer prefe-
rences.  Coates & Hubbard, supra note 155, at 195-97.  Although buyers might well be 
willing to pay a higher price when purchasing a large screen television in order to pa-
tronize a local vender or enjoy the services of a full service retailer, it is not clear that 
comparable differences characterize the mutual fund market.  Moreover, the authors 
provide no evidence that those funds that charge higher fees offer differentiated services.    
206 Indeed, the industry markets these products on the premise that they can de-
liver superior returns to a low-cost indexed fund or ETF.  Compare Charles Schwab & 
Co., Actively Managed Funds:  Seeking Competitive Performance, ON INVESTING, Spring 
2010, at 33, 33 (advising potential investors “looking to beat the market . . . to consider 
including actively managed mutual funds in [their] portfolio[s]”), with Johnsen, supra 
note 190, at 44 (“It is clear that what investors own when they buy fund shares does not 
include an expectation of sharing in any abnormal returns to an active fund manager’s 
superior stock picking skill.”). 
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between performance and fees.207  Fund performance is highly time 
sensitive.208  The choices of time period and start date have a substan-
tial effect on one fund’s performance relative to that of another.  Even 
when examined over three-, five-, and ten-year periods, funds may shift 
their relative positions.  Part of the reason for these differences is that 
fund returns vary based on risk, investment horizon, and asset alloca-
tion.209  The percent of cash held by a fund, for example, can cause the 
fund to lag a bull market but outperform during a bear market.  As 
Ross Miller observes, Jeff Vinik’s badly timed decision to move more 
than a quarter of the Magellan fund’s assets into fixed income securi-
ties caused the fund to lag its benchmark by over ten percent for 
1996.210  Similarly, a substantial number of stock-focused mutual funds 
were holding unusually high levels of cash in April 2009, as the stock 
market hit its low.211  For some of these funds, the cash holdings re-
duced the impact of the market downfall, but it is unclear whether the 
cash positions reduced the profitability of the subsequent market re-
bound as well. 
In addition, because investor money flows into and out of funds 
continuously, a fund’s reported return over a given time period does 
not necessarily reflect the return achieved by individual investors who 
entered and exited the fund during that time period.212  Mutual funds 
typically report (and empirical studies typically use) time-weighted re-
turns, which reflect the return on the fund’s assets averaged over time.  
If the total amount of the fund’s assets varies substantially over the time 
 
207 See, e.g., Eero J. Pätäri, Do Hot Hands Warm the Mutual Fund Investor?  The Myth of 
Performance Persistence Phenomenon, INT’L RES. J. FIN. & ECON., Dec. 2009, at 117, 134 
(concluding  that efforts to evaluate performance persistence are highly sensitive to 
sample selection and methodology). 
208 See, e.g., Benz, supra note 190 (quoting John Rekenthaler as stating that, when 
funds beat their relevant index, “[t]hose tend to be accidents of a time period”). 
209 See infra note 350 and accompanying text (detailing the importance of asset 
allocation). 
210 Ross M. Miller, Stansky’s Monster:  A Critical Examination of Fidelity Magel-
lan’s “Frankenfund” 1 (Feb. 22, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=964824. 
211 Diya Gullapalli, More Stocks Funds Declare Cash King, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2009, at 
C9 (warning that “cash-laden stock funds risk alienating investors if the market rallies 
and they still are on the sidelines”). 
212 See, e.g., MORNINGSTAR, FACT SHEET:  MORNINGSTAR INVESTOR RETURN (2006), 
available at  http://corporate.morningstar.com/us/documents/MethodologyDocuments/ 
FactSheets/InvestorReturns.pdf (explaining the concept of investor return); see also Ilia 
D. Dichev, What Are Stock Investors’ Actual Historical Returns?  Evidence from Dollar-Weighted 
Returns, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 386, 386 (2007) (distinguishing between dollar-weighted per-
formance and buy-and-hold performance). 
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period, however, the average investor may earn substantially more or less 
than the time-weighted average.  This alternative measure of return—
investor-weighted or dollar-weighted return—is particularly important if 
strong mutual fund performance attracts investment inflows because, 
even if the return on newly invested dollars is low, the fund’s time-
weighted return may remain positive for a substantial period of time. 
Russel Kinnel offers an example:  the volatile CGM Focus Fund 
has one of the highest returns for a large-cap growth fund, providing a 
ten-year annualized return of around nineteen percent (ranking it 
first in its Morningstar category).213  It achieves this return by making 
big and risky sector bets.214  When those bets pay off, the Fund does 
well and attracts new money.215  That new money may arrive just in 
time to experience the large losses that are equally likely with a risky 
investment strategy.  Kinnel observes that while the CGM Focus Fund 
earned a ten-year annualized return of 17.8% during the period he 
examined, its investors suffered an annualized 16.8% loss during that 
same time period.216  A recent article extends this analysis and finds 
that individual investors engage in mutual fund trading strategies that 
generate poor performance even if the funds themselves are perform-
ing well.217  Even if some fund managers exhibit short-term stock-
picking skill, “it is clear that the higher returns earned at the short ho-
rizon are not effectively captured by individual investors.”218 
That a fund’s reported expense ratio does not always capture its 
total costs further impedes evaluation of the relationship between cost 
and performance.219  The type of cost most commonly excluded from 
the expense ratio is the fund’s trading costs or commissions.220  Trad-
 
213 Russel Kinnel, Why Your Results Stink, KIPLINGER’S PERS. FIN., Nov. 2009, at 35. 
214 Id. 
215 For example, the Fund’s assets under management grew from less than a bil-
lion in 2004 to slightly over two billion in 2006.  CAPITAL GROWTH MGMT., CGM FOCUS 
FUND 47TH QUARTERLY REPORT 7 (2009), available at http://cgmfunds.com/pdf/2009-
06-30-focus-quarterly.pdf.  In 2007, the fund reported an eighty percent return, and by 
year-end, its assets under management had grown to over five billion.  Id.  
216 Kinnel, supra note 213.     
217 Andrea Frazzini & Owen A. Lamont, Dumb Money:  Mutual Fund Flows and the 
Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 299, 319 (2008).  
218 Id.   
219 In addition to trading costs, funds may incur interest costs and costs associated 
with maintaining short positions, among others.  These costs are particularly signifi-
cant for funds that use leverage or aggressive trading strategies.   
220 John M.R. Chalmers et al., An Analysis of Mutual Fund Trading Costs 10-11 
(Nov. 23, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
195849.  The SEC does not require mutual funds to disclose trading commissions as a 
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ing costs are not easy to extract from a mutual fund’s mandated dis-
closures,221 but a careful examination of trading costs in 2001 con-
cluded that, for large equity funds, trading costs averaged forty-three 
percent of the funds’ expense ratios.222  A slightly older study ex-
amined a sample of equity mutual funds and found that trading costs 
averaged 0.78% of fund assets per year.223 
The significance of trading costs varies from fund to fund.  Al-
though funds may pay different commission rates, depending on their 
size or business relationships, the most significant component of total 
trading cost is turnover.  Fund turnover rates vary substantially224:  the 
CGM Focus Fund reported a turnover rate of 504% in 2008,225 while 
the turnover rate for the Vanguard S&P 500 index fund was 6%.226  
Karceski et al. found that, for funds with the highest turnover rates, 
brokerage commissions alone averaged 1.67% of assets.227  In some 
cases, a fund’s trading cost exceeded its expense ratio.228  Even index 
 
percentage of assets under management.  According to the SEC, trading commissions 
are not included in fund expense ratios  
because under generally accepted accounting principles they are either in-
cluded as part of the cost basis of securities purchased or subtracted from the 
net proceeds of securities sold and ultimately are reflected as changes in the 
realized and unrealized gain or loss on portfolio securities in the fund’s finan-
cial statements.  
Request for Comments on Measures to Improve Disclosure of Mutual Fund Transac-
tion Costs, Securities Act Release No. 8349, Exchange Act Release No. 48,952, Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 26,313, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,820 (Dec. 24, 2003); see also 
Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 32, at 4554 (rejecting the suggestion that trading 
costs be included in expense ratio).  Instead, funds must disclose their turnover ratio 
and the total dollar amount of brokerage commissions they paid.  See id. (adopting a 
requirement that funds report their turnover ratios, but not actual trading costs, in the 
summary prospectus).   
221 The dollar amount of brokerage commissions is not even included in the mutual 
fund prospectus.  To obtain this information, an investor must consult a separate docu-
ment:  the “Statement of Additional Information.”  See SEC, supra note 37.  
222 Jason Karceski et al., Mutual Fund Brokerage Commissions 9 ( Jan. 2004) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://www.zeroalphagroup.com/news/ZAG_ 
mutual_fund_true_cost_study.pdf. 
223 Chalmers et al., supra note 220, at 11.   
224 The turnover rate is typically much higher for actively managed funds, but it 
can vary for a variety of reasons, including management strategy, the percentage of in-
stitutional ownership, and the frequency with which investors enter and exit the fund.   
225 CAPITAL GROWTH MGMT., supra note 215, at 8. 
226 VANGUARD GROUP, supra note 186, at 15.  
227 Karceski et al., supra note 222, at 8. 
228 See id. at 10 (“In some cases, the total costs of trading are more than double the 
level of the expense ratio.”). 
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funds can have trading costs that vary enough to lead to significant 
differences in performance.229 
The foregoing suggests that fund costs may be higher than they 
appear—but costs can be lower as well.  In particular, funds often re-
duce fees below those to which they are contractually entitled through 
voluntary fee waivers.230  As Bruce Johnsen observes,  “forty percent of 
equity funds from 1998 to 2004 waived fees annually.”231  Because fee 
waivers reduce the actual costs below those reflected in the fund pros-
pectus, the amounts reflected in empirical studies may be overstated.232 
C.  The Effect of Selling Agents on Market Discipline 
Why might a market with easy entry and extensive competition 
nonetheless show signs of market failure?  One possible explanation, 
suggested above, is inadequate transparency.  If investors lack adequate 
information to evaluate the costs and performance of mutual funds, 
they may make poor investment decisions.233  Another factor may be 
the transaction costs associated with exit.  The sale of a mutual fund is 
a recognition event that requires an investor to pay income tax on any 
capital gain.  Investors who hold mutual funds in taxable accounts may 
be reluctant to shift their holdings to another fund because of the im-
pact of this tax.  Back-end loads—fees charged to withdraw or redeem 
fund holdings—if applicable, are another cost of exiting. 
Commentators have also attributed failure of the mutual fund 
market to limitations on investor rationality.  Donald Langevoort has 
warned that consumer decisionmaking in the mutual fund context 
does not appear to be consistent with rational behavior.234  Jim Cox 
 
229 See Anne Tergesen & Lauren Young, Index Funds Aren’t All Equal, BUSINESS-
WEEK, Apr. 19, 2004, at 122 (reporting that in 2003, eighty percent of index funds 
tracked by Morningstar “fell short of the performance ideal of a plain-vanilla index 
fund:  to deliver the benchmark’s return, minus the fund’s expense ratio”). 
230 The use of fee waivers, which effectively mask price competition, is imposed on 
the market by the governance requirements associated with advisory contracts.  Fund 
managers require shareholder approval, through a vote on a new advisory contract, to 
raise fees, but managers can voluntarily lower fees without shareholder approval.  As a 
result, the contractual rate may be higher than that which would occur in the absence 
of regulatory constraints.  I am grateful to Eric Roiter for this observation.   
231 Johnsen, supra note 190, at 36. 
232 See, e.g., Gil-Bazo & Ruiz-Verdú, supra note 201, at 2155 n.3 (acknowledging 
that, because of fee waivers, “the loads typically reported in databases . . . can often 
overestimate effective loads”). 
233 The SEC has repeatedly reexamined mutual fund disclosure requirements.  
The result of these efforts is considered in Section III.B., infra. 
234 Langevoort, supra note 156, at 1042-55. 
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and John Payne argue that mutual fund purchasers exhibit bounded 
rationality.235  Although an extensive examination of the literature is 
beyond the scope of this Article, empirical studies provide support for 
these concerns.  Studies show, for example, that investors largely ig-
nore cost information and focus instead on past performance infor-
mation,236 and that they rely heavily on advertising237 and brand name 
(identification with a fund family).238  One well-known study docu-
ments that investors respond to mutual fund name changes, moving 
money into funds with names that reflect a “hot investment style,” 
even when these changes are purely cosmetic and reflect no changes 
in fund strategy or performance.239 
This Article focuses on another factor:  the importance of sales 
agents in the market for retail investments.  The Investment Company 
Institute reports that, of investors owning mutual funds outside of 
employer-based retirement accounts, “77 percent own fund shares 
through professional financial advisers.”240  Investors purchase their 
 
235 James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures:  A Behavioral 
Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 930-35 (2005).    
236 See Brad M. Barber et al., Out of Sight, Out of Mind:  The Effects of Expenses on Mu-
tual Fund Flows, 78 J. BUS. 2095, 2107 (2005) (demonstrating that mutual fund inflows 
are generally unrelated to fund expenses); Beth A. Pontari et al., Regulating Information 
Disclosure in Mutual Fund Advertising in the United States:  Will Consumers Utilize Cost Infor-
mation?, 32 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 333, 336-49 (2009) (demonstrating the insignificance 
of cost information in fund advertising); Daniel Bergstresser & James Poterba, Do Af-
ter-tax Returns Affect Mutual Fund Inflows? 1-3 (Feb. 2000) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=253914 (citing studies showing net fund 
inflows are positively related to past fund performance and demonstrating that after-
tax returns outperform pretax returns in explaining inflows); see also Alan R. Palmiter 
& Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Investors:  Divergent Profiles, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
934, 981-90 (2008) (discussing additional research showing the relative unimportance 
of cost information to fund investors). 
237 See, e.g., Michael A. Jones & Tom Smythe, The Information Content of Mutual Fund 
Print Advertising, 37 J. CONSUMER AFF. 22, 24-25 (2003) (documenting the importance 
of mutual fund advertising and arguing that effective regulation of such advertising is 
difficult). 
238 See, e.g., Vikram Nanda et al., Family Values and the Star Phenomenon:  Strategies of 
Mutual Fund Families, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 667, 668-69 (2004) (finding that mutual fund 
families with at least one star performer draw disproportionate inflows to other funds 
within the family). 
239 Michael J. Cooper et al., Changing Names with Style:  Mutual Fund Name Changes 
and Their Effects on Fund Flows, 60 J. FIN. 2825, 2853 (2005). 
240 INV. CO. INST., supra note 8, at 68; see also Brian K. Reid & John D. Rea, Mutual 
Fund Distribution Channels and Distribution Costs, INVESTMENT COMPANY INST. PERSP., 
July 2003, at 1, 5 (reporting that, as of 2001, only fifteen percent of households made 
their primary purchases of mutual funds directly or through a discount broker or fund 
supermarket).  The selection of mutual funds in 401(k) plans raises analogous prob-
lems that are discussed below. 
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funds through investment professionals despite the ability to purchase 
most mutual funds directly, often at lower cost, from the fund sponsor 
or through a fund supermarket.241 
This manner of compensating brokers creates an obvious conflict 
of interest—the brokers’ incentive is to maximize their compensation, 
not to offer the investor the best mutual fund option.  The funds that 
compensate brokers most highly are those that charge higher loads 
and 12b-1 fees, but these higher fees, in turn, reduce investor returns.  
Complex fee structures heighten the conflict.  Two-thirds of mutual 
funds have more than one share class, each of which has a different 
fee structure.242  In most cases brokers have monetary incentives to sell 
the class of shares that is least advantageous to investors.243  Indeed, 
FINRA recently warned investors that brokers might be improperly 
recommending an inappropriate class of shares because the brokers 
would receive higher commissions.244 
Brokers receive additional compensation for selling preferred funds 
through soft-dollar arrangements and revenue sharing.  Soft dollars in-
volve institutional money managers paying for services—typically re-
search services—indirectly through brokerage commissions, rather than 
directly.245  The brokerage commissions normally exceed the rates that 
the institutions would pay and have the effect of bundling together the 
payments for execution services and for research.  The advantage of soft 
dollars for fund advisors is that soft dollars both mask the cost of pur-
chased research and pass that cost through to investors in the mutual 
fund.  If the research were purchased separately, it would either reduce 
the advisor’s profit246 or increase fund expenses, which are reported to 
investors.  Commissions, however, as discussed earlier, are not reported 
as part of the disclosure of fund expenses.  For brokers, soft dollars 
represent an additional source of revenue, making it more attractive for 
 
241 See IN. CO. INST., supra note 8, at 68 (explaining that investors compensate 
these professionals through the payment of loads and 12b-1 fees).   
242 Id. at 27. 
243 See Edward S. O’Neal, Mutual Fund Share Classes and Broker Incentives, FIN. ANA-
LYSTS J., Sept.–Oct. 1999, at 76, 83 (highlighting “the obvious conflict of interest be-
tween mutual fund brokers and investors”). 
244 FINRA Investor Alerts, Class B Mutual Fund Shares:  Do They Make the Grade?, 
http://www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/MutualFunds/p005975 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
245 See Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 
39, 50-52 (2007) (describing the use of soft dollars). 
246 See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Spill, Regulation of Mutual Funds:  What You Don’t Know Can Hurt 
You, N.H.B.J., Spring 2005, at 50, 52 (2005) (explaining that the advisor can increase its 
profit by avoiding paying for research services out of its contracted advisory fee). 
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them to direct investor assets to funds that use soft dollars.  Despite 
these potential conflicts, the SEC has confirmed the legality of soft dol-
lars, pursuant to certain guidelines.247 
Mutual fund companies also pay brokers for shelf space.248  As one 
court explained, “[A] shelf-space agreement occurs when a mutual 
fund pays [additional compensation] in exchange for the broker-
dealer preferentially marketing its shares.”249  The additional compen-
sation is typically, in addition to any commission applicable at the time 
of the initial sale, an ongoing payment based on a percentage of assets 
that continue to be invested in the mutual fund.  Preferential market-
ing can include more frequent recommendations, including the funds 
on a preferred list, and naming them on the brokerage firm’s website. 
Revenue sharing can be a major component of a brokerage firm’s 
overall income, although most brokers do not disclose the precise dol-
lar amounts they receive.  Edward Jones’s disclosure in connection with 
the settlement of an SEC enforcement action is an indication of the 
magnitude of revenue sharing.250  Edward Jones disclosed income from 
revenue sharing, for the year ending December 31, 2009, of $94.2 mil-
lion.251  Its total net income for the same period was $164.3 million.252 
 If the economic incentive to recommend funds that engage in 
revenue sharing was not sufficient, some brokers explicitly exclude 
fund families that do not participate in revenue sharing from access-
ing their registered representatives and promoting their funds.  As 
 
247 See Commission Guidance Regarding Client Commission Practices Under Sec-
tion 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 54,165, 
71 Fed. Reg. 41,978, 41,978 ( July 24, 2006) (recognizing and interpreting the scope of 
the safe harbor for fund managers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(e), 
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)).  But cf. D. Bruce Johnsen, The SEC’s 2006 Soft Dollar Guidance:  
Law and Economics, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1545, 1548 (2009) (describing the SEC’s guid-
ance as “a laundry list of legally arbitrary and economically irrelevant formalisms”). 
248 Previously, mutual funds also compensated brokers for preferential treatment 
through directed brokerage, which involved a mutual fund directing its trades (and 
the resulting commissions) to a brokerage in exchange for preferred marketing.  See, 
e.g., Spill, supra note 246, at 52 (describing directed brokerage as a “polic[y] and pro-
cedure[] . . . structured to benefit the adviser instead of the shareholder”).  In 2004, 
the SEC amended Rule 12b-1 under the ICA to prohibit directed brokerage.  17 C.F.R. 
§ 270.12b-1(h)(1) (2009). 
249 People v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 130, 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
250 See Press Release, SEC, Edward Jones to Pay $75 Million to Settle Revenue Shar-
ing Charges (Dec. 22, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-177.htm. 
251 Edward Jones, Disclosure Information, http://www.edwardjones.com/en_US/ 
disclosures/rev_sharing/disclosure_information/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
252 Id. 
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Morgan Stanley explains, “Fund families that do not remit revenue-
sharing payments typically will not be provided such access [to branch 
offices and advisors] and will not participate in or receive other pro-
motional support.”253 
Empirical evidence suggests that brokers’ monetary incentives—
rather than fund costs or performance—drive recommendations.  
Studies show that brokers direct most investment dollars into higher-
cost load funds254 and that “broker-dealers typically market load funds 
to their less sophisticated customers.”255  Studies find that broker-
directed mutual fund investments result in lower returns to investors 
than funds acquired through direct purchases.  Daniel Bergstresser et 
al., for example, find that “[f]unds sold by brokers underperform 
those sold through the direct channel, even when returns are calcu-
lated on a pre-distribution-fee basis.”256  They also find “no evidence 
that, in aggregate, brokers provide superior asset allocation advice 
that helps their investors time the market.”257 
Research also shows that broker-directed load funds have higher 
operating expenses.258  This result extends even to index funds that do 
not attempt to beat the market or to differentiate themselves based on 
the stock-picking talent of portfolio managers.259  Thus, the broker 
role in selling mutual funds to retail investors offers a convincing ex-
planation, by itself, of why market forces may not operate to control 
fees or to select efficient or high performing funds.  Broker intermed-
iation operates in direct opposition to the disciplinary capacity of 
 
253 Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, Mutual Funds:  Revenue Sharing Fund Families, 
http://www.smithbarney.com/products_services/mutual_funds/investor_information/ 
revenueshare.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
254 See Daniel Bergstresser et al., Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual 
Fund Industry, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 4129, 4153 (2009) (reporting that broker clients pay 
loads that are as much as 417 basis points higher than those that direct purchasers pay).  
255 Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better Off Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. 303, 328 (2008). 
256 Bergstresser et al., supra note 254, at 4140. 
257 Id. at 4146. 
258 See, e.g., Todd Houge & Jay Wellman, The Use and Abuse of Mutual Fund Expenses, 
70 J. BUS. ETHICS 23, 24 (2007) (arguing that load fund investors pay higher operating 
expenses for having funds “marketed to them” with no corresponding increase in quality). 
259 See id. at 27-28 (finding that no-load index funds had an average expense ratio of 
nineteen basis points, compared to fifty-five basis points for load funds); see also Mercer 
Bullard & Edward S. O’Neal, The Costs of Using a Broker to Select Mutual Funds 2 (Nov. 
30, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.zeroalphagroup.com/ 
studies/113006_Zero_Alpha_Group_Fund_Democracy_Index_Funds_Report.pdf (find-
ing that brokers directed investors into load index funds that had higher operating ex-
penses than no-load funds, before counting brokers’ fees). 
FISCH FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/24/2010  12:01 PM 
2010] Rethinking Securities Intermediary Regulation 2003 
market forces.  The role of the broker is particularly troubling in light 
of the fact that the least-informed investors may rely on brokers due to 
their inability to sort and select mutual fund investments directly.  
Moreover, the role of brokers may explain, in part, the unusually high 
level of management fees paid by investors in Canadian mutual 
funds—eighty-five percent of those funds are sold through a financial 
advisor rather than through direct marketing.260 
The SEC has apparently recognized the potential conflict of inter-
est implicated by revenue sharing, but its response has been minimalist.  
In its most recent amendments to the prospectus disclosure require-
ments, the SEC adopted a requirement that mutual funds disclose that 
they may compensate brokers for the sale of fund shares and that this 
compensation may create a conflict of interest.261  Funds are not re-
quired to disclose the amount or structure of this compensation.  In de-
fending the rule, the SEC stated that it was sufficient to put investors on 
notice of the potential conflict.262 
When investors purchase mutual funds through 401(k) plans, the 
agency costs and conflicts of interest are similar.  Under ERISA sec-
tion 404(c), employees in a 401(k) plan choose their investments, but 
they are limited in that choice to the investment alternatives offered 
by the plan.  These alternatives are selected by the plan provider.  Im-
portantly, although plans may offer employees different types of 
funds, they do not typically offer multiple funds with the same invest-
ment strategy.263  Thus, a plan may offer investors a choice between a 
 
260 E-mail from Joanne De Laurentiis, President & CEO, The Inv. Funds Inst. of 
Canada, to Peter Tufano, Professor of Fin. Mgmt., Harvard Bus. Sch., et al. (Oct. 27, 
2006), available at http://randsco.com/_img/blog/0702/ific_response.pdf. 
261 The SEC’s specific language is: 
If you purchase the Fund through a broker-dealer or other financial interme-
diary (such as a bank), the Fund and its related companies may pay the inter-
mediary for the sale of Fund shares and related services.  These payments may 
create a conflict of interest by influencing the broker-dealer or other inter-
mediary and your salesperson to recommend the Fund over another invest-
ment.  Ask your salesperson or visit your financial intermediary’s Web site for 
more information. 
Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 32, at 4557. 
262 See id. at 4558 (“[W]e are adopting a statement that will alert investors generally 
to the payment of compensation and the potential conflicts arising from that payment.  
An investor could then obtain further detail from his or her salesperson or the interme-
diary’s Web site.”). 
263 Some plans offer participants substantially broader choices by including a bro-
kerage window as an investment option.  Through that window, investors can purchase 
stocks and mutual funds directly, as with a standard brokerage account. 
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money market fund, an equity index fund, and various domestic and 
international actively managed funds.  An investor who prefers an in-
dex fund, however, is limited to the provider’s choice of fund.  As a 
result, plan participants are limited to choosing among fund types 
and, within a given category, cannot choose the lowest-cost alternative. 
Fees charged by mutual funds in 401(k) plans vary tremendous-
ly.264  According to a recent Deloitte survey, the average “all-in” fee was 
0.93% of assets per year,265 which is slightly less than the average mu-
tual fund expense ratio.266  The sampling methodology in the Deloitte 
study has been criticized, however, and some commentators argue that 
fees as high as 3% are common.267  Fees at small firms tend to be much 
higher; the Deloitte study found that plans with fewer than 100 partici-
pants pay an average of 2.03% of the plans’ assets in annual fees.268 
401(k) plans introduce an additional layer of revenue sharing be-
cause of the role of the plan provider or trustee.  It is common prac-
tice for the mutual funds selected for inclusion in a 401(k) plan to 
share a portion of the revenues they collect from plan participants 
with the plan provider.269  In turn, the plan provider may reduce the 
administrative expenses charged to the plan.  As a result, the em-
ployees bear the costs of running the plan but pay those costs indirect-
 
264 See, e.g., Anne Tergesen, Does Your 401(k) Cost Too Much?, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, 
June 7, 2004, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_23/b3886145.htm 
(reporting that in 2004, plan fees ran as high as three percent); Press Release, Inv. Co. 
Inst., A Number of Factors Impact Retirement Plan Fees, ICI-Deloitte Study Finds Plan 
Size, Contribution Rates, and Auto Enroll Associated with Lower Fees (Apr. 14, 2009), 
available at http://www.ici.org/pressroom/news/09_news_dc_401k_fee_study (reporting 
that, among 130 plans studied, the median fee “was 0.72 percent of assets, within a range 
from 0.35 percent (the 10th percentile) to 1.72 percent (the 90th percentile) of assets”).   
265 DELOITTE, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION/401(K) FEE STUDY 18 (2009), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_09_dc_401k_fee_study.pdf. 
266 Significantly, neither the average mutual fund expense ratio nor the all-in fee 
in the Deloitte study includes trading costs.  See id. at 16 (describing components of the 
all-in fee). 
267  See Posting of Ryan Alfred to Bright Scope Blog, Reconciling the 401k Fee Es-
timates of the ICI and Its Critics, http://www.brightscope.com/blog/2009/05/13/  
reconciling-the-401k-fee-estimates-of-the-ici-and-its-critics/ (May 13, 2009, 18:23 EST) 
(identifying sampling problems in Deloitte study). 
268 DELOITTE, supra note 265, at 20; see also Spors, supra note 144 (reporting on 
possible legislation to respond to high fees for small 401(k) plans). 
269 See, e.g., Lynn O’Shaughnessy, A 401(k) Picks a Mutual Fund.  Who Gets a Perk?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, at BU5 (citing Michael Weddell, a retirement consultant at 
Watson Wyatt Worldwide, as stating that 90% of 401(k) plans engage in revenue shar-
ing); see also Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, 588 F.3d 585, 590 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining 
that a trust agreement between the employer and the plan trustee required them to 
keep the amounts of the revenue sharing payments confidential).   
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ly through the fees charged to them by the participating mutual 
funds.  In many cases, neither plan participants nor the employer it-
self know the amount of revenue sharing that occurs.270 
As with broker-directed mutual fund sales, revenue sharing in 
401(k) plans creates two problems.  First, the hidden nature of the 
payments may mislead participants to believe that their investment 
costs are lower than they actually are.  Second, and more problematic, 
the potential for compensation may influence the plan provider’s se-
lection of investment alternatives.  As the Wall Street Journal put it, “At 
issue . . . is whether companies managing the plans are receiving pay-
ments in return for including certain fund companies in their 
plans.”271  Such payments might cause employers to include inferior 
funds in their plans and to spurn strong performers that do not engage 
in revenue sharing.  According to press reports, for example, fund ad-
ministrators have refused to include Vanguard funds in their plans 
upon learning that Vanguard “won’t pay to play.”272 
The importance of fund selection in retirement plans is heigh-
tened because it can influence investor decisions outside of the plans.  
Studies suggest that mutual fund investors demonstrate brand loyalty 
and will purchase multiple funds from a single fund family.273  More-
over, a majority of households purchase their first mutual fund 
through an employer-sponsored retirement plan.274  As a result, their 
employers’ selection of plan options is likely to influence their subse-
quent investment decisions. 
 
270 See, e.g., Tom Lauricella, Spitzer Aims at Another Mark:  Fee Disclosure, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 10, 2006, at C1 (explaining that employers and plan participants are often “kept 
in the dark” as to the exact amount of revenue sharing). 
271 Id.  
272 Editorial, The Benefits Aren’t Mutual, STAR-NEWS (Wilmington, N.C.) Feb. 22, 
2004, at 6E, available at 2004 WLNR 17445525.  Vanguard seems to have overcome this 
problem by becoming one of the largest 401(k) plan administrators.  See, e.g., Ross 
Kerber, More Dip Early into Funds for Retirement, BOSTON GLOBE, June 6, 2008, at 1A, 
available at 2008 WLNR 10690503 (describing Fidelity Investments, CitiStreet, and 
Vanguard as the three largest administrators of 401(k) plans). 
273 See Nanda, supra note 238, at 668-69 (explaining how star funds attract new 
money growth for fund families).  Investing in a single family is likely to be a poor 
strategy.  See Edwin J. Elton et al., The Impact of Mutual Fund Family Membership on Inves-
tor Risk, 42 J. FIN & QUANT. ANALYSIS 257, 274-75 (2007) (finding that funds within a 
single fund family have a higher correlation than funds selected from different fami-
lies, thereby exposing investors to higher risk). 
274  See Characteristics of Mutual Fund Investors, 2009, RES. FUNDAMENTALS (Inv. Co. 
Inst., Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2009, at 9, available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/fm-
v18n8.pdf (stating that sixty-two percent of mutual fund–holding households pur-
chased their first fund through an employer-sponsored retirement plan).   
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Therefore, the conflicts and incentives faced by selling agents—
including brokers, financial advisors, and 401(k) plan sponsors—have 
the potential to influence their investment choices, and empirical data 
suggest that these conflicts impact investor welfare.  Selling agents 
face limited accountability, however, for their choices and recom-
mendations. 
Regulators have engaged in some enforcement of broker suit-
ability obligations in the mutual fund context.  FINRA has brought 
several enforcement actions focusing on broker recommendations of 
inappropriate share classes.275  FINRA has also fined several brokers 
for shelf-space violations.276  The New York State Attorney General’s 
Office and the SEC have also investigated specific instances of reve-
nue-sharing in an effort to determine whether the practice has 
crossed the line and turned into the payment of kickbacks.277 
Private litigation has had limited success.  Courts have generally 
held, for example, that retail brokers are not fiduciaries for their cus-
tomers unless they possess investment discretion.278  Indeed, when 
Congress passed the Investment Advisers Act, it explicitly exempted 
brokers, despite the knowledge that brokers might have business inter-
ests or conflicts of interest that could bias their recommendations.279 
 
275 See, e.g., Press Release, FINRA, FINRA Fines Banorte Securities International $1.1 
Million for Improper Sales of Class B Mutual Fund Shares (Oct. 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Newsreleases/2008/P117233 (reporting settlement of 
FINRA enforcement action involving sales of inappropriate share class); Press Release, 
FINRA, NASD Files Enforcement Actions Involving Unsuitable Sales of Mutual Funds 
(Aug. 12, 2003), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Newsreleases/2003/ 
p002885 (announcing that the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), lat-
er consolidated into FINRA, brought enforcement actions based on brokers’ recom-
mendations of unsuitable class B shares). 
276 See Thomas Derpinghaus, Two Brokerage Firms Will Pay Fines, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 
2005, at C19 (reporting that the NASD fined two brokers “for giving preferred sales 
treatment to mutual funds in exchange for brokerage commissions and other payments”).   
277 See, e.g., Phyllis Feinberg, SEC’s Investigation Shines Light on DC Fee Practices, 
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, July 12, 2004, at 4 (describing the SEC’s request to mutual 
funds for “detailed answers about how revenue-sharing fees are structured”); Anne 
Kates Smith, Shedding Light on 401(k) Fees, KIPLINGER’S PERS. FIN., Feb. 2007, at 19 (ob-
serving that “[s]ome forms of revenue sharing bear an unsettling similarity to kick-
backs” and describing regulatory concerns). 
278 See Jill E. Fisch, Fiduciary Duties and the Analyst Scandals, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1083, 
1094-95 (2007) (citing authority for this determination); cf. O’Malley v. Boris, 742 
A.2d 845, 849 (Del. 1999) (“[B]rokers must act in the customer’s best interests and 
must refrain from self-dealing unless the customer consents, after full disclosure.”). 
279 See Fisch, supra note 278, at 1094 (noting that when the exemption was created, 
brokers “were known to provide . . . ‘brokerage house advice’”).  Pending legislation 
would explicitly establish a fiduciary duty for brokers, akin to that of investment advi-
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Instead, customers alleging broker misconduct or conflicts of in-
terest must generally rely on the rules of the self-regulatory organiza-
tions (SROs).  The suitability requirement280 and the know-your-
customer rule281 obligate brokers to recommend only investments that 
are suitable in light of their customers’ investment objectives.282  Pri-
vate enforcement of these rules is problematic.  Most courts have dis-
missed suitability claims, at least to the extent that they do not plead 
fraud, holding that investors lack a private right of action under SRO 
rules.283  In addition, claims by retail investors against their brokers are 
typically subject to FINRA-controlled arbitration pursuant to the stan-
dard terms of retail brokerage agreements.284  Although arbitration 
proceedings may, in some cases, allow investors to recover, the arbitra-
tion process has been challenged as unprincipled, arbitrary, and bi-
ased against the customer.285  Moreover, most arbitrations are resolved 
in secret.286  Judicial review, even of published awards, is “severely li-
mited.”287 
 
sors.  See The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 
111th Cong. (2009). 
280 FINRA Rule 2310, the suitability rule, permits brokers “to recommend a securities 
transaction to a customer only if the recommendation suits the customer’s investment 
portfolio, financial situation and needs.”  See FINRA, BrokerCheck FAQ, http:// 
www.finra.org/Investors/ToolsCalculators/BrokerCheck/P015174 (last visited Apr. 15, 
2010).     
281 New York Stock Exchange Rule 405 requires brokers to “[u]se due diligence to 
learn the essential facts relative to every customer.”  NYSE Rule 405(1), N.Y.S.E. Guide 
(CCH) ¶ 2405 (2002). 
282 See generally Bradley J. Bondi, Securities Arbitrations Involving Mortgage-Backed Se-
curities and Collateralized Mortgage Obligations:  Suitable for Unsuitability Claims?, 14 FORD-
HAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 251 (2009) (exploring these obligations). 
283 See, e.g., Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 200 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(“NASD regulations do not give rise to a private right of action.”); Jablon v. Dean Wit-
ter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding no private right of action under 
either the suitability rule or the know-your-customer-rule). 
284 See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Attorneys as Arbitrators, 39 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 109, 112-16 (2010) (describing arbitration provisions in customer agree-
ments).   
285 See, e.g., Bondi, supra note 282, at 268 (describing arbitrators as applying a 
“flexible” standard); Choi, Fisch & Pritchard, supra note 284, at 116 -19 (summarizing 
claims of arbitrator bias); Dan Solin, FINRA:  A Wily Fox Guarding Your Nest Egg, HUF-
FINGTON POST, Dec. 29, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dan-solin/finra-a-wily-
fox-guarding_b_403552.html (describing FINRA as a “shill for the securities industry”). 
286 Choi, Fisch & Prichard, supra note 284, at 116 (observing that seventy to eighty 
percent of arbitration claims are settled or resolved through means other than an arbi-
trator decision and noting that no public information is available on these claims). 
287 See Bondi, supra note 282, at 269 (explaining that most arbitration decisions are 
unpublished and “under the Federal Arbitration Act, a court generally may not vacate 
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Apart from procedural impediments, private litigation suffers 
from a more general problem—the difficulty of establishing that a 
broker recommendation of a specific mutual fund is unsuitable.  Al-
though as a general matter, suitability claims by brokerage customers 
are common,288 they are typically filed for complex and high-risk in-
vestments such as collateralized mortgage obligations and credit de-
fault swaps.  Mutual funds are, by contrast, diversified, low cost, and 
relatively safe, which is why regulators and commentators have identi-
fied them as suitable investments for retail investors.  Absent outright 
fraud, it is difficult for an investor to demonstrate lack of suitability 
simply by demonstrating that an alternative fund has lower fees or his-
torically higher returns.  Even when a broker’s recommendation is 
both inappropriate and based on personal financial incentives, an in-
vestor must establish a causal connection between the conflicts of in-
terest and the investor’s loss.289  Finally, courts are unlikely to impose 
liability, even where an investor relies on a broker, if the investor could 
have ascertained the relevant information from fund disclosures.290 
Recent litigation involving 401(k) plans illustrates these problems.  
Plan participants have brought a number of lawsuits alleging that rev-
enue sharing and other conflicts of interest have led employers and 
plan providers to offer inappropriate investment choices, rather than 
lower-cost and better-performing alternatives.291  Plaintiffs claim that 
because of these arrangements, they have paid excessive fees and re-
ceived inferior returns on their contributions.  To date, plaintiffs have 
not succeeded at establishing a breach of fiduciary duty based on 
 
an arbitration award because the arbitrator made erroneous findings of fact or mis-
applied the law”). 
288 Id. at 257 (reporting that in 1998, ninety-five percent of broker liability insur-
ance filings were based on suitability claims).  
289 See, e.g., Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover & Co., No. 97-1272, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEX-
IS 9489, at *13-20 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1998) (dismissing a claim that, because of financial 
incentives, a broker pushed certain in-house mutual funds “regardless of suitability, mar-
ket conditions, or customer need” because the plaintiff had not alleged a causal connec-
tion between these recommendations and subsequent losses).  
290 See, e.g., DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 492 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(rejecting a suit alleging that a broker recommended an inappropriate share class due 
to a conflict of interest on the basis that “investors could calculate on their own wheth-
er one class of shares [was] more economically attractive than another”). 
291 See, e.g., Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 578 (7th Cir. 2009) (claiming that 
defendants provided poor investment options and failed to disclose the plan’s fee struc-
ture); Taylor v. United Techs. Corp., No. 06-1494, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19059, at *30-35 
(D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2009), aff’d, No. 09-1343, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 26068 (2d Cir. Dec. 1, 
2009) (claiming that the plan offered mutual funds with unreasonably high fees and ex-
penses and paid excessive compensation to its recordkeeper). 
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these allegations.292  The court’s decision in Hecker v. Deere is typical.  
In addition to rejecting claims that Fidelity Trust (the plan trustee) 
and Fidelity Research (the advisor to the funds in the 401(k) plan) 
owed fiduciary duties to the plan beneficiaries,293 the court concluded 
that the plan’s selection of twenty mutual funds could not be impro-
per where plaintiffs had the option of selecting alternative funds 
through a brokerage link.294 
A recent decision by the Eighth Circuit offers plaintiffs some 
hope.  In Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court concluded that the 
plaintiff’s allegations295—which it described as amounting to an asser-
tion that the $9.5 billion Wal-Mart 401(k) plan296 offered a limited 
menu of inferior investment options that “were chosen to benefit the 
trustee at the expense of the participants”297—were sufficient to state a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 298  Specifically, the court stated that 
the allegations, if substantiated, could show that “the process by which 
appellees selected and managed the funds in the Plan would have 
been tainted by failure of effort, competence, or loyalty.”299 
Even if plaintiffs succeed in some of these cases, it is unlikely that 
litigation will have a significant impact on plan policies.  As with other 
claims of mismanagement, any claim of improper fund selection is 
likely to be effectively rebutted by a showing that the defendants en-
gaged in a diligent process—meaning that they received and evaluated 
 
292 Recently, however, Caterpillar announced that it had settled a lawsuit challeng-
ing the fees in its 401(k) plan for $16.5 million.  See Emily Lambert, Caterpillar Suit 
Could Lower 401(k) Fees, FORBES.COM, Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/ 
2009/11/11/caterpillar-pension-lawsuit-personal-finance-retirement-plan.html (suggest-
ing settlement may “set a precedent for other companies to follow”). 
293 Hecker, 556 F.3d at 584. 
294 Id. at 581. 
295 The plaintiff alleged that the plan offered employees a small group of investment 
options that charged unreasonably high fees and expenses and fell short of the indices 
that they were designed to track.  Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 590 (8th 
Cir. 2009).  The plaintiff alleged that the defendants imprudently offered only retail-class 
mutual fund shares despite the fact that, because of the size of Wal-Mart’s 401(k) plan, 
they had access to lower cost alternative investment options.  Id.  Finally, the complaint 
alleged that the funds included in the Plan made revenue-sharing payments to the trus-
tee, Merrill Lynch, and that these payments were not made in exchange for services ren-
dered, but rather were a quid pro quo for inclusion in the Plan.  Id. 
296 Mark Bruno, Wal-Mart Suit Hits 401(k) Fees, FINANCIALWEEK.COM, Apr. 28, 2008, 
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080428/REG/156632963/
1028. 
297 Braden, 588 F.3d  at 596. 
298 Id. at 591. 
299 Id. 
FISCH FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/24/2010  12:01 PM 
2010 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 1961 
appropriate information concerning the plan’s investment options.300  
In addition, to show damage, plaintiffs must be able to demonstrate 
that the plan’s offerings were clearly inferior and that a causal relation-
ship exists between plan deficiencies and an actual investment loss.  
The methodological challenges identified above will impede these 
showings.  Absent the imposition of more rigorous obligations on plan 
providers in connection with the selection of plan options, the agency 
costs inherent in the 401(k) structure are likely to persist. 
III.  LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
The mutual fund market is characterized by extensive regulatory 
intervention, but it is unclear that this regulation is effective in im-
proving market discipline and protecting investors.  This Part identi-
fies critical limitations in the effectiveness of the existing regulatory 
structure—in particular the corporate governance and disclosure re-
quirements—in meeting these objectives. 
A.  Corporate Governance 
As described in Part I, the ICA regulates mutual funds in a man-
ner similar to the regulation of operating companies.  The statute re-
quires mutual funds to use traditional corporate governance mechan-
isms, including shareholder voting and oversight by a board of 
directors.  The board is required to monitor the investment advisor—
similar to the way an operating company’s board monitors the CEO—
and to review potential conflicts of interest, such as the investment ad-
visor’s execution obligations and use of soft dollars.301  Importantly, 
the SEC has established a variety of exemptive rules that permit mu-
tual funds to engage in otherwise prohibited transactions subject to 
the approval of the board or, in some cases, the independent direc-
tors.302  The board is also responsible for approving the investment ad-
 
300 See Taylor v. United Techs. Corp., No. 06-1494, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19059, at 
*28 (D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2009) (“[T]he undisputed facts detail the evaluation and analyt-
ical process or ‘appropriate consideration’ by which UTC selected the mutual funds.”). 
301 See, e.g., Commission Guidance Regarding the Duties and Responsibilities of 
Investment Company Boards of Directors with Respect to Investment Adviser Portfolio 
Trading Practices, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58,264, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 28,345, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2763, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,646, 
45,649-56 (proposed Aug. 6, 2008) (proposing guidance for fund directors in oversee-
ing investment advisors’ use of soft dollars).   
302 See, e.g., Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Act 
Release No. 7932, Exchange Act Release No. 43,786, Investment Company Act Release 
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visor’s compensation.  The ICA imposes fiduciary duties on the direc-
tors in performing these obligations.303  In addition, mutual fund 
shareholders, like shareholders of operating companies, exercise vot-
ing rights.  Specifically, the shareholders elect the directors.  Share-
holders must also approve major structural changes, such as the con-
version of a fund from open-end to closed-end (or vice versa), a 
change in the fund’s concentration classification or other investment 
objectives, and material changes in the advisory contract. 
The utility of applying these corporate governance mechanisms to 
the mutual fund context is unclear.  Many commentators have argued 
that the mutual fund board is worthless because it has no effective 
power over the investment advisor.304  In an operating company, the 
board’s power to monitor management is premised on the board’s 
statutory authority to hire and fire the CEO and other executives.305  
In recent years, boards have increasingly exercised this power to re-
move underperforming CEOs.  Although mutual fund directors can, 
in theory, terminate the advisory contract pursuant to their authority 
under the ICA, such a decision is of little practical value because it ef-
fectively terminates the fund.306  The advisor provides all the opera-
tional components of the mutual fund; without it, the fund is simply a 
pool of assets.  The absence of an effective mechanism for influencing 
 
No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 16, 2001) (codified at C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, 270, 274) 
(amending exemptive rules in a manner designed to increase fund directors’ indepen-
dence and efficacy). 
303 Commentators have criticized the SEC for failing to enforce these fiduciary du-
ties adequately.  See, e.g., H. Norman Knickle, The Investment Company Act of 1940:  SEC 
Enforcement and Private Actions, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 777, 792 (2004) (“[T]he 
Commission has not frequently filed 1940 Act charges against fund directors, advisers, 
and officers for breach of fiduciary duties . . . .”); see also In re Hammes, Securities Act 
Release No. 8346A, Investment Company Act Release No. 26290A, ( Jan. 7, 2004) 
(Campos, Comm’r, dissenting), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-
8346a.htm (criticizing an SEC settlement for failing to impose adequate sanctions on 
outside directors). 
304 See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power:  An Analysis of Rents and Re-
wards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1448-51 (2006) (describing the 
lack of board power over investment advisors and portfolio managers); Caroline J. Dil-
lon, Note, Do You Get What You Pay For?  A Look at the High Fees and Low Protections of Mu-
tual Funds, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281, 288 (2006) (“[T]he board’s negotiating 
power is so limited that the investment adviser essentially can dictate the terms of the 
[advisory] agreement.”). 
305 See Birdthistle, supra note 304, at 1449 (noting that, although firing a CEO is 
difficult, it is far easier than terminating an advisory contract). 
306 See Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(“[A] mutual fund cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser.”  
(quoting S. REP. NO. 91-184 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4870, 4901)). 
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the advisor’s behavior imposes a critical limit on a director’s ability to 
act as an effective fiduciary.307 
Commentators have also questioned the ICA requirement that the 
independent fund directors approve advisory fees.  Wallison and Litan 
make perhaps the strongest case, arguing that this requirement dis-
places market forces and produces a form of rate regulation analog-
ous to public utilities’ rate-setting process.308  As they explain, boards 
see their role as limiting the size of the advisor’s profit309 and, conse-
quently, perform a type of cost-plus analysis in which they judge the 
size of the management fee by reference to the fund’s administrative 
costs.  This “utility-like” process, they argue, “reduces or eliminates the 
incentive of an adviser to reduce its costs.”310  Wallison and Litan also 
evaluate the board’s role in addressing conflicts of interest and argue 
that a trustee-custodian could perform this monitoring equally well 
and more cost-effectively.311 
Despite these concerns, other commentators argue that the mu-
tual fund board has value.  Donald Langevoort argues that the board 
offers at least the potential for a measure of fiduciary obligation as a 
counterweight to the market pressures felt by mutual fund managers 
and sponsoring firms.312  Empirical research is even more positive,313 
identifying correlations between board independence and board ef-
fectiveness.314  Studies have found, for example, that boards with more 
 
307 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 156, at 1041 (“Whatever the merits of the de-
bate in corporate law generally, the influences in the mutual fund marketplace are too 
weak simply to presume that directors will act as faithful fiduciaries in the strong, legal 
sense of the term.”). 
308 WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 165, at 77. 
309 Wallison and Litan explain that this approach is required by the Second Cir-
cuit’s decision in Gartenberg, which precludes boards from relying on comparisons with 
the fees charged by other advisors.  Id.  To be fair, it is not clear that Gartenberg goes 
this far; it simply holds that a board cannot rely on “prevailing industry advisory fees.”  
Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929.   
310 WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 165, at 80. 
311 Id. at 107-16. 
312 See Langevoort, supra note 156, at 1040 (“One can have relatively moderate ex-
pectations for the performance of disinterested directors and still believe that the 
strategy adds some value, and there is a body of evidence to support this.”). 
313 Not all the studies find evidence that independence is valuable.  See, e.g., Ste-
phen P. Ferris & Xuemin (Sterling) Yan, Do Independent Directors and Chairmen Matter?  
The Role of Boards of Directors in Mutual Fund Governance, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 392, 393 (2007) 
(finding no evidence that an independent board or an independent chair correlates 
with the probability of a fund scandal or superior fund performance). 
314 See generally Memorandum from Chester Spatt, Chief Economist, Office of 
Econ. Analysis, SEC, to Inv. Co. File S7-03-04, Literature Review on Independent Mu-
tual Fund Chairs and Directors (Dec. 29, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
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independent directors tend to negotiate lower fees,315 merge under-
performing funds more quickly,316 and are more likely to remove fund 
managers who have performed poorly. 317  Camelia Kuhnen constructs 
a more rigorous measure of independence using business connections 
between directors and fund advisors and finds that these business con-
nections are positive predictors of expense ratios and advisory fees.318 
A significant limitation of the empirical literature is its inability to 
determine causation.319  Rather than causing better performance or 
operations, an independent board may be the result of a fund advisor 
or a fund family’s commitment to best operational practices and good 
governance.  An independent board may signal that the fund family is 
attentive to its fiduciary obligations and seeks to minimize conflicts of 
interest.  It may also operate as a bonding or commitment device in 
that, once an advisor has selected the initial independent directors, 
those directors, and not the advisor, will choose the subsequent inde-
pendent directors.  Under this view, independent directors may well 
be attentive and vigilant, but it is the advisor’s willingness to subject 
itself to this oversight, and not the oversight itself, that accounts for 
the empirical results. 
It is also worth noting that some of the empirical results identified 
above are consistent with the interests of the advisory firm itself, if not 
the individual portfolio manager.  An advisory firm does not wish to 
suffer the outflows that may result from an underperforming fund, 
nor does it want the fund family to suffer possible damage to its repu-
 
proposed/s70304/oeamemo122906-litreview.pdf (summarizing the empirical litera-
ture on board effectiveness). 
315 See, e.g., Peter Tufano & Matthew Sevick, Board Structure and Fee-Setting in the U.S. 
Mutual Fund Industry, 46 J. FIN. ECON. 321, 323 (1997) ( “[L]ower fees are charged by 
funds whose boards are smaller, whose boards have a larger proportion of indepen-
dent members, and whose board members sit on a larger fraction of other boards for 
the same sponsor.”). 
316 See Ajay Khorana et al., Board Structure, Mergers and Shareholder Wealth:  A Study of 
the Mutual Fund Industry, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 571, 573 (2007) (“[F]und mergers . . . are 
significantly more likely when the target underperforms and its board is composed 
primarily of independent directors . . . .”). 
317 See Bill Ding & Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Performance and Governance 
Structure 25 (Dec. 9, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=687273 (“For . . . underperforming funds, it appears that the number of in-
dependent directors, proxied by the total number of directors, is the most important 
predictor of replacement . . . .”).    
318 Camelia M. Kuhnen, Business Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in 
the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2185, 2186-89 (2009).   
319 See Spatt, supra note 314, at 12-18 (identifying other problems with empirical 
methodology in these studies). 
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tation from a poor performer.  Merging the fund or replacing the 
portfolio manager does not discipline the advisory firm, but rather 
benefits it.  Indeed, it is unclear why fund families of any significant 
size would require board action to replace a poorly performing port-
folio manager—the only funds for which replacement is unlikely are 
those in which the portfolio managers are sufficiently powerful within 
the advisory firm itself.  This explanation is consistent with the finding 
that fund outflows were more likely to lead to the replacement of the 
portfolio manager.320 
The rationale for providing mutual fund shareholders with voting 
rights is even less compelling.  The high percentage of small retail in-
vestors321 magnifies the traditional constraints on voting as an effective 
corporate governance mechanism:  collective action problems and ra-
tional apathy.  The significance of these constraints is also increased 
by the opportunity for shareholders to exit readily at NAV.  That these 
constraints are, in fact, operating is evidenced by the low percentage 
of mutual fund shares that are voted by their beneficial owners.  As 
the Investment Company Institute noted in a 2005 report, only thirty-
two percent of mutual fund shares held in street name were voted by 
beneficial owners.322  Commentators have observed that mutual funds 
must engage in frequent and costly resolicitations because of their 
regular inability to obtain a quorum.323  Soliciting the proxies of mu-
tual fund investors is costly and investors ultimately bear the cost 
through increased expense ratios. 
Because of the cost of proxy solicitation, most mutual funds do 
not even hold regular annual meetings.  Many do not hold meetings 
at all unless there is an issue for which shareholder approval is re-
quired.324  The absence of regular annual meetings highlights the in-
 
320 See Ding & Wermers, supra note 317, at 4 (“[F]unds with outflows are more like-
ly to replace underperforming managers.”). 
321 Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 60,215, 74 Fed. Reg. 
33,293, 33,303 (July 10, 2009) (describing mutual funds as having a “disproportionate-
ly large retail shareholder base”). 
322 INV. CO. INST., COSTS OF ELIMINATING DISCRETIONARY BROKER VOTING ON UN-
CONTESTED ELECTIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY DIRECTORS 6 (2006), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/wht_broker_voting.pdf. 
323 See, e.g., Richard M. Phillips, Deregulation Under the Investment Company Act—A 
Reevaluation of the Corporate Paraphernalia of Shareholder Voting and Boards of Directors, 37 
BUS. LAW. 903, 908-09 (1982) (describing the problematic need for frequent and costly 
resolicitations). 
324 See Letter from Jennifer S. Taub, Lecturer & Coordinator of the Bus. Law Pro-
gram, Isenberg Sch. of Mgmt., Univ. of Mass., Amherst, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, 
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significance of shareholder voting rights.  Indeed, in its recent ap-
proval of the New York Stock Exchange’s elimination of discretionary 
broker voting for uncontested director elections, the SEC authorized 
an exemption for investment company elections.325  Consequently, 
even when a mutual fund holds a meeting to elect directors, the result 
is largely the product of broker votes.  Given the financial ties between 
brokers and mutual funds, this practice effectively ensures approval of 
any proposed director candidates. 
Unlike operating companies, mutual funds do not offer the poten-
tial for increased voting power in the event of a control contest.  There 
is no takeover market for mutual funds because there is no economic 
justification for paying a premium for shares that trade at NAV.  Simi-
larly, the absence of arbitrage opportunities prevents hedge funds and 
other activist shareholders from engaging in proxy contests.326 
The SEC has specifically described the ICA as preserving “share-
holder participation in key decisions.”327  Yet in reality, apart from the 
toothless power to elect directors, mutual fund shareholder voting 
power is generally limited to approving significant changes in invest-
ment policy328 and material changes in the advisory contract.329  Al-
though the SEC has interpreted the scope of the statute broadly—
requiring fund sponsors to take many issues to the shareholders330—as 
a practical matter, shareholder voting on these issues is unimportant, 
given shareholder power to exit a fund at NAV upon an announced 
change in investment policy.  At its best, shareholder voting with re-
 
SEC (Aug. 13, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-
127.pdf (describing the infrequency of shareholder meetings). 
325 See Self-Regulatory Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 33,303. 
326 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker:  Choices About Investor 
Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L.R. 1591, 1617 (2006) (identifying the 
absence of arbitrage opportunities in the mutual fund market). 
327 Self-Regulatory Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 33,303. 
328 These include changing the fund’s concentration policy, borrowing money, and 
ceasing to be an investment company.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a) (2006).  In addition, mutual 
funds must also adopt fundamental policies with respect to key investment activities.  See 
Id. § 80a-8(b) (2006) (listing the policies that must be reported for fund registration).  
These policies can be changed only by a shareholder vote.  Id. § 80a-13(a).    
329 Shareholders must approve the initial advisory contract.  Id. § 80a-15(a) (2006); 
17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1(b)(4) (2010).  Following that approval, board approval can be 
substituted for a shareholder vote.  15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-15(a) to (b), 80a-13(a).  Sections 
80a-15(a)(3) and 80a-15(a)(4) also provide shareholder voting rights with respect to a 
new management contract following the board’s termination of a management con-
tract and any assignment of the contract.  Id. § 80a-15(a)(3) to (4) (2006). 
330 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 323, at 903-04 (describing how the SEC has im-
posed “the corporate paraphernalia of shareholder voting”).   
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spect to these issues provides value in that the proxy solicitation re-
quirements alert investors to such changes.  At its worst, shareholder 
voting impedes fund flexibility.  Contractual fee rates in advisory con-
tracts may, for example, be set higher than they otherwise would be 
because of the requirement that fund shareholders approve any at-
tempt by managers to raise fees, but not to lower them.331 
B.  Disclosure 
Perhaps the biggest failure of existing regulation is the scope and 
structure of the disclosure requirements.  Like the corporate gover-
nance provisions, mutual fund disclosure obligations are modeled af-
ter those of operating companies.  Purchasing a mutual fund, howev-
er, is not the same as investing in an operating company. 
The disclosures of operating companies provide investors and the 
market with sufficient information about the issuer to value the com-
pany and its securities.  Information about the issuer’s past perfor-
mance, financial condition, and management team enable the market 
to predict future cash flows, and discounting those future cash flows 
leads to a determination of an appropriate market price. 
For operating companies, the determination of market price 
enables the application of market discipline.  Investors adjust the 
price at which they will trade in response to changes in the issuer’s 
behavior and performance, and any failure of the market to respond 
is addressed through arbitrage.  Poorly performing firms face a higher 
cost of capital and, in some cases, are taken over.  Operating perfor-
mance is likely to persist to a large degree from one period to the 
next, at least to the extent that the firm’s assets, products, and policies 
remain consistent. 
Unlike operating companies, the prices of mutual fund shares are 
fixed at NAV.  Investors do not use discounted cash flow or other me-
thodologies to value fund shares, and fund prices do not respond to 
changes in fund performance, management, or investment objectives.  
Although these changes may affect investor demand for shares, 
changes in investor demand do not affect share price.  Because share 
price is fixed, it does not serve as a vehicle for the exercise of market 
discipline.  Similarly, investors cannot sell mutual fund shares short 
and, even if hostile takeovers were possible, fund pricing is incompat-
 
331 Raising fees is a modification of the advisory contract that requires shareholder 
approval.  Managers can lower fees through a voluntary fee waiver.  See supra note 230 
and accompanying text (describing fee waivers). 
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ible with a takeover premium.  Finally, for most, if not all, mutual 
funds, performance is not likely to persist.  As a result, the primary 
factors relevant to the investment decision include cost, risk, asset al-
location, and diversification. 
In order to evaluate these factors, mutual fund investors need in-
formation about fund structure, investment strategy, and expenses.  
Investors choosing among mutual funds should be able to determine 
readily the types of securities in which the fund invests and the extent 
to which the fund is committed to specific asset types and classes (e.g., 
foreign versus domestic, debt versus equity, and small- versus large-
cap) or retains discretion to shift among asset classes in response to 
market conditions.  Investors also should be able to ascertain the ex-
tent to which the fund concentrates its investments within a limited 
number of securities or industries and whether the fund uses leverage 
or derivatives in its trading strategy.  Investors should have access to 
complete information about fund costs, including the incentive struc-
ture created by the fund’s payments to its portfolio managers, selling 
brokers, and other service providers.  Most importantly, investors 
should be presented with information on the characteristics that dis-
tinguish a particular fund from its competitors. 
Existing regulation allows, and in some cases creates affirmative 
incentives, for funds to obscure this information.  As indicated above, 
although the SEC has repeatedly revised the provisions concerning 
disclosure of fund expenses, those disclosures remain incomplete and 
confusing.  Investors report that they do not find these disclosures 
helpful, and most do not even read them.332 
One example is operating expenses.  Although the SEC has finally 
mandated in its most recent amendments that fund turnover be in-
cluded in the summary prospectus, it has not required disclosure of 
brokerage commissions or other operating costs, and the turnover 
disclosure provided does not furnish a ready mechanism for quantify-
ing those costs in a manner comparable to other fees.333  The use of 
 
332 According to the Investment Company Institute’s 2006 investor survey, only 
thirty percent of recent mutual fund investors consulted shareholder reports before 
their most recent purchase, and only thirty-four percent used the fund prospectus.  
INV. CO. INST., UNDERSTANDING INVESTOR PREFERENCES FOR MUTUAL FUND INFORMA-
TION 12 (2006), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_06_inv_prefs_full.pdf.  In a 
1996 survey, only fifteen percent of investors reported reading the mutual fund pros-
pectus in its entirety.  Id. at 25.   
333 See supra notes 219-32 and accompanying text (discussing incomplete disclo-
sure of fund operating costs). 
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soft dollars also masks a fund’s true operating expenses.334  In light of 
the demonstrated importance of both quantifying and adequately ca-
tegorizing fund expenses, this lack of transparency is problematic.  At 
the same time, increasing investor attention to fund expenses creates 
competitive pressure for funds to structure costs in ways that allow 
their exclusion from the reported expense ratios, as the use of soft 
dollars highlights. 
Vague disclosure also reduces competition by preventing share-
holders from evaluating the extent to which mutual funds differ along 
critical factors such as diversification, asset allocation, and risk.  In 
turn, shareholder confusion may contribute to the degree of price 
dispersion in the market.  For example, although funds are required to 
disclose their investment objectives, regulation does not require funds 
to be specific or to explain how their approach differs from that of 
their competitors.  This leads to a situation in which hundreds of 
funds, with very different investment strategies, disclose that their in-
vestment objective is “long-term capital growth.” 335 
So-called “closet index funds” offer an example in which a lack of 
disclosure leads to investor confusion.336  Many actively managed mu-
tual funds hold portfolios that do not differ significantly from the rele-
vant index-fund benchmark.337  This strategy reduces the risk that the 
fund will underperform the index; at the same time, the fund’s returns 
are unlikely to differ from a comparable index fund, but come at a 
higher cost.  Investors who purchase closet index funds pay a premium 
for active management while receiving index fund returns.338  The 
 
334 See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text (describing use of soft dollars). 
335 See, e.g., AM. CENTURY INV., SUMMARY PROSPECTUS:  DISCIPLINED GROWTH FUND 
1 (2009), available at http://prospectus.americancentury.com/summary.asp? doc-
type=spro&clientid=amercentll&fundid=02507M675 (reporting such an objective). 
336 See, e.g., Tom Lauricella, Professors Shine a Light into ‘Closet Indexes,’ WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 18, 2006, at C1 (describing characteristics and returns of closet index funds). 
337 See, e.g., Lewis Braham, How to Spot A Closet Index Fund, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 6, 
2004, at 108 (describing the Putnam Voyager Fund, which purports to be actively ma-
naged and has a one percent annual expense ratio, as a closet index fund because of 
the similarity between its holdings and those of the Russell 1000 Growth Index); K.J. 
Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active is Your Fund Manager?  A New Measure 
That Predicts Performance 3 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 06 -14, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891719 (finding an increase in closet indexers 
during the 1990s). 
338 Indeed, because of the higher costs, closet index funds typically provide lower 
returns than their indexed counterparts.  See Braham, supra note 337, at 108 (explain-
ing that, after subtracting its management fees, Voyager’s performance lags behind 
that of the benchmark index); Cremers & Petajisto, supra note 337, at 3-4 (finding that 
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problem could be addressed by more detailed requirements concern-
ing the number of portfolio holdings or the degree to which the port-
folio differs from its relevant benchmark.339 
Incomplete disclosure of fund investment objectives and strategy 
is one possible explanation for investors’ reliance on fund names.340  
The SEC has explicitly acknowledged that “investors may focus on an 
investment company’s name to determine the company’s investments 
and risks,” and that “the name of an investment company may com-
municate a great deal to an investor.”341  In light of the potential for 
investors to be misled by a fund’s name, the SEC adopted a rule in 
2001 providing that if a fund’s name suggests that it focuses on a par-
ticular investment type, the fund must invest at least eighty percent of 
its assets in that type.342  This requirement, however, is only partially 
effective.  First, it still enables a fund to invest twenty percent of its as-
sets elsewhere, allowing the fund’s risk and return profile to deviate 
substantially from that suggested by its name.343  Second, it applies on-
ly to names that connote a generally accepted meaning.344  The impor-
 
closet indexers charge comparable fees to actively managed funds but tend to under-
perform both true actively managed funds and their benchmarks). 
339 There are a variety of measures that can be used to assess the degree to which a 
fund mirrors an index.  Cremers & Petajisto offer a new measure of active investing in 
their recent paper, which “decompos[es] any portfolio into a 100% position in its 
benchmark index plus a zero-net-investment long-short portfolio on top of that.”  Cre-
mers & Petajisto, supra note 337, at 1-2.  An alternative approach looks to the fund’s R², 
which is a measure of the degree to which a fund’s performance can be explained by the 
benchmark’s performance.  See Braham, supra note 337, at 109.  Morningstar provides R² 
statistics under modern portfolio statistics in its “ratings and risk” section.  See, e.g., Mor-
ningstar, Fidelity Magellan Report, http://quicktake.morningstar.com/FundNet/ 
RatingsAndRisk.aspx?symbol=FMAGX&country=USA (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (report-
ing an R² for the Magellan fund of ninety compared to the S&P 500).  
340 See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.   
341 Investment Company Names, Securities Act Release No. 7933, Exchange Act 
Release No. 43,845, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,828, Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. 1917, 74 SEC Docket 313, 314-15 ( Jan. 16, 2001).  
342 17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-1 (2009).  
343 See SEC, supra note 65 (warning investors that one-fifth of securities may not 
correspond to the fund name and may be risky as a result).  
344 See Mercer Bullard, Despite SEC Efforts, Accuracy in Fund Names Still Elusive, THE-
STREET.COM, Jan. 30, 2001, http://www.thestreet.com/story/1282823/despite-sec-
efforts-accuracy-in-fund-names-still-elusive.html (explaining how “value” may not be 
covered by SEC restriction); see also Donohue, supra note 46 (identifying examples of 
fund names that conveyed use of derivatives in the fund’s strategy, including “income,” 
“floating rate,” “high yield,” and “short term”). 
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tance of fund names is evidenced by the surprising frequency with 
which funds continue to change them.345 
Limited transparency also reduces shareholder oversight.  Because 
shareholders must approve significant changes in a fund’s investment 
objectives, a fund can avoid the need for a shareholder vote by keeping 
its disclosure vague or by disclosing that it retains the discretion to use 
a variety of strategies.346  Fidelity’s Magellan Fund offers an example: 
Fidelity Management & Research Company (FMR) normally invests the 
fund’s assets primarily in common stocks.  FMR may invest the fund’s as-
sets in securities of foreign issuers in addition to securities of domestic is-
suers.  FMR is not constrained by any particular investment style.  At any 
given time, FMR may tend to buy “growth” stocks or “value” stocks, or a 
combination of both types. . . . FMR may also use various techniques, 
such as buying and selling futures contracts and exchange traded funds, 
to increase or decrease the fund’s exposure to changing security prices 
or other factors that affect security values.
347
 
If a fund is not required to commit itself to a specific strategy or 
allocation of assets, then fund managers can shift their investment 
style and respond to trends without any advance notice.348  As a result, 
funds may drift significantly from the holdings, investment style, and 
risk level that the investors initially selected.349  Even in benign cases, 
these shifts are problematic if they are not transparent.  Asset alloca-
 
345 See, e.g., Diya Gullapalli & Shefali Anand, The Bull Market in Mutual-Fund Name 
Changes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2006, at C1, (reporting that 719 funds changed their names 
in 2005).  
346 See, e.g., NAKOMA MUTUAL FUNDS, NAKOMA ABSOLUTE RETURN FUND PROSPEC-
TUS 2 (2009), available at http://www1.nakomafunds.com/portal/LinkClick.aspx?link= 
NARFX+Prospectus_20090925_CURRENT.pdf&tabid=498&mid=1356 (“The Fund’s 
investment objective and strategies are not designated ‘fundamental policies’ within 
the meaning of the [ICA], and may be changed by the Fund’s Board of Trus-
tees . . . without shareholder approval.”). 
347 FIDELITY INVS., FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND PROSPECTUS (2009), available at 
http://content.members.fidelity.com/epro/PROS/316184100/?format=HTML&part=F
RAMESET&app=RETAIL&consent=Y.  Significantly, despite this broad disclosure, the 
extent to which the Magellan Fund currently uses an active investing strategy is unclear.  
See Braham, supra note 337, at 108 (describing Magellan as a “closet” index fund). 
348 The Magellan Fund is frequently cited for style drift.  See, e.g., Jerry Morgan, 
Style Sticklers:  Pension Consultants Policing Fund Managers to See That They Invest as Adver-
tised, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1996, at D9 (“Magellan started 1995 as a diversified growth 
fund, then invested more than 40% of its assets in technology stocks.  Then it sold the 
tech shares and jumped into government bonds in a big way.”). 
349 See, e.g., Karen Hube, The Drifters, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2008, at R7 (reporting 
that style drift among stock mutual funds has ranged from thirty-two to forty-six per-
cent, with increases during market shifts); see also Moon Kim et al., Mutual Fund Objec-
tive Misclassification, 52 J. ECON. & BUS. 309, 311 (2000) (finding that over fifty percent 
of mutual funds are misclassified and thirty-three percent are severely misclassified). 
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tion policy is a critical determinant of fund performance.350  Disclosure 
of asset allocation enables an investor to evaluate the fund’s perfor-
mance in context as well as to determine the stability of the fund and 
how it fits within the investor’s overall portfolio.351  For these reasons, 
services like Morningstar categorize funds and compare funds within 
designated categories, such as “large-cap stock fund,”352 but the utility 
of this information is undermined by style inconsistency and drift. 
In the most problematic cases, managers may take an approach 
that causes a fund’s risks to be very different from those perceived by 
investors.353  Research suggests that agency problems are a likely factor 
in explaining shifts in style, and that the resulting shifts are likely to 
damage fund performance.354  Although funds are required to disclose 
the composition of their portfolios, disclosure is only required on a 
quarterly basis,355 allowing the opportunity for a substantial amount of 
drift between reporting periods, even assuming that investors monitor 
composition when it is disclosed.356 
 
350 See, e.g., Gary P. Brinson et al., Determinants of Portfolio Performance, FIN. ANALYSTS J., 
July–Aug. 1986, at 39, 39 (documenting the overwhelming importance of asset-allocation 
policy); Gary P. Brinson et al., Determinants of Portfolio Performance II:  An Update, FIN. ANA-
LYSTS J., May–June 1991, at 40, 40 (reporting that asset allocation explains, on average, 
91.5% of the variation in quarterly fund returns); Roger G. Ibbotson & Paul D. Kaplan, 
Does Asset Allocation Policy Explain 40, 90, or 100 Percent of Performance?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., 
Jan.–Feb. 2000, at 26, 26 (finding that asset allocation “explained forty percent of the var-
iation of returns among funds [and] virtually 100 percent of the level of fund returns”). 
351 See Letter from Laura Paulenko Lutton, Senior Mutual Fund Analyst, Mor-
ningstar, Inc., to Nancy M. Moris, Sec’y, SEC (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-74.htm (advocating that the SEC require 
funds to disclose asset allocation over the preceding three years). 
352 See Wells Fargo, Morningstar Category Descriptions, https://www.wellsfargo.com/ 
investing/mutual_funds/morningstar_desc (listing Morningstar mutual fund categories 
and descriptions). 
353 See, e.g., Kathryn A. Holmes & Robert W. Faff, Style Drift, Fund Flow and Fund Per-
formance:  New Cross-Sectional Evidence, 16 FIN. SERVS. REV. 55, 56 (2007) (explaining that 
style drift may expose investors to different risk levels or types than what they were ex-
pecting). 
354 See Jennifer Huang et al., Risk Shifting and Mutual Fund Performance 25-26 (Univ. 
of Tex. at Austin McCombs Sch. of Bus. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
FIN-04-08, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108734 (suggesting “agency 
problems play a role in explaining risk shifting behavior”); see also Keith C. Brown et 
al., Staying the Course:  The Role of Investment Style Consistency in the Performance 
of Mutual Funds (Mar. 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364737 (finding that funds that maintain consistent styles 
outperform less style-consistent funds on a risk-adjusted basis). 
355 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.331, 249.332, 274.128, 274.130 (2009). 
356 See, e.g., Hube, supra note 349 (explaining that fund drift is difficult to monitor 
because “information on fund holdings is not available to investors on a real-time basis”). 
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A prominent recent example of lack of transparency involves tar-
get date funds.  Target date funds are a relatively new type of mutual 
fund, marketed primarily for retirement investing.  Specifically, target 
date funds offer investors professional allocation of their assets by 
shifting from an equity portfolio in the early years toward an increas-
ing percentage of fixed income securities both leading up to and fol-
lowing the target date, a shift that is termed the fund’s “glide path.”357  
As a result, the funds purport to meet the increasingly conservative in-
vestment needs of consumers as they age and approach retirement. 
Target date funds received an explicit regulatory blessing in 2006 
when Congress authorized them as the default investment option for 
401(k) investments, thereby exempting from liability employers that 
invested in target date funds on behalf of employees who did not de-
signate an alternative investment choice.358  This regulatory seal of ap-
proval, coupled with the apparent simplicity of target date funds, al-
lowed them to accumulate $168 billion in aggregate assets by February 
2008.359 
Yet things did not work out as planned.  Initially, during the bull 
market of the mid-2000s, some commentators criticized target date 
fund investment allocations as unduly conservative.360  These criti-
cisms, coupled with pressure to generate high returns, led some target 
date funds to invest substantial portions of their portfolios in riskier 
investments.  Some funds allocated as much as ninety-four percent of 
their portfolios to equities.361  This strategy backfired when the market 
crashed in 2008.  The market downtown revealed that many target 
date funds were far riskier than investors had expected.  According to 
the SEC, funds with target dates of 2010 had as much as seventy-nine 
percent of their investments in stock when the market crashed, caus-
ing some of these funds to lose more, on a percentage basis, than the 
 
357 See, e.g., Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Takes on Target-Date Funds, WALL ST. J., May 5, 
2009, at C3 (explaining the “glide path” concept). 
358 See Leslie Wayne, Mutual Funds with Targets, and Misfires, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
2009, at B1 (describing the “safe harbor” for employers who automatically sent em-
ployee 401(k) money to target date funds). 
359 Bob Frick, Target Funds Under Fire, KIPLINGER’S PERSONAL FINANCE, Feb. 2008, 
at 34, 34.  
360 See, e.g., Steven Goldberg, Target Funds Are Simply Flawed, KIPLINGER.COM, June 
7, 2005, http://www.kiplinger.com/columns/value/archive/2005/va0608.htm (criti-
cizing Vanguard and Fidelity target date funds as “too conservative”). 
361 See Frick, supra note 359, at 34 (“In an effort to improve performance and break 
from the pack, many target-date funds have boosted their holdings in riskier invest-
ments.”). 
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S&P 500.362  The public and media responded to these revelations by 
attacking target date funds as insufficiently conservative. 
It appears that target date funds suffered from several problems.363  
First, and most important, although the products that they offered va-
ried tremendously, differences in investment objectives and asset allo-
cation were not disclosed to investors.  Funds with the same target 
date could differ dramatically, making it difficult for investors to com-
pare them.364  Thus, an investor could not simply assume that all 2010 
target date funds were equivalent or would meet the needs of an in-
vestor planning to retire in 2010. 
In addition, many investors appeared to expect that the target 
date reflected a date by which the majority of fund assets would be in-
vested in conservative, fixed income securities.365  In contrast, fund 
managers were making allocation decisions that reflected a longer 
time horizon, with the objective of enabling fund assets to continue to 
appreciate over the course of what might be an extended period of 
retirement.  These glide paths differed from one fund to another. 
Perhaps most problematically, the funds were generally marketed 
to investors with very limited investment expertise and were portrayed 
as safe investments for retirement accounts.366  The appeal of the tar-
get fund was the investor’s ability to delegate allocation decisions to 
 
362 Wayne, supra note 358.  
363 Similar issues have been raised by 529 plan funds, which are supposed to pro-
vide a vehicle for college savings.  See, e.g., Shefali Anand & Craig Karmin, Oregon Sues 
Over Risks Taken in Its ‘529’ Fund, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2009, at C1 (describing litigation 
alleging that  the Oppenheimer Core Bond fund, which was billed as conservative, be-
came unduly risky); Jane J. Kim, Investors to Recover ‘529’ Losses, WALL ST. J., June 13-14, 
2009, at B2 (describing a tentative settlement of the litigation).  
364 See, e.g., Wayne, supra note 358, (quoting SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro as stat-
ing that 2010 target date funds had anywhere from twenty-one percent to seventy-nine 
percent of their holdings invested in stocks).  
365 See, e.g., Robert Powell, Target-Date Funds Under the Microscope, MARKETWATCH, 
June 4, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/target-date-funds-under-the-
microscope (“Folks on the cusp of retirement who purchased 2010 funds apparently 
assumed that such funds would have little or no assets invested in stocks, but they got a 
rude awakening . . . .”). 
366 See, e.g., Lisa Shidler, Target Date Funds Increase Equity Exposure, INVESTMENT 
NEWS, June 16, 2008, available at http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20080616/ 
REG/310303540 (describing target date funds as less transparent and difficult to un-
derstand, but quoting investment advisors as stating that such funds are suitable for 
persons who lack investment expertise). 
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expert fund managers, yet the broad differences among funds fru-
strated this objective.367 
Target date funds offer an example of disclosure failure, but they 
raise a further question:  to what extent is disclosure sufficient?  Many 
intermediated investments are complex financial products.  Even with 
extensive disclosure, evaluating their structure is difficult.  Mutual 
fund alternatives range from long-only index funds to products that 
use leverage and derivatives to mimic hedge fund strategies.  Exam-
ples of more complex mutual funds include the Nakoma Absolute Re-
turn Fund, which uses the long/short strategy of a traditional hedge 
fund to seek “positive absolute returns with low volatility independent 
of market conditions,”368 and the Direxion mutual funds, which offer 
double the return, or double the inverse of the return, for a variety of 
standard market indexes, such as the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ 
100.369  Several fund sponsors—of which Direxion and Proshares are 
the best known—are marketing an array of leveraged and leveraged-
inverse ETFs, some of which offer as much as three times the daily re-
turns of various indexes, sectors, and commodities. 
Although some Internet and media sources have touted these 
products to retail investors, understanding their performance is com-
plicated.  First, leverage makes funds far more volatile than the index-
es they track.  Significant market movements can rapidly wipe out a 
highly leveraged ETF investment.  In the highly volatile market during 
the spring of 2009, for example, shares of the Direxion Daily Financial 
Bear 3X fund fell eighty-five percent between January and June.370 
Second, and more important, most leveraged ETFs track market 
performance and are rebalanced on a daily basis.371  Daily compound-
 
367 See, e.g., John Prestbo, Behind the Target, MARKETWATCH, July 8, 2009, http:// 
www.marketwatch.com/story/target-date-funds-need-better-aim?pagenumber=2 
(“[T]he potpourri of offerings needs some standardization and benchmarking to be 
more transparent to investors.”). 
368 Nakoma Mutual Funds, http://www1.nakomafunds.com/portal/nf/Home/ 
tabid/456/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).   
369 Direxion Fund Information Overview, http://www.direxionfunds.com/ 
products.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).   
370 Daisy Maxey, FINRA Urges Caution on Leveraged Funds, WALL ST. J., June 23, 
2009, at C9.  
371 Direxion appears to have responded to the concerns addressed in this Sec-
tion by shifting the investment objective of its leveraged mutual funds to monthly, 
rather than daily, returns.  See, e.g., Direxion Monthly S&P 500 Bull 2x Fund, http:// 
www.direxionfunds.com/funds/sp500_bull.html?performance;funds=dxslx (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2010) (“As of 9/30/2009, the Bull Fund’s investment objective has changed 
from seeking daily investment results, before fees and expenses, of 250% of the price per-
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ing means that, over the long term, leveraged ETFs need not mimic the 
performance of the associated index and frequently do not.  As the 
holding period extends, the returns of the leveraged product will differ 
increasingly from those predicted by the movement of the index,372 and 
may even move in the opposite direction.373  Academic research demon-
strates that these effects are due to the structure of the leveraged prod-
ucts and that, over time, leveraged ETFs (in either direction) will un-
derperform the benchmark index.374  This underperformance will 
increase with the volatility of the underlying index.375 
Faced with litigation claiming inadequate disclosure,376 many 
funds now provide extensive and specific warnings about their risks 
and indicate that they are not appropriate for investors who do not 
understand those risks.377  Regulators, including the SEC and FINRA, 
 
formance of its benchmark to seeking monthly investment results, before fees and ex-
penses, of 200% of the price performance of its benchmark.”).  Direxion’s ETFs continue 
to reflect an investment objective based on daily returns.  Direxion, ETF Information, 
http://www.direxionshares.com/etfs (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).  
372 See, e.g., Tom Lauricella, ETF Math Lesson:  Leverage Can Produce Unexpected Returns, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, at R1 (explaining how daily compounding produces this result). 
373 See, e.g., The Riskiest ETFs on Earth—3X Sector ETF Short/Long, http:// 
www.darwinsfinance.com/riskiest-etfs-earth-3x-returns/ (May 22, 2009) (citing two ex-
amples in which the underlying index, the leveraged ETF, and the leveraged inverse ETF 
all lost money over a six-month and a seventeen-month holding period); see also CANA-
DIAN FOUND. FOR ADVANCEMENT OF INVESTOR RIGHTS, HEADS YOU LOSE, TAILS YOU 
LOSE:  THE STRANGE CASE OF LEVERAGED ETFS 2 (2009), available at http:// 
faircanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/etfs-may-14pm-etf-sw-final-final1.pdf (re-
porting findings that, over a twelve-month study period, four of nine pairs of leveraged 
commodity ETFs lost money in both their bull and bear positions). 
 The Canadian study offers the case of gold-mining stocks as a dramatic example: 
The Canadian gold sub-index gained 1% for the 12 months ending March 31, 
2009.  The HBP S&P/TSX Global Gold Bear Plus ETF did not lose 2%, as its 
2X inverse would indicate.  It actually lost 87%.  Its pair, the inverse Global 
Gold Bull Plus ETF, should have gained 2%.  Instead, it lost 46%. 
Id. at 1. 
374 Lei Lu et al., Long Term Performance of Leveraged ETFs 14-15 (August 1, 
2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344133.  
375 Id.  
376 See, e.g., Daisy Maxey, ProShare Draws Suit Over a Leveraged ETF, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
7, 2009, at C11 (describing litigation alleging that ProShare improperly failed to dis-
close the risks of its Ultrashort Real Estate ETF, “including the risk of a ‘spectacular 
tracking error’”). 
377 See, e.g., DIREXION, PROSPECTUS 4-7 (2009), available at http:// 
www.direxionfunds.com/pdfs/Prospectus_Except_1208.pdf.  Direxion warns that, 
among other things, the funds “are very different from most mutual funds,” “are not suit-
able for all investors,” “should be utilized only by sophisticated investors,” and that “a 
Fund could theoretically lose an amount greater than net assets in the event of a move-
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have stated that these products are not suitable for all investors.378  
Some firms have responded by restricting the sale of leveraged 
ETFs.379  It remains unclear, however, whether regulators should inter-
vene by requiring more precise labeling and disclosure of product 
risks, by banning funds that offer a high degree of volatility or risk, or 
at least by precluding unsophisticated retail investors from purchasing 
them.380  On the other hand, concern about liability and regulation, in 
the absence of explicit regulatory guidance, may lead firms to ban 
these products despite their utility to some investors.381 
IV.  REFORMING REGULATION 
If existing regulation is inadequate, how can it be fixed?  Pending 
congressional proposals include a number of reforms to the regula-
tion of mutual funds and other retail investments.  The Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 contains, within its 
 
ment of its target index in excess of 50% in a direction adverse to the Fund . . . . In short, 
the risk of total loss exists.”  Id. 
378 See, e.g., Ross Kerber, SEC Warns Investors on Leveraged ETF Holdings, REUTERS, 
Aug. 18, 2009, http://reuters.com/article/idustre57h64620090818 (describing a joint 
warning by the SEC and FINRA).  FINRA also imposed increased margin requirements 
on leveraged ETFs.  See Increased Margin Requirements for Leveraged Exchange-Traded and 
Associated Uncovered Options, REG. NOTICE 09-53 (FINRA, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2009, 
(effective date Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/ 
@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p119906.pdf. 
379 See Don Dion, Leveraged ETFs:  A Call for Coordination, THESTREET.COM, Aug. 10, 
2009, http://www.thestreet.com/story/10569383/1/leveraged-etfs-a-call-for-coordination. 
html (describing decisions by several firms to restrict the sale of leveraged ETFs). 
380 See id. (calling for CFTC, FINRA, and the SEC to join forces in requiring that 
traders be identified as sophisticated before being allowed to purchase leveraged 
ETFs); Scott Burns, Time for Derivative ETFs to Comply, MORNINGSTAR, June 12, 2009, 
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=295136 (arguing that ETFs 
that use derivatives should be regulated like derivatives, and investors should be re-
quired to get approval before purchasing them).  The SEC also imposes wealth/income 
and sophistication requirements on purchasers of hedge funds and private equity.  See 
generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2009) (defining “accredited investor”).  The SEC has 
also considered tightening these restrictions to prevent the “retailization” of the mar-
ket for such investments.  See, e.g., Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled 
Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Se-
curities Act Release No. 8766, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2576, 72 Fed. Reg. 
400, 400-03 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007) ( “[M]any individual investors today may be eligi-
ble to make investments in privately offered investment pools as accredited investors 
that previously may not have qualified as such for those investments.”). 
381 See, e.g., Ron DeLegge, Is the Backlash Against Leveraged ETFs Warranted?, ETF-
GUIDE.COM, July 31, 2009, http://www.etfguide.com/commentary/581/Is-the-
Backlash-against-Leveraged-Etfs-Warranted? (challenging brokerage firms’ bans of 
sales of leveraged ETFs, but criticizing regulators’ failure to regulate these instruments 
properly by insisting on appropriate names and disclosure). 
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thousand-plus pages, proposed legislation that would create an inves-
tor advisory committee, explicitly authorize the SEC to engage in con-
sumer testing, establish a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers, and au-
thorize the SEC to pass rules requiring point-of-sale disclosure.382  If 
adopted, these reforms will respond to a number of the concerns de-
tailed in this Article.  The problem, however, is that these proposals, 
like prior reform efforts, represent a reactive and piecemeal approach 
that is largely modeled on the existing regulatory structure.  More im-
portantly, the reforms do not correct the fundamental deficiencies in 
market structure.  To a large extent, both the existing and proposed 
regulations impede, rather than enhance, market forces by misdirect-
ing investment choice, constraining product variation, and creating 
inappropriate incentives for revenue sharing, product manipulation, 
and strategic complexity. 
This Article proposes an alternative—replacing the ICA with a 
conceptually distinct method of regulating retail investment products.  
First, this Article proposes a product-based approach to the regulation 
of mutual funds, ETFs, and similar consumer-directed investments.  
Second, it calls for the creation of a new regulator, the Consumer In-
vestment Regulatory Authority (CIRA), to administer this approach, 
with the authority to regulate both intermediated investment products 
and the processes by which they are sold. 
For products, the Article introduces a new, market-enhancing 
regulatory approach:  conform or explain.  Under this approach, CI-
RA would collect data and provide information on standardized in-
vestment products.  Rather than being limited to specific product 
structures, as with existing law, product sponsors would be free to in-
novate and offer alternatives to the standardized products, subject to 
the requirement that they explain the ways in which their products 
differ from the standards. 
With respect to the sales process, this Article rejects the generalized 
constraints of the “know your customer” and suitability requirements, as 
well as their administration under the opaque oversight of FINRA.  In-
stead, this Article argues for conduct-based regulation of retail sales 
practices.  In particular, the Article proposes that brokers be required to 
document their disclosures to investors about asset allocation, perfor-
mance, and costs, as well as the justification for advising unsophisticated 
retail clients to purchase higher-cost and nonconforming products. 
 
382 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th 
Cong. §§ 7101–04 (2009). 
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A.  Product Regulation—Conform or Explain 
As Part III has shown, the corporate governance components and 
the disclosure requirements of the existing regime are flawed.  Even 
well-intentioned independent directors lack the tools to provide a 
meaningful evaluation of the fairness of transactions involving con-
flicts of interest—from soft dollars to management fees—and the ap-
plication of fiduciary principles through litigation burdens directors 
who act properly and is unlikely to constrain directors who do not.  At 
best, fiduciary principles drive directors toward documenting their 
processes and deliberations more carefully but offer little counter-
weight to the market incentives operating upon the investment advi-
sor.  Shareholder voting provides limited value to shareholders who 
have the option of ready exit at NAV,383 and the procedural adjust-
ments that would be required to make shareholder voting meaningful 
cannot be justified in terms of their costs. 
At the same time, there is evidence of substantial failures in the 
market for mutual funds.  Existing disclosure requirements operate im-
perfectly, in part due to differences between the traditional capital 
markets and the market for mutual funds.  Market checks, such as pric-
ing, arbitrage, and the market for corporate control, do not operate on 
mutual funds.  To eliminate wasteful governance mechanisms, the regu-
latory structure must be strengthened to improve market discipline. 
The solution is a shift in focus.  Mutual funds and comparable al-
ternatives should be regulated as products, not investments.  In par-
ticular, the approach of the ICA, which compels investment compa-
nies to be organized as distinct legal entities subject to designated 
corporate governance and which characterizes funds as clients subject 
to the fiduciary protection of the Investment Advisers Act, should be 
eliminated.  Regulation should instead treat those investments as con-
sumer products and treat fund advisors as the producers of such 
products.384 
 
383 See, e.g., John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Exit, Voice, and Fee Liability in Mutual Funds, 
120 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1547162) (arguing that the ability of shareholders to exit for cash virtually eli-
minates shareholders’ incentives to impose accountability through director elections or 
fee litigation). 
384 Other commentators have, in general terms, endorsed this approach.  See, e.g., 
Harvey L. Pitt, Over-Lawyered at the SEC, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2006, at A15 (faulting “the 
60-year-old legislation the SEC administers” for “treat[ing] mutual funds as companies 
when the economic reality is that they are products”). 
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In theory, product regulation can take various forms.  Regulators 
can ban products that are unduly complex or risky.  The FDA bans a 
variety of products on this basis.385  Regulators can limit product sales 
to qualified purchasers, as the SEC does with hedge fund investments, 
or require that an intermediary operate as a gatekeeper who controls 
access to risky products, as the FDA does with prescription pharma-
ceuticals.  A regulator can also require a product to meet certain speci-
fications or to have particular characteristics that are designed to make 
it safe for consumers.  One variation of this approach is to mandate 
standardization, as reflected in proposals to require certain types of 
“plain vanilla” consumer credit products such as credit cards or resi-
dential mortgages.  Regulators can also require disclosure of product 
dangers, such as the FDA-mandated warnings on cigarette packages. 
This Article proposes a different approach to enhance market 
function:  standardization as a baseline to structure and simplify dis-
closure.  Rather than relying on regulators to identify appropriate 
products, the proposal relies on investor choice, facilitated by im-
proved transparency.  At the same time, the proposal advocates regu-
latory identification of standardized products to simplify investment 
decisions for unsophisticated consumers. 
In moving toward product regulation, regulators should reject the 
analogy to common stock.  Investors are not attempting to determine 
the going concern value of productive assets when they evaluate mu-
tual funds or ETFs.  Returns from a mutual fund will not, for the aver-
age mutual fund shareholder, be based on managerial talent—and 
even if they are, investors are unlikely to be able to select for this.  Ac-
cordingly, investors should be actively discouraged, through disclosure 
regulation, from focusing on historical performance data or mana-
gerial expertise. 
Instead, returns will be based on the structure of the product.  In-
vestors need, and should receive, disclosure of investment strategy, in-
cluding asset allocation, leverage, and diversification, as well as the 
costs associated with this strategy.  Investors should receive specific da-
 
385 See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Threatens to Ban Caffeinated Alcoholic Drinks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A11 (describing the FDA’s announcement that it would ban 
caffeinated alcoholic beverages unless manufacturers proved they were safe).  Regula-
tory error can result in the banning of useful products.  Moreover, a product may be 
useful to only a subset of users.  Cf. Anup Malani et al., Accounting for Differences Among 
Patients in the FDA Approval Process 26 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & 
Econ. Working Paper (2d Series), Working Paper No. 488, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492909 (observing that FDA policy leads it to deny “ap-
proval for drugs that benefit some patients, but not the average patient”).  
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ta on the extent to which these factors represent committed product 
characteristics or may be modified at management’s discretion.  Most 
importantly, investors need this information on a comparative basis. 
Conform or explain, the key component of this Article’s proposed 
approach, centers on this need for comparative information.  In se-
lecting among close to 10,000 competing products, investors with li-
mited time and sophistication need more than information in a stan-
dardized form—they need standardized reference points.  No retail 
investor can compare 10,000 products along multiple dimensions.  In-
stead, regulators should provide investors with guidance about stan-
dardized products and their features, and identify the most important 
dimensions across which products differ.386  Regulation should, in ef-
fect, provide the framework for rational investor choice. 
Conform or explain would require CIRA to collect data on exist-
ing retail investment products and, using this data, to construct a 
menu of standardized, or “plain vanilla,” products involving main-
stream investment options and simple product structures.  These 
standardized options might include an S&P 500 index fund, an active-
ly managed domestic small-cap fund, a long-term bond fund, and so 
forth.387  The regulator would specify certain features of these prod-
ucts to maximize simplicity, such as the absence of loads or 12b-1 fees, 
and an investment strategy that did not employ leverage or the use of 
derivatives.  The regulator would publish benchmark numbers or 
ranges for typical product features such as asset allocation, average 
expense ratio, turnover rates, and returns. 
Conform or explain would then provide a mechanism for struc-
turing market-based disclosure.  Unlike substantive regulation, con-
form or explain would not limit product features or require firms to 
offer plain vanilla products.  Instead, sponsors would have two alterna-
tives.  If they chose to conform their product to the specifications of the 
 
386 Standardized products limit information costs by reducing investors’ choices to a 
more limited menu of options.  See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Stan-
dardization in the Law of Property:  The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 38-42 
(2000) (arguing that standardization can reduce the information and transaction costs 
that excessive individual tailoring causes).  Because the optimal degree of standardization 
in the mutual fund market is unknown, and because of the risk of regulatory effort, this 
Article does not propose any limit on the sale of alternatives to the standardized products.   
387 The Morningstar mutual fund categories might provide an initial list of prod-
ucts, and CIRA could then identify qualifying characteristics.  See Wells Fargo, supra 
note 352 (describing mutual fund categories).  Some existing products would likely 
qualify under CIRA’s criteria.  See CHRISTINE BENZ, MORNINGSTAR GUIDE TO MUTUAL 
FUNDS:  FIVE-STAR STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS 103 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining that some 
fund families, such as Putnam and T. Rowe Price, offer “style-pure” funds). 
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plain vanilla product, they could simply disclose the relevant product 
category with no additional point-of-purchase disclosure required.  In-
vestors could rely on the product category without the need to deter-
mine whether the product had unanticipated characteristics or fea-
tures. 
The second alternative would be for sponsors to explain their 
products’ distinguishing features.  Sponsors would be unrestricted as 
to product form and structure as long as they explained the relevant 
differences.  Disclosure requirements for nonconforming products 
would require sponsors to provide the published information on the 
most closely analogous standardized product, as well as an explana-
tion of each feature in which the offered product varied from the 
standard.388  For example, an actively managed large-cap equity fund 
that held fewer securities than the standard product, employed strate-
gies that included the use of futures and options, and had a higher 
expense ratio would have to identify and explain each of these fea-
tures.  Finally, sponsors would be free to modify characteristics of in-
vestment products on an ongoing basis, but any material modification 
would require notice to shareholders—akin to the 8-K notifications of 
material events provided by operating companies.389  Thus, sharehold-
ers would receive an affirmative warning if a fund shifted its style or 
asset allocation, as the Magellan fund did.390 
Conform or explain would have several advantages over the cur-
rent disclosure system.  As indicated above, the disclosure would focus 
on information important to a rational shareholder decision and 
would structure that information in a way that facilitates consumer 
choice.  Commentators have repeatedly urged the SEC to mandate the 
disclosure of comparative information for investors, arguing that inves-
tors cannot evaluate information on fees, returns, and risks without 
understanding how the fund compares to similar funds.391  Important-
 
388 Regulations would provide a list of relevant features, which would include ex-
penses, asset allocation, leverage, derivatives, short selling, and discretion to alter the 
fund’s investment strategy. 
389 A reporting company must file an 8-K within two days after the occurrence of 
specified material events.  17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2009); SEC, Current Report (Form 
8-K), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf. 
390 Because shareholders can exit mutual funds at NAV, notice of modifications is 
sufficient protection; requiring shareholders to approve such changes is unnecessary. 
391 See, e.g., Letter from David Certner, Legislative Counsel and Dir. of Legislative 
Policy, AARP, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Feb. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-114.pdf (stating that the SEC should 
require comparative information because, “absent this kind of comparative informa-
tion, it is difficult to know whether fees and expenses, for example, are reasonable for 
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ly, conform or explain would structure comparative information in a 
way that would render it useful.  In contrast, under existing regulation, 
funds may provide comparative information to a wholly dissimilar 
product or benchmark, rendering the comparison highly misleading.392 
Comparative information facilitates investor choice because it is 
consistent with consumer decisionmaking strategies in other contexts.  
Although the literature on this subject is extensive, a few principles 
stand out.  First, consumer evaluations are largely comparative in na-
ture.393  Rather than assessing a product option in absolute terms, con-
sumers weigh the product against various alternatives along one or 
more preference dimensions.394  Second, in making complex choices, 
consumers often act with bounded rationality, limiting the dimensions 
along which they compare competing products.395  Third, consumers 
tend to be heavily influenced by the information presented to them, 
making their preferences both context-dependent and subject to ma-
nipulation.396 
These principles suggest that the retail investor is likely to com-
pare product alternatives along the dimensions that the funds present 
for comparison.  If mutual funds present performance data, the con-
sumer will attempt to choose the best performing fund.  If funds 
 
the fund in question”); Letter from Mercer Bullard, Founder and President of Fund 
Democracy, et al., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 8 (Feb. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-108.pdf [hereinafter Bullard Com-
ment Letter] (“Nothing would promote comparison shopping and competition in the 
fund industry more than a mandatory fee comparison in the fund fee table.”). 
392 See, e.g., Bullard Comment Letter, supra note 391 (observing that the SEC al-
lows Internet funds to use the S&P 500 as a benchmark for performance); Letter from 
Joseph A. Franco, Professor, Suffolk Univ. Law School, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 
2 (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-113.pdf 
(observing that the Janus website compared the Contrarian Fund to the S&P 500 In-
dex, despite the fact that forty-four percent of the Contrarian Fund’s holdings were 
foreign securities and forty-eight percent were small-cap stocks).   
393 See, e.g., Ravi Dhar et al., Trying Hard or Hardly Trying:  An Analysis of Context Ef-
fects in Choice, 9 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 189, 192-93 (2000) (suggesting that bias in con-
sumer choice results from consumers making too many comparisons). 
394 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Itamar Simonson, Context-Dependent Preferences, 39 
MGMT. SCI. 1179, 1182 (1993) (explaining how the presentation of alternative choices 
can alter consumer preferences). 
395 See, e.g., James R. Bettman et al., Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 187, 187 (1998) (describing bounded consumer rationality). 
396 See, e.g., Mukesh Bhargava et al., Explaining Context Effects on Choice Using a Model 
of Comparative Judgment, 9 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 167, 168-69 (2000) (explaining that 
consumers may lack stable preferences when they have limited information and con-
sequently construct preferences by comparing attributes of available alternatives); 
Dhar et al., supra note 393, at 190 (exploring why consumers focus on “the compara-
tive aspects of the choice alternatives”). 
FISCH FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/24/2010  12:01 PM 
2010] Rethinking Securities Intermediary Regulation 2033 
present data on expenses, the consumer will focus on expenses.  If 
funds emphasize risk, the consumer will evaluate that characteristic.397  
The studies suggest that the presentation of information is critical to 
consumer choice among investment alternatives.398 
This literature readily explains why investors rely so heavily on 
performance data—fund disclosures tell them to.  The funds’ man-
dated disclosure documents and marketing materials present perfor-
mance as the single most important fund characteristic.399  The trend 
toward greater sensitivity to mutual fund expenses is also unsurpris-
ing;400 recent regulatory changes have increased the detail and visibili-
ty of expenses in mandated fund disclosure.  The importance of pres-
entation highlights the significance of the SEC’s decisions to limit the 
requirement that funds disclose trading costs.  Even if investors can 
ascertain such costs by researching funds’ additional disclosure doc-
uments, consumer evidence suggests that fund purchasers will be un-
 
397 Commentators have suggested that the SEC affirmatively mandate standardized 
disclosure of mutual fund risks.  See, e.g., Press Release, BARRA Inc., BARRA Offers 
SEC Recommendations on Standard Mutual Fund Risk Disclosure (Sept. 11, 1995), 
available at LEXIS, BWIRE file (describing a proposal that the SEC adopt a fund’s 
standard deviation as the measure of fund risk).  Some private service providers, such 
as Morningstar, offer risk ratings.  See, e.g., Morningstar.com, Fidelity Magellan Report, 
http://quicktake.morningstar.com/FundNet/RatingsAndRisk.aspx?symbol=FMAGX& 
country=USA (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (providing standard deviation, sharpe ratio, 
beta, Morningstar risk rating, and other numbers for Magellan Fund).  Problematical-
ly, however, mutual fund risk can be measured in a number of ways.  See, e.g., Brenda 
Buttner, Which Mutual Fund Risk Measures Really Matter, THESTREET.COM, July 20, 1998, 
http://www.thestreet.com/story/31848/which-mutual-fund-risk-measures-really-
matter.html (detailing five ways of quantifying mutual fund risk).  In addition, it is un-
clear whether standard finance measures of risk capture the dominant concerns of re-
tail investors.  See, e.g., Paul Schott Stevens & Amy Lancellotta, Improving Mutual Fund 
Risk Disclosure, INVESTMENT COMPANY INST. PERSP., Nov. 1995, at 1, 2, available at 
http://www.idc.org/pdf/per01-02.pdf (opposing a proposal that the SEC mandate a 
single standardized numerical risk measurement because the proposal “ignores that 
risk is multifaceted, necessarily having different meanings for different investors”).  
Moreover, efforts to quantify risk can be misleading.  See L. Gordon Crovitz, Opinion, 
The 1% Panic, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2008, at A17 (discussing shortcomings of the VaR 
(value at risk) model).  Accordingly, this Article proposes increased comparative disclo-
sure, rather than an effort to quantify risk precisely.   
398 See, e.g., James R. Bettman et al., supra note 395, at 202 (“The organization of 
information displays can have a major impact on consumer choices.”). 
399 See, e.g., INV. CO. INST., UNDERSTANDING INVESTOR PREFERENCES FOR MUTUAL 
FUND INFORMATION 3 (2006), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_06_inv_ 
prefs_full.pdf (reporting survey results indicating that sixty-nine percent of investors 
reviewed historical performance prior to purchase).  
400 Id. at 3 (reporting that seventy-four percent of investors reviewed fund fees and 
expenses prior to purchase). 
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likely to undertake such research or to make the conversions neces-
sary to integrate those costs into the funds’ expense ratios.401 
Standardization would have the benefit of reducing the number 
of options by enabling investors to group product alternatives in a 
meaningful way based on the standard categories.402  It would also re-
duce the dimensions along which investors compare competing prod-
ucts to a manageable number and focus investors on those dimensions 
that are most important.403  Finally, for those investors without suffi-
cient interest or sophistication to evaluate fund-specific differences, 
standardization would allow them to choose a mainstream product 
and avoid being misled into selecting a product with above-average 
costs or risks. 
In contrast to alternative regulatory approaches, conform or ex-
plain permits market competition to operate as a check on regulatory 
error.  If a regulator incorrectly identifies certain features as nonstan-
dard, a review of fund disclosures will identify the error.  Unlike the 
current system, funds will have the opportunity to demonstrate to the 
market the value of alternative structures and features, such as incen-
tive-based compensation for fund advisors.  Finally, because regulators 
will proactively evaluate existing products and their disclosures, they 
should be in a position to detect features of new products that should 
be disclosed, such as the glide paths of target date funds and the daily 
compounding of leveraged ETFs. 
Perhaps most important, product regulation would reduce the 
need to apply fiduciary principles to fund operations.  Viewing fund 
shares as products weakens the conception of a fund as a discrete legal 
entity that is entitled to invoke fiduciary principles.  Instead, the advisor 
is offering an investment product for sale.  Like any product, the fund 
must be advertised accurately and be free from design defects.  But 
producers do not owe fiduciary obligations to their products.  Similarly, 
regulatory oversight over many affiliated transactions that current law 
heavily restricts would be reduced because the transactions would not 
 
401 See Bettman et al., supra note 395, at 202 (describing the “concreteness” prin-
ciple, according to which decisionmakers “will use only that information that is expli-
citly displayed and will use it in the form it is displayed, without transforming it”). 
402 See Dhar et al., supra note 393, at 199 (highlighting the importance of product 
categories in influencing consumer choice).  
403 Commentators have suggested a similar approach in the home mortgage con-
text.  See MICHAEL BARR ET AL., NEW AM. FOUND., BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED FINANCIAL 
SERVICES REGULATION 10 (2008) (arguing that offering a standardized default option 
would help anchor the consumer, as well as provide some expectations regarding the 
factors relevant to the choice of product). 
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involve conflicts of interest.  Although some practices might be suffi-
ciently problematic to require regulation,404 the primary check on con-
flicts that make a product less attractive would be market competition. 
This Article’s proposal has particular implications for excessive fee 
cases like Jones v. Harris Associates.405  Improved transparency with re-
spect to products and selling processes would enhance market discip-
line and eliminate the need for post hoc judicial review under a prob-
lematic fiduciary standard.406  Although there is no guarantee that 
average fees would decrease under this proposal—indeed, they might 
well increase in the presence of more informative disclosure—a func-
tional market would justify a court’s reliance, as Judge Easterbrook 
suggested in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Jones.407 
B.  Intermediary Regulation 
Conform or explain also offers a template for a conduct-based ap-
proach to the regulation of brokers, financial advisors, 401(k) plan 
sponsors, and other intermediaries.  Existing law takes two approach-
es, neither of which is satisfactory.  On the one hand, courts have gen-
erally held that brokers do not act as fiduciaries when they make in-
vestment recommendations to customers, leaving their conduct to the 
limited constraints of the SRO rules.408  On the other hand, directors, 
investment advisors, and 401(k) plan sponsors are all subject to fidu-
ciary duties.  Those duties are then subject to uncertain and inconsis-
tent judicial enforcement, which creates the prospect of liability expo-
sure without predictable standards of conduct. 
 
404 It is unclear whether some of the practices currently treated as conflicts could 
survive under a meaningful conception of product regulation.  If, for example, an ETF 
represents an ownership share of a pool of securities, it is difficult to see how interest 
earned on lending those securities could belong to anyone other than the owners of 
ETF shares.  An investment advisor’s retention of such interest would not be a “conflict 
of interest;” it would be stealing.  See, e.g., John Jannarone, Getting a Fair Share from ETFs, 
WALL. ST. J., Jan. 8, 2010, at C10 (stating that iShares kept fifty percent of the stock lend-
ing fees its Dow Jones US Financial ETF earned).  Many of these transactions, which 
fund boards of directors currently oversee, could be monitored by compliance officers. 
405 No. 08-586 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/ 
09pdf/08-586.pdf. 
406 See M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) 
(manuscript at 10-13), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499410 (arguing that the 
Gartenberg standard, at issue in Jones, creates the risk of costly and inefficient litigation). 
407 Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are skeptical 
about Gartenberg because it relies too little on markets.”). 
408 See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text (identifying difficulties with pri-
vate enforcement of SRO rules). 
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In lieu of either approach, this Article proposes that intermediary 
regulation focus on sales practices.  The starting point should be the 
mandated disclosure described above.409  Intermediaries would be re-
quired either to recommend or choose a standardized product for 
their clients or to make an informed determination that an alternative 
product is superior.  Intermediaries—including brokers and employ-
ers sponsoring 401(k) plans—would be required to evaluate their 
clients’ needs, understand the distinctive components of nonstandar-
dized products, and make an informed decision.  Compliance with 
these obligations would require explicit consideration of the distin-
guishing features of the nonstandard product but would not require 
the intermediary to demonstrate the superiority of its chosen product, 
either ex ante or ex post; it would be sufficient for the intermediary to 
determine that the product was a reasonable choice. 
Point-of-sale disclosure to investors would include the same expla-
natory information.  The intermediary would be required to disclose a 
product’s nonconforming attributes and to document the rationale 
for recommending the product.  In addition, the intermediary would 
be required to disclose the existence and amount of any revenue shar-
ing or other incentives associated with the product. 
To provide meaningful accountability, these requirements would be 
enforceable both by CIRA and through an explicit private right of ac-
tion.410  To minimize the cost of liability exposure, however, intermedia-
ries that demonstrate procedural compliance, an informed process, and 
the absence of undisclosed conflicts of interest would be protected by a 
statutory safe harbor permitting prediscovery dismissal of any litigation, 
including litigation alleging fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. 
C.  The Consumer Investment Regulatory Authority 
The final component of conform or explain is the creation of a 
new agency, the Consumer Investment Regulatory Authority (CIRA).  
Like the SEC and the Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) 
currently under congressional consideration,411 CIRA would be struc-
 
409 See supra Section IV.A. (explaining the disclosure element of conform or explain). 
410 Consideration of the details of this cause of action is beyond the scope of this 
Article.   
411 As currently proposed, the CFPA would not exercise jurisdiction over mutual 
funds or retirement accounts but would focus its attention on credit cards, mortgages, 
and similar products.  See Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 
3126, 111th Cong. § 101(8) (2009) (proposing the creation of a Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency). 
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tured as an administrative or independent agency412 and would be 
charged with the regulation of retail investment products, including 
mutual funds, money market funds, and ETFs,413 whether purchased 
directly or through employer-sponsored retirement accounts.  CIRA 
would also have the authority to regulate intermediaries, including 
brokers, financial advisors, and 401(k) plan sponsors with respect to 
retail transactions involving these products.  Pursuant to this charge, 
CIRA would be vested with rulemaking authority, enforcement power, 
and the resources to collect information about the market. 
The preceding two Sections partially described CIRA’s responsibili-
ties.  Understanding the retail investment market is critical to these re-
sponsibilities.  CIRA should not have to rely on studies conducted by 
outside researchers and organizations, but should engage in ongoing 
internal data collection and analysis.414  In carrying out these responsi-
bilities, CIRA should be structured and staffed to facilitate product re-
search and to analyze consumer decisionmaking.  Accordingly, CIRA 
personnel should not be limited to lawyers but should include econo-
mists who can analyze the data CIRA collects on existing market prod-
ucts and provide insight into the factors that influence performance 
and risk.  CIRA should also employ experts in consumer behavior who 
can study, on an ongoing basis, the effect of the disclosure mandates 
on consumer choice. 
Concededly, political barriers may render the creation of a new 
agency difficult.415  In principle, the SEC could implement and admi-
nister the regulatory structure detailed in this Article.  The SEC has 
long been understood as the champion of investor protection.416  CI-
 
412 Cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
98-99 (2008) (advocating reliance on an administrative agency rather than targeted 
legislation or ex post judicial intervention).   
413 Although CIRA would have jurisdiction over retail investment products, juris-
diction need not be limited to those products discussed in this Article.  Indeed, the 
regulatory model this Article proposes could readily be extended to broaden retail in-
vestor access to pooled investment products, such as hedge funds and private equity 
funds, that have traditionally been restricted to accredited investors.   
414 CIRA would be able to conduct studies and collect data without incurring the 
claims of industry bias that are sometimes raised against organizations like FINRA and 
the Investment Company Institute.  Notably, under the existing regulatory structure, 
industry organizations are virtually the only sources of information about the market 
and existing products. 
415 See, e.g., Damian Paletta, Consumer-Protection Agency in Doubt, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 
2010, at A4 (identifying political opposition to the creation of a stand-alone agency).  
416 See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the Commonwealth Club 
(May 17, 1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1996/ 
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RA’s mission, as described herein, is sufficiently extensive to warrant 
separate regulatory authority, however, and a new regulatory ap-
proach may be most effective when administered by an agency that is 
not invested in the old regulatory apparatus.  Moreover, there are ad-
ditional justifications for establishing a new regulator. 
First, CIRA’s creation would signal the importance of retail inves-
tor protection as a regulatory priority.  Commentators have criticized 
the existing regulatory agencies for focusing on other priorities and 
paying insufficient attention to consumer needs.  Although existing 
reform proposals seek to address consumer injuries with respect to 
mortgage and credit card products, nothing on the table is designed 
to restore consumer confidence in the capital markets or to deal with 
the forward-going need for consumers to act as effective investors.417 
Second, CIRA’s creation would recognize and legitimate the split 
between capital market regulation and retail investor protection.  The 
“deretailization” of the capital markets and the explosion of institution-
only products and markets highlight a dichotomy between two regula-
tory goals:  market protection and retail investor protection.418  The fi-
nancial crisis has demonstrated that market protection is a critically im-
portant regulatory objective, and the SEC’s existing regulatory regime is 
well suited to obtaining the information necessary to inform debt and 
equity prices; yet, as this Article has demonstrated, the methodologies 
for protecting the traditional capital markets may not address the spe-
cialized needs of retail purchasers of intermediated products.419 
Third, CIRA would centralize authority for retail investor protec-
tion.  Existing regulatory authority over mutual funds, ETFs, and re-
tirement accounts is split among the SEC, the CFTC, the Department 
of Labor’s Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA), and 
 
spch101.txt  (“For the last 62 years, the protection of investors has been the primary 
goal of the Commission.”). 
417 Proposals to privatize social security would dramatically increase this need.  See 
generally Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Privatizing Social Security:  Adminis-
tration and Implementation, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1325 (2001) (exploring the adminis-
trative implications of privatization proposal trade-offs between limiting risk and facili-
tating individual control). 
418 See Cartwright, supra note 7 (describing the growth of institution-only markets 
and asset classes that do not involve disclosure or regulatory oversight other than anti-
fraud remedies). 
419 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop?  The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 
785, 819 (2009) (“Many of the SEC’s most glaring deficiencies . . . have centered on 
intermediary oversight.”); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors and the Insti-
tutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1081 (2009) (“The SEC is the 
retail investor’s champion only in a bounded way.”). 
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FINRA.  A single regulator would clarify regulatory responsibility and 
prevent the Department of Labor from relying on the SEC to regulate 
401(k) disclosure or the SEC from relying on FINRA to monitor bro-
ker-dealer sales practices.420  Centralizing regulatory authority would 
limit efforts to structure products for the purpose of evading regula-
tion—so-called regulatory arbitrage.  By addressing both the product 
and the sales practice, a single regulator could identify relationships 
between the two, such as the extent to which broker advice benefits 
from or counteracts the effects of consumer-directed disclosure.  Final-
ly, concentrating authority within a single regulator would allow the 
development of expertise with respect to disclosure effectiveness, cog-
nitive biases, and other issues of particular relevance to the protection 
of retail investors. 
This last point suggests a valuable extension of CIRA beyond the 
administration of conform or explain.  Regulators and commentators 
have identified a need for improved investor education,421 a need that 
has expanded as a result of the growth in consumer-directed invest-
ment through retirement accounts, education accounts, and else-
where.  Yet retail investors today demonstrate investment behaviors 
that, even in the face of the best products, limit their ability to maxim-
ize their returns, including poor asset allocation, misguided efforts at 
market timing, performance chasing, and herding.  Early evidence 
suggests, in particular, that retail investors will suffer disproportionate-
ly from the market turmoil of the last few years because of the poor 
timing of their investment decisions.422  An agency that developed ex-
 
420 The SEC has been repeatedly criticized, most recently in connection with the 
Madoff scandal, for delegating regulation of broker-dealers to FINRA.  See, e.g., Fisch,  
supra note 419, at 800-03 (identifying shortcomings in FINRA’s regulation of broker-
dealers and protection of customers); Posting of Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas to 
Stockbroker Fraud Blog, http://www.stockbrokerfraudblog.com/2009/09/sec_nasd_ 
finra_sipc_new_sec_report_card_on_madoff_catastrophy_furhter_reveals_that_investor_ 
protection_is_severely_flawed.html (Sept. 3, 2009) (describing FINRA as “a non-profit 
corporation owned by securities firms, with a charter similar to that of a country club”). 
421 See, e.g., Black, supra note 255, at 307 (highlighting the need for retail investors 
to receive sufficient education to evaluate their brokers’ recommendations); James A. 
Fanto, Comparative Investor Education, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1083, 1084-86 (1998) (calling 
for increased attention to investor education in light of developments in how retire-
ment accounts are managed). 
422 As the market reached its trough in March 2009, retail investor money was ra-
pidly exiting equity funds.  See, e.g., Shell, supra note 14 (reporting that, during the 
week ending March 11, 2009, “investors yanked a net $22.1 billion out of stock funds”).  
Retail investors remained on the sidelines as the market rebounded during the re-
mainder of 2009.  See, e.g., Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Many Small Investors Have Sat Out 
Rally, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2009, at A18 (reporting that most small investors stayed out 
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pertise in retail investors and their investment behavior would be well 
positioned to tailor investor education to these problems. 
CONCLUSION 
Mutual funds and other intermediated retail investment products 
offer the potential for consumers to participate in capital market 
growth, protect their savings from the effects of inflation, and build a 
nest egg for education, retirement, and other financial goals.  This po-
tential has led an increasing number of investors—including many of 
limited means and sophistication—to purchase such products.  It is 
time for regulators to respond to these developments through a regu-
latory approach tailored to the needs of those retail investors. 
Although the SEC has endeavored to protect retail investors pur-
suant to the ICA, an examination of the market for retail investment 
products suggests deficiencies in that approach.  At the same time, the 
regulatory and governance components of the ICA are costly and limit 
innovation.  This Article has argued that an alternative approach 
premised on giving investors the choice of standardized financial 
products or comparative disclosure of product differences could re-
duce compliance costs and protect investors. 
Conform or explain couples increased transparency, through the 
promulgation of standardized products, with a set of objective and 
predictable sales practices that would enhance consumer protection 
while limiting excessive liability exposure.  Conform or explain 
enables providers of retail investment products to innovate and to dif-
ferentiate their products from those of competitors with the assurance 
that market forces can adequately evaluate such innovations.  Finally, 
conform or explain provides a template for CIRA, a new agency, to 
structure regulation and to develop expertise in the retail market that 
can facilitate future developments in investor education. 
It is difficult to predict the effect this proposal would have on exist-
ing products and fee structures.  Conform or explain may dramatically 
reduce the number of retail investment products as improved disclo-
sure unmasks limited product differences and strategic complexity.  Al-
ternatively, new products and product structures may emerge as fund 
 
of the market as it rose 53% between March and October 2009).  Subsequently, after 
the market recouped much of what it had lost, retail money began to flow back into 
the market.  See, e.g., Jeff Cox, Are Average Investors Getting Too Optimistic About Stocks?, 
CNBC.COM, Jan. 4, 2010, http://www.cnbc.com/id/34688573 (reporting that retail 
investment into equity funds “soared” in the week ending December 22, 2009). 
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sponsors are freed from existing regulatory constraints on leverage, 
compensation structure, liquidity, and concentration.  The critical 
component of the proposal is that it does not depend on regulatory 
omniscience to determine which products are suitable for investors but 
instead unleashes market forces to make these choices. 
 
